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ABSTRACT 
 
(VIMALANAND SHRIKANT PRABHU) 
Income pooling and demand aggregation in low-income households in Navi 
Mumbai, India: Evidence from willingness to pay, risky choices and 
anthropometrics. (Under the direction of Dale Whittington) 
Maternal employment brings with it additional income that may result in benefits 
to the household such as better nutrition and health for family members, and more 
autonomy for the mother. However, it could also mean less time that a mother has for 
housework, childcare and leisure.  The benefits and costs of maternal employment 
depend upon how the mother and other household members utilize their time, money and 
other resources. Thus, a study of the economic benefits of maternal employment should 
take issues of intrahousehold resource allocation into account. 
Traditional analyses based on the common preference model neglect the 
differences in household member preferences and do not account for issues of 
intrahousehold resource allocation. Emerging empirical evidence and theoretical 
advances recognize the differences in household member preferences and recommend 
that we study the bargaining that takes place among households members. While the 
literature largely has relied on revealed preference data, an integrated approach that 
combines revealed and stated preference information can help us understand the 
complexity of intrahousehold resource allocation to the fullest.  
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In this dissertation, I examine issues of intrahousehold resource allocation in the 
slums of Navi Mumbai, India, through a novel multidimensional approach. The 
dissertation consists of three modules, each of which examines issues of intrahousehold 
resource allocation in its own way. In the first module, I examine the differences in 
husband and wife preferences and evaluate the utility of a short private discussion 
between husbands and wives in aggregating preferences. In this study, husbands and 
wives were interviewed separately first and jointly thereafter in a stated preference 
framework to obtain their household willingness to pay for a malaria vaccine. This 
protocol is the first of its kind in a developing or an industrialized nation.  
The second component examines the differences in anthropometric measurements 
(z-score for height-for-age and stunting) of children of different genders. These 
differences may be the result of differences in the investment in children’s health over a 
period of time. The third component examines intrahousehold resource allocation through 
differences in income pooling behavior when individuals are faced with a risky choice. 
Both husbands and wives were offered a lottery choice with real monetary payoffs, 
designed so that the preferred choice by an income pooler was different from that of a 
non-income pooler. This is the first study of its type in a developing nation. This research 
also represents the first time that stated preference data, revealed preference data and 
choice experiment data were analyzed simultaneously. 
Husbands’ and wives’ stated demand for vaccines differed significantly at lower 
prices, where respondents had the freedom of budget space. The short private discussion 
enabled a majority of husbands and wives to reduce differences in their stated demand, 
with many couples choosing to purchase a vaccine either for all members of the 
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household or for no one. Respondents tended to be especially accommodative of their 
spouse’s wishes at lower prices. Wives who had some source of income were less likely 
to change their opinion in a joint interview indicating that they probably had higher 
autonomy in decision-making. However, analyses of z-score for height of children 
revealed that daughters of these women were shorter than those of women who did not 
work. Furthermore, the eldest daughter was likely to be shorter than her other female 
siblings, but the eldest son was not shorter than his male siblings. Overall, the analysis 
demonstrates how intrahousehold allocation asserts itself in multiple ways—maternal 
employment improved the autonomy of women but did not counterbalance the 
detrimental effects of the mother’s absence from her home on the well being of her 
daughters, particularly the eldest daughter, who was likely helping her mother with 
housework and childcare responsibilities from a young age. In the choice experiment 
(lottery data), I found that a specific rule of intrahousehold resource allocation did not 
apply universally to all households. 
Overall, the research rejects the common preference model of intrahousehold 
resource allocation in slums of India. The stated demand as estimated by a traditional 
survey that interviewed both husbands and wives randomly from a household is likely to 
underestimate demand at lower prices and hence the associated welfare benefits.  
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 CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Man and Woman are equal in status…I should treat daughters and sons 
 on a footing of perfect equality.  
…Mahatma Gandhi (excerpt from Women and Social Injustice) 
1. Motivation 
Indian women have come a long way from the days of ‘purdah’1. Women like 
Kalpana Chawla, the astronaut who sacrificed her life in the 2003 Columbia shuttle; 
Indra Nooyi, the CEO and President of PepsiCo; and Sania Mirza, the first Indian 
woman to win an ATP Tennis tournament, embody the rising spirits of independent 
Indian women. Despite these achievements, India remains a patriarchic society. The 
2003-04 Economic Survey of India reports that Indian women suffer from lower 
literacy rates, lesser labor participation and lower earnings when compared to their 
male counterparts.  
Despite these constraints, the participation of women in the workforce has 
increased steadily from about 32% in 1992-93 (IIPS, 1995) to 39% in 1998-99 (IIPS 
and ORC-Macro, 2000). More and more women have to do a balancing act between 
employment and household work. Additional income in the hands of the mother can 
improve the decision-making power of women within the household and can increase 
                                                 
1 Purdah is the custom of preventing men from seeing women. This custom was practiced widely in 
India in olden times. These are still some instances of women practicing the purdah.  
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the quality of nutrition and health of the family. At the same time, it can reduce the 
time available for other activities such as housework, childcare and leisure. 
Understanding intrahousehold resource allocation—how households manage their 
money, food and time resources—is crucial to assess whether households benefit 
from maternal employment.  
The most widely used model of intrahousehold resource allocation is the 
common preference model. This model examines the preferences of a single 
individual within the household and extrapolates it to other members of the 
household. This is possible because of extremely restrictive assumptions that either 
all household members have homothetic preferences or that the person whose 
preferences are examined is a dictator responsible for all decisions made by the 
household, much akin to the husband in a stereotypical patriarchic society. However, 
there seems to be an emerging consensus that the common preference model is passé 
and that intrahousehold behavior is more complex with some “bargaining” taking 
place among household members. Tests on intrahousehold resource allocation have 
emerged and since the '90s “resource pooling has emerged as the crucial empirical 
issue” (Pollak, 2003).  
Economic analyses that involve these complex models of bargaining require 
additional resources, including better quality secondary data. Rosenzweig and Schultz 
(1982) contend that to replace the common preference framework with a “less 
parsimonious model of intra-family resource allocation, the increase in complexity 
should be explicitly demonstrated to have empirically distinguishable predictions”. In 
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other words, is it really worth it to examine complex issues of intrahousehold 
resource allocation, especially in a patriarchic setup such as India?  
There are several reasons why intrahousehold resource allocation should be 
studied. While power asymmetries do exist in Indian households, there is emerging 
evidence that more and more women are playing an increasing role in household 
decision-making and that their preferences cannot be taken for granted. Despite this, 
most studies that measure household demand rely on aggregated data or interview 
only a single person within the household. Secondly, preferences of women who are 
more vulnerable are likely to be neglected in a common preference approach as their 
opinions count the least. Yet such women bear a disproportionately large burden of 
social costs in the case of diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Assessing the bargaining 
power of women within the household can help us identify changes in factors that 
could improve the status of such vulnerable women within the household. The 
primary motivation to for research is to conduct a parsimonious analysis that 
incorporates issues of intra-family resource allocation.  
Observing intrahousehold resource allocation could be difficult as every 
action taken by a household member (such as a stay-at-home mother joining the 
workforce) could have multiple impacts. Measuring all of these using a single 
technique may not be possible. Measurement of intrahousehold resource allocation is 
still restricted to the domain of revealed preference methods. Although these methods 
can help us measure certain aspects of intrahousehold resource allocation such as 
income pooling, they are not enough to measure differences in preferences of 
household members and the preference aggregation method adopted by these 
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members to arrive at decisions. Stated preference studies and choice experiments 
offer promise in this regard.  The secondary motivation for this research is to measure 
simultaneously different possible impacts of intrahousehold resource allocation 
through different techniques and to compare multiple models and measures of 
intrahousehold resource allocation.  
 
2. Brief description of the study 
The study was conducted on 422 married couples with at least one child 
between the ages of 1 and 18 and who live in slums in Navi Mumbai, India. In this 
study, I examine intrahousehold resource allocation in three different ways:  
The first component is a stated preference survey that measures the demand to 
reduce the risk of getting malaria by assessing their willingness to pay (WTP) for a 
(hypothetical) preventive vaccine. The main objectives of this component are to 
examine the differences between household member preferences, how members 
aggregate their preferences, and the role of income pooling within the household. 
Essentially, it examines if women have bargaining power within the household and 
the factors that affect their bargaining power. To achieve these objectives, the 
husband and wife were invited to a central office and interviewed, separately first and 
jointly thereafter, about their household WTP for a malaria vaccine. The second 
component is a revealed preference analysis that measures health outcomes (z-score 
for height and stunting) that are the result of allocation of intrahousehold resources 
over a period of time. The main objective of this component is to examine if there are 
  5
different health outcomes among children of different gender and whether there are 
other factors that accentuate these differences including the birth order of the child.  
A third component is a choice experiment to examine differences in pooling 
behavior within and among households. In this component, husband and wives were 
separately asked to play a series of risky choice experiments with real payoffs for 
both. The payoffs were decided by a toss of a coin and were designed so that income 
poolers and non-poolers would choose differently. The main objective of this 
experiment was to determine if husbands and wives displayed similar income pooling 
tendencies or whether the tendency to pool income varied by husband and wife. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the policy implications of my research 
and the rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on the various models of intrahousehold resource allocation and the 
different techniques that researchers have employed to examine intrahousehold 
resource allocation. It examines the costs and benefits of maternal employment, and 
the increased role that intrahousehold resource allocation plays in understanding these 
costs and benefits. It examines models of intrahousehold allocation and firmly 
establishes the role played by revealed techniques in analyzing intrahousehold 
resource allocation. It explores the yet unfulfilled promise held by stated preference 
techniques such as contingent valuation and choice experiments in assessing the 
differences in preferences of household members and the challenges in preference 
aggregation. It comments on the role played by social issues in intrahousehold 
bargaining and gender inequities. Toward the end, this chapter discusses the existing 
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gaps in the literature and describes the contributions that this research makes to the 
literature. 
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework for the study. The heart of the 
conceptual framework is a universal demand model for health. This model is 
exploited in two ways— (1) to estimate the WTP for vaccines using a stated 
preference approach, and (2) to examine intrahousehold differences in health 
outcomes using anthropometric measurements. These two components form the basis 
for the stated and revealed preference modules of the study. In addition, the 
conceptual framework includes a series of conditions under which income poolers 
could respond differently to a risky choice (lottery) experiment from a non-income 
pooler. These conditions form the basis for the experiments involving risky choices. 
While, most studies of intrahousehold resource allocation attempt to study a single 
dimension of household resources, the conceptual framework presented herein allows 
us to examine various measures of intrahousehold resource allocation.  
Chapter 4 describes the research design for the study. The research design 
consists of design and hypothesis testing for three different modules, each developed 
on the basis of the three different approaches discussed in the conceptual framework. 
These include:  
1. Design of the stated preference module for separate and joint 
interviews of husbands and wives. 
2. A section to collect anthropometric data on height (and weight) for 
all individuals within the household.  
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3. Design of choice experiment lottery with real payoffs offered to 
both husbands and wives separately. The payoffs were increased 
gradually in three installments.  
  Chapter 4 also provides me with an opportunity to describe my fieldwork, 
including the selection of study sites, sampling frame and fieldwork protocol. A 
research design involving vaccines, if not handled carefully, can lead to various 
ethical infractions. The protocols adopted to mitigate ethical risks to the satisfaction 
of the Internal Review Board (IRB) are also described in this chapter.  
Chapters 5 to 8 present the empirical findings of the study. Chapter 5 focuses 
on findings of the raw data, where I present the demographics of the respondents, 
their living conditions, knowledge of malaria and knowledge of vaccines, among 
other things. This chapter demonstrates the tough conditions of people living in the 
slums. The poorest families often live in single rooms, built with building materials as 
temporary as plastic polythene, without electricity, private water supply or sanitation. 
Few adults were well educated or had high quality permanent jobs. Women had lower 
labor participation and on average, significantly lower wage rates then their male 
counterparts. Forty five percent of the sons and 39% of the daughters were stunted. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the stated preference component of this 
survey. Although, I found evidence for significant differences between husband and 
wife behavior when interviewed separately, the short private discussion did reduce 
the differences between husband and wife stated demand. Many respondents adopted 
an “all or nothing” approach and were willing to pay for a vaccine for either the entire 
household or for no one. Women were more likely than men to change their opinion 
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during the joint interview, with those women having no source of income the most 
likely to change their opinion. Overall, I did find some evidence in favor of 
bargaining. Other than examining issues of intrahousehold resource allocation, I also 
explored the use of the random effects probit model and the switching regression 
techniques to study household demand. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the revealed preference module of the 
research. I found that daughters of women who do not have any source of income or 
those who have only primary education or less are likely to be taller (compared to a 
well nourished population) than other children. Moreover, the eldest daughter of 
women who had some source of income was more likely to be shorter than others 
daughters. However, the eldest son was not likely to be shorter than other sons. 
Chapter 8 focuses on the econometric results of the lottery choice experiment 
with real payoffs. I found differences in pooling behavior among households and also 
between husbands and wives. 
 Chapter 9 summarizes the conclusions of the entire study. Overall, I found 
that a specific rule of intrahousehold resource allocation does not apply universally to 
all households. Among other factors, education, household and individual income of 
both husbands and wives and age are more likely to influence income pooling and 
household bargaining. Overall, I was able to reject the common preference model of 
intrahousehold resource allocation. 
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3. Contributions 
In the space of this dissertation, I make the following contributions to the 
literature: 
The stated preference survey with separate and joint interviews of multiple 
household members and the (lottery) choice experiment survey do present themselves 
as novel approaches for examining bargaining in the developing world. Unlike 
analyses based on revealed preferences techniques, these approaches do not require 
quality secondary data. This study also represents the first attempt to assess 
household bargaining using different tools simultaneously. 
The stated preference component is the first experiment of its type in either an 
industrialized or a developing nation in which husbands and wives were interviewed 
separately first and jointly thereafter within a contingent valuation framework for 
their household WTP for a vaccine. Chapter 6 assesses how a short private discussion 
can help reduce the differences in husband and wife stated demand. With measures of 
the husband’s and wife’s separate and joint household demand, I was able to conduct 
a variety of tests, compare aggregated demand to heuristic estimates, and estimate 
sharing weights for husband and wife welfare functions. I also examined the socio-
economic characteristics of women most likely to change their opinion in the joint 
discussion. 
The second module on analyses of anthropometric data reveals how additional 
effort in collecting simple anthropometric data can reveal rich information about 
intrahousehold resource allocation. This is the first instance when additional 
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information on anthropometrics has been collected and analyzed along with a stated 
experiment.  
The (lottery) choice experiment is also the first experiment of its type in 
developing countries. While such a choice experiment has been conducted in an 
industrialized nation before, my study design was inherently simpler and modified for 
use in developing countries, where literacy rates are much lower. This study assesses 
differences in income pooling behavior between husbands and wives.  
On the technical front, I experimented with different ways to compute 
household demand. I introduced the random effects probit framework, which shows 
potential but did not work as expected, mainly because a majority of respondents 
adopted an “all or nothing” approach. But it has potential for other applications. I also 
presented the concept of switching regression in the computation of WTP, which 
shows that respondent behavior is different at higher and lower prices, a finding 
consistent throughout the analyses. 
 
4. Policy implications 
This research demonstrates the role played by intrahousehold resource 
allocation in the accurate estimation of economic benefits of economic interventions. 
It provides insights into the household decision-making process, something that can 
help us with additional information to formulate policy.  
Accurate estimation of economic surplus: A major component of this 
research focuses on the household demand for the malaria vaccine for people living in 
slums in Navi Mumbai. The foremost benefit of this particular study is that it 
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provides us with refined estimates of consumers’ surplus and WTP for a malaria 
vaccine. The term, “WTP,” encompasses both, a person’s ability and her desire to 
pay. The constraint on “ability” may be economic or political, as in having sufficient 
or insufficient power within the household to fulfill the desire. Power asymmetries in 
households may restrict the ability of certain individuals to participate in decision-
making, thus hindering their ability to mitigate risk and increasing their vulnerability 
to the disease. Bergstorm (2003) raises the question that “If parents are willing to pay 
different amounts to save their child from a single day of cold symptoms when asked 
in a stated preference setup, should the value of child’s health be the sum of two 
parents’ WTP, the maximum or the minimum of their two answers?” An assessment 
of how members aggregate their preference is necessary to answer this question. 
This study provides an opportunity to observe husband and wife preferences 
separately and jointly. The resulting estimates are likely to be more accurate, resulting 
in a more informed decision-making by policy makers. In Chapter 6, I have 
demonstrated the differences between the WTP estimated by studies that would and 
would not take into account the impact of preference aggregation. These differences 
can affect the accuracy of economic analyses of a vaccine intervention program.  
Demand forecasting: The study provides us with a demand estimate for a 
malaria vaccine for a slum in Navi Mumbai. This estimate can be used in demand 
forecasting exercises, which can help the government, pharmaceutical companies, 
public health planners and donor organizations assess the size of the market for a 
vaccine, and help us design strategies to introduce the vaccine once such vaccine is 
invented (Whittington et al., 2004).  
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Patterns of household demand: The study underlies the importance of 
identifying patterns of intrahousehold allocation in household demand, in addition to 
estimating WTP. One such pattern that respondents could adopt is an “all or nothing” 
approach. Households with same aggregate household WTP but different patterns of 
intrahousehold resource allocations may react differently to the market prices 
resulting in different market demand for the good.  
Consider two households, A and B, with four household members and a 
similar aggregate household WTP of $8, and cost of vaccine sold to be $1. Let us 
suppose that household A adopts an “all-or-nothing” approach whereas household B 
is willing to pay for only one household member. The demand curves for the two 
households are shown in the figure 1.1 and the estimates of economic benefits for two 
different prices ($1.5 and $6.5) are shown in table 1.1 with the dark curve indicating 
the demand curve for household A and gray curve indicating the demand curve for 
household B. 
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Figure 1.1: Economic benefits for two different households 
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Table 1.1: Intrahousehold resource allocation and economic surplus 
Surplus Scenario 1 (price of vaccine 
= $1.50) 
Scenario 2 (price of vaccine 
= $6) 
Cost of vaccine C1 + C2 C1+C2 
   
Household A   
# Vaccines purchased 4 0 
Producers’ surplus X1 + X2  = 0.50*4 = 2 0 
Consumers’ surplus Y1 + Y2 =0.50*4=2 0 
Total surplus 4 0 
   
Household B   
# Vaccines purchased 1 1 
Producers’ surplus X1 = 0.50 X1+Y1+Z1=0.50+0.50+4=5.0 
Consumers’ surplus Y1+Z1+Z2=0.5+4+2=6.5  Z2=2 
Total surplus 7.0 7.0 
 
  14
Table 1.1 shows that as the price is increased from $1.5 to $6, household B 
will still pay for one vaccine and the total surplus (producers’ and consumer’s 
surplus) for household B is maintained at $7. However household B adopts an all-or-
nothing approach, and in doing so, it will not pay for even a single vaccine at a higher 
price even though it will pay for four vaccines at the lower price.  Although both 
households have identical aggregate household WTP, the all-or-nothing approach 
imposes additional constraints on the prices that vaccine manufacturers could charge 
in the market. If a majority of respondents adopt an all-or-nothing approach, it is 
necessary to qualify the household WTP estimates to arrive at an appropriate demand 
forecast. 
Multiple dimensions of intrahousehold resource allocation: This research 
demonstrates that intrahousehold resource allocation does have multiple impacts. In 
the stated preference module and choice experiment, I found that women who do not 
have any source of income are likely to have less bargaining power. However, in the 
revealed preference module, I found that the same group of women has significantly 
taller daughters. Further, the eldest daughter of women who work is likely to be 
shorter than other daughters, but the eldest son is not likely to be shorter than other 
sons. It is likely that women in slums who work have their own set of problems and 
may be compromising on nurture of their children. Our data show that women’s value 
of time as valued by their hourly wage rate is significantly lower than that for men. 
Are women working in the informal sector appropriately compensated for their time? 
Are daughters of working women more likely to contribute to household work than 
those of women who stay at home? These questions are difficult to answer with my 
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research. However, the research demonstrates that each action that a household 
member takes, such as a mother joining the workforce, could have both welfare costs 
and benefits and that it is essential to analyze different sources of data to study the 
overall impact of such action
  
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
1. Costs and benefits of maternal employment 
 
In the modern world, mothers’ responsibilities often include earning income 
in addition to the traditional responsibilities of doing household work and providing 
childcare.  Maternal employment has its benefits and costs for the household. On one 
hand, maternal employment brings along with it an increase in household income 
with possible improvements in quality of dietary intake of household members and 
health status. On the other hand, maternal employment results in reduced time for 
cooking, household work and providing childcare.  
Much of the literature examines the impact of maternal employment on the 
time that a mother has available for her traditional duties. In his study in Laguna, 
Philippines, Popkin (1980) found that maternal employment did result in reduced 
time that mother provided for her children. He found that this slack was picked up by 
elder siblings but not by fathers. In India, the caretaker sibling can be a daughter as 
young as five to six years old who can barely take care of herself (Chatterjee, 1992 cf 
Daniels, 2000).  
It is not necessary that an employed mother always spend less time on 
childcare than an unemployed mother, especially in a rural setting. Desai and Jain 
(1994) found only a small decline in the time that mothers in rural Karnataka, India, 
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spent with their children, and a moderate increase in alternate childcare time. This is 
because mothers in rural areas, although not employed were often busy conducting 
“expenditure saving activities” such as cooking and cleaning, fetching water, hauling 
large loads of firewood, carrying meals to family members, etc. Thus, these women 
were not the sole caretakers of their children as children still spent substantial time of 
about 3 to 4 hours daily under supervision of other adults or children when mothers 
were busy. Desai and Jain (1994), however, did find that maternal employment did 
cause a considerable reduction in leisure time and sleep of mothers actively 
employed.  
The quality of life of women working in the informal sector is further 
compromised because of the quality of their jobs. In her study in slums of Delhi, 
Fernandes (1990) cf Daniels (2000) found that low status jobs that women take may 
“perpetuate their bondage”.  
 Tucker and Sanjur (1988) developed a model of the tradeoff between income 
from maternal work and time available for household work and childcare, and how it 
may affect nutritional status. The framework is presented in figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Tradeoffs of maternal employment 
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 As can be seen in the framework, a variety of factors such as household 
composition/ structure, availability of substitute caregivers, distance to work, nature 
of work, household income/income of other members, food production, housing, 
sanitation, child’s age, child’s gender, etc., can have a potential confounding effect of 
maternal work on nutritional status. 
For example, maternal work is often associated with a shift from traditional 
preparations to less time intensive preparations, which are expensive. In such cases, 
the nutritional quality of diet could suffer unless food expenditures increase 
significantly (Senauer 1990). Household infrastructure such as piped water and 
modern cooking equipment can reduce the time needed for household activities 
(Popkin, 1980).  
 The magnitude and direction of impact of maternal employment on dietary 
intake and anthropometric measurements of children are inconsistent. In Laguna, 
Philippines, Popkin (1980) found no significant effect of maternal work on kilocalorie 
  19
or protein intake when controlled for mother’s education, presence of electricity, etc. 
However, he found a significantly negative relationship between maternal 
employment and weight for age for preschool children.  Popkin and Solon (1976) 
found a significantly positive impact of maternal employment on nutrition at lower 
income levels and significantly negative impact at middle income levels. Evidence of 
a positive and significant impact of maternal employment on weight-for-age of 
children was found by Tripp (mothers employed in trading in Ghana), and Kumar 
(working mothers in Kerala, India). In a review of relationship between income 
through maternal employment and nutritional status of children, Leslie and Paolisso 
(1989) found evidence of both positive and negative relationships in the literature. 
 
A. Maternal education and child health 
Although maternal employment is associated with costs and benefits, 
empirical evidence suggests that the impact of a mother’s education is always 
positive. Education may work in several ways. Maternal education enhances 
knowledge about effective ways to prevent, recognize and treat childhood illnesses 
(Cleland and van Ginneken, 1988). Maternal education is positively correlated with 
knowledge of immunization (Streatfield et al, 1990). Education leads to better 
hygiene and sanitation practices, nutrition and greater willingness to seek medical 
care (Bennett, 1992). It also has been found to reduce under age five child mortality, 
infant deaths, maternal mortality and fertility (Summers, 1992). Educated mothers are 
generally thought to invest more in their children.  
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Quihui et al (2006) examined the impact of maternal education and 
employment levels on intestinal parasite infection in rural school children in 12 rural 
communities in two Mexican states. They found that children from lower-income 
families who had unemployed and less educated mothers, defecated in the open, and 
showed a higher risk of intestinal parasitism. Such a pattern is observed in most 
studies. Behrman and Wolfe (1987), however, assert that specific health knowledge 
may be more important than general formal education, although fewer illiterate 
women than educated women may have this “knowledge.” 
 
B. The role of intrahousehold resource allocation 
Many studies that examine only the time-income tradeoff do not consider who 
controls the income, nor account for differences between working and non-working 
women such as marital status, education and poverty and the significance of 
alternative childcare arrangements (Lamontage et al, 1998). Recent studies such as 
those by Tucker and Sanjur (1988), Lamontage et al (1988) also focus on the efficient 
use of time and monetary resources. This is where intrahousehold resource allocation 
within the household comes to the fore. 
Households assume importance as they can “shape gender roles” and form the 
basis for allocation of resources. The differences in boy’s and girl’s roles are more 
pronounced into adulthood and affect the allocation of resources within the household 
throughout their life (The World Bank, 2001). There may be various underlying 
social, economic and cultural reasons why resources are allocated in a particular 
manner within the household. The anxiety of Indian parents to know the gender of 
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their unborn child is a result of various implications that gender could have for the 
family. A son continues their family name and provides final religious rites 
(Mutharayappa et al., 1997). A daughter imposes a “burden” on her parents, as they 
have to finance her marriage and provide her with a dowry2. A son, on the other hand, 
earns the dowry during his marriage. Economics also matters. Rosenzweig and 
Schultz (1982) contend that differences in allocation among children of different 
gender are a response to the labor market, which itself discriminates against females. 
Sons are also more likely to provide farm labor, and support parents during old age 
(Bardhan 1998, Basu 1989, Dharmalingam 1996, Mamdani 1972, Miller 1981, cf 
Mutharayappa et al., 1997).  Families try to control their sex composition by either 
differential stopping behavior (avoiding pregnancy after a son is born) or by female 
genocide in the form of feticide after detecting the sex of the child through 
ultrasound. The result of this discrimination is a skewed sex ratio of 927 females (894 
for urban and 939 for rural India) per 1000 men, smaller families having significantly 
higher proportion of sons (Clark, 2000), higher female under  age five mortality and 
lower nutrition for young girls as compared to boys (Chen et al., 1981).  
 In a typical male-dominated household, women have little bargaining power, 
and would play a small role in decision-making. Sons would be favored over 
daughters. Intrahousehold resource allocation helps us assess the power dynamics 
                                                 
2 India has a tradition of “arranged marriage” where parents scout for potential matches of the same 
caste, and in some sects, particularly in North and South India, the groom’s family is given (or 
promised) a “dowry” in marriage. Women who do not bring the promised dowry are oppressed by her 
in-laws.  Burning of women for additional dowry results in about 600-750 dowry related deaths each 
year (Kumar and Kanth, 2004). Instances of suicide among poor illiterate newly wed women who want 
to escape torture to ensure that poor parents do not have to meet demands of greedy in-laws are also 
common (Kumar and Kanth, 2004). Although the number of annual deaths is very small as compared 
to the total population, the threat of death or torture does reduce the autonomy of women, and 
highlights the cultural issues that compromise the bargaining power of women in a household. 
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within a household, the autonomy that women have in their decision-making, whether 
they bargain with their husbands or whether husbands unilaterally make all household 
decisions, and how resources (time, money, nutrition and other) are allocated among 
household members, and what are the results of these allocations. 
In the subsequent sections, I examine the different theories of intrahousehold 
resource allocation and try to answer some of the following questions regarding 
intrahousehold resource allocation: How do we observe mechanisms of 
intrahousehold resource allocation and whether household resources are utilized 
efficiently? How do we measure the differential impact that, for example, maternal 
employment could have on nutrition and health status of sons and daughters? How is 
bargaining power within the household measured? How do husbands and wives make 
decisions within the household, and how do we observe the decision-making process?  
 
2. Intrahousehold resource allocation 
A detailed discussion of the different models of various models of 
intrahousehold resource allocation is given in Appendix I. The most simplistic and 
restrictive model of intrahousehold resource allocation is the common preference 
model. Researchers that measure only aggregate consumption or aggregate income in 
the household, or those who interview only a single respondent for household 
demand, implicitly use this model.  
This model assumes that either all household members have homothetic 
preferences or one of the household members (generally the head of the household) is 
a dictator responsible for all decision-making within the household. The common 
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preference models enables us to conduct economic analyses without taking into 
account the intricacies of intrahousehold resource allocation.  
Modern theoretical advances and empirical findings in the field of household 
economics have questioned the findings of the common preferences model. The 
“Rotten Kid Theory” put forth by Gary Becker (1974, 1981) redefined the way 
economists examined household decision-making. He conceptualized an altruistic 
parent (or husband) who manipulated transfers for his rational but egotistic “rotten” 
kids (or wife), such that each member in the household behaved to maximize 
household income. Thus, household choice was essentially a collective choice. 
Although widely criticized by economists and feminists (Lindbeck and Weibull , 
1988, Bergstorm, 1989, Bruce and Waldman, 1990), this model provided a real 
alternative to the common preference theory and a starting point to the study of 
household economics. McElroy and Horney (1981), and Manser and Brown (1980) 
defined the concept of bargaining in which husbands and wives were assumed to be 
independent utility maximizers indulged in a game of Nash Bargaining. These models 
assumed that individuals will stay in a marriage only if they have certain benefits to 
enjoy that outweigh the costs. Whether an individual stays in a relationship depends 
upon her/his reserve utility, defined as a “threat point,” that she/he would get if she/he 
were single. If an individual does not derive benefits with respect to this reserve 
utility that she/he gets from the marriage, the marriage may dissolve and result in a 
divorce. Further modifications of the Nash Bargaining model investigate a more 
appropriate threat point than divorce (Bergstorm, 1996) as each argument in a 
marriage does not result in a divorce. Defining an appropriate threat point is often 
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problematic, and may require data that is difficult to get. Chippori (1988a), (1991) put 
forth a collective bargaining model that depends only on a pareto efficient outcome 
rather than Nash equilibrium to generate testable restrictions on labor supply 
functions and recover individual preferences and outcomes, thus reducing the need to 
define threat points and thus reduces data requirements.  Non cooperating bargaining 
models (Chen and Wooley, 2001) focus on non-cooperative bargaining framework 
such as Cournot-Nash bargaining, where each person maximizes his or her welfare, 
given the expected actions of others and his or her own resource constraints.  
While the common preference model is the most restrictive, the non-
cooperative bargaining model is the least restrictive model. The key in differentiating 
between models lies in looking at what people do with their income—whether they 
pool it into a single “pot” or keep it for themselves. Since the 1990’s “resource 
pooling has emerged as the crucial empirical issue” (Pollak, 2003). If individual labor 
income rather than total household income affects expenditure patterns, the common 
preference model can be rejected.  
The collective model of bargaining is a generic model with Becker’s unified 
model and the co-operative bargaining model as restricted cases of this model. 
Becker’s unified model also involves pooling of household resources. However, 
merely testing whether individual labor income affects expenditure patterns is not 
enough. Among the early works on pooling that rejected Becker’s unified model 
include those by Thomas (1990). Thomas (1990) showed that children have better 
mortality and morbidity if their mother controls a larger fraction of the family’s 
resources. Thomas contended that labor income is endogenous as it reflects labor 
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supply decisions. Hence, he examined non-labor income, which he assumed to be 
exogenous. Thus, determining whether expenditure patterns are dependent upon non-
labor income could provide us information to reject Becker’s model of a unified 
household.  
However, non-labor income could be the result of previous labor related 
decisions, and hence not really exogenous. In Thomas’s case, one can also provide a 
counter-argument of unobserved heterogeneity, that “better mothers” control more 
resources in the household, and also raise children in a better manner (Pollak, 2003).  
Situations or shocks involving exogenous changes in income and expenditure are 
needed to test for income pooling. 
Such a shock was provided in the late 1970’s when Margaret Thatcher 
restructured the child-benefit program in UK from a tax deduction to a direct cash 
installment to mothers (at the post office). It indirectly transferred income from 
primary wage earners (typically the men) to their wives. Lundberg et al. (1997) 
studied this natural experiment, and found a significant increase in children’s clothing 
expenditure relative to men’s clothing expenditure and also a significant increase in 
women’s clothing expenditure relative to men’s clothing expenditure. Lundberg et al., 
(1997) provide perhaps the most compelling argument that husbands and wives do 
not pool their income, and hence the unified model of intrahousehold resource 
allocation is not appropriate. Thus, the unified model can be rejected if expenditure 
patterns are dependent on non-labor income, and there is no strong argument for any 
unobserved heterogeneity that affects outcomes.  
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Measuring non-labor income is often difficult. However, even if it is 
measured with error and income is pooled, the ratio of their marginal utility of 
income for the good should be the same for the common preference model and the 
Beckerian unified model, i.e., equality of the ratios cannot be rejected (Thomas, 
1990). 
Further tests are based on inspecting for pareto efficiency (Doss, 1996), i.e., 
whether there exists a constant ratio of income effects across all goods (as shown in 
the equation 2.15). The tests of intrahousehold resource allocation, summarized by 
Doss (1996), are reported in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Tests of intrahousehold resource allocation models 
Bargaining models Null hypothesis Common 
preferences 
model 
Unified 
model 
Collective 
model 
Cooperative  Non-
cooperative 
Individual labor income does 
not affect expenditures 
R C C C C 
Individual exogenous income 
does not affect 
expenditures/ does not 
affect labor supply 
R R C C C 
Pareto efficiency: constant ratio 
of income effects across 
different goods/ constant 
ratio of marginal 
productivity of inputs. 
R R R R C 
(The table is reproduced from Doss(1996). Cells indicate whether the rejection of null hypothesis is 
consistent with or implies a rejection of the model). 
R: Reject, C: Consistent 
 
 
3. Increased bargaining of women in developing countries 
Although males are often regarded as unilateral decision makers in male-
dominated societies, emerging empirical evidence suggests that even within male-
dominated societies such as Brazil, women have a great deal of control over 
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household expenditures, including the distribution of food (Neuhouser, 1989 cf 
Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982). In a study in Bangladesh, Chen et al. (1981) found 
that family members typically ate dinner together, consuming shares allocated by 
women, who ensured equal shares were distributed to children of different gender. 
However, in cases of food shortages, the women agreed that they were likely to give 
male children a preference.  
Table 2.2: Women’s autonomy in India 
Household decision Respondent 
(female) made the 
decision by 
herself* 
Decision made jointly 
(with husband or other 
family members)* 
Husband alone 
made the 
decision* 
Items to be cooked 71 (71) 15 (16)   4  (4) 
Health care for self 35 (28) 24 (27) 34 (41) 
Purchasing jewelry/ major household 
items 
13 (10) 47 (44) 29 (36) 
Staying with her parents/ siblings 18 (12) 37 (37) 36 (41) 
Using self earned cash 57 (37) 27 (29) 14 (31) 
Source: IIPS and ORC-Macro (2000) 
All figures in percentages. 
*Figures in parentheses show values for rural India. 
Excluded category is when someone other that the husband or wife made the decisions. 
 
In the Second National Family Health Survey (IIPS and ORC Macro, 2000) of 
about 90,000 ever-married women aged 19-49 in India in 1998-99, up to 91% of 
women reported at least some level of participation in household decision-making. 
Some results of this survey are reported in table 2.2. Interestingly, about 57% of the 
women in urban areas and 37% in rural areas said that they have autonomy in 
deciding how to spend their self-earned cash income. About 59% of women in urban 
areas and 55% of women in rural areas played some role in making decisions 
regarding their own health. These results highlight the fact that women do play a part 
in the nutrition and health outcomes of children and some women also have decision-
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making power in spending decisions, and hence are in a position to bargain. Thus, 
issues of intrahousehold resource allocation may have implications even in countries 
with patriarchic setup like India. 
 
4. Measuring income pooling through revealed health status 
As discussed earlier, intrahousehold resource allocation can affect 
consumption and production decisions within a household. If there are biases against 
certain household members, these may result in lesser allocation of resources to these 
members, including lower investments in their health. If these differences in 
allocation of resources persist over a period of time, they can be observed through 
specific health outcomes.  
 
A. Measuring health status through anthropometrics 
One way to examine differences in health outcomes is through collection of 
anthropometric data. Anthropometric measurements are stock measures that have 
been used successfully to measure the standards of living. Anthropometric 
measurements are easy to measure at low cost. The biggest advantage they have over 
other measures is that although measures are subject to random error3, the 
measurement error is not systematically correlated to respondent characteristics such 
as income (Strauss and Thomas, 1998). Whereas lower weight for a given height (and 
sex) reflects acute (wasting) and chronic (stunting) malnutrition, lower height for a 
given age (and sex) reflects chronic deprivation (Waterlow, 1972).  
                                                 
3 The random error can be reduced if measured by a trained physiologist. 
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In 1995, a WHO Expert Committee (1995) compiled a report on the use and 
interpretation of anthropometry. According to the report, height-for-age, weight-for-
age and weight-for-height are the three most commonly used indicators. Moreover, 
the relevant anthropometric indicator depends upon both the desired policy 
intervention that we want to measure and the age group of the subjects. For example, 
to identify areas to target health and economic interventions and to determine the 
priority of allocation of resources, the appropriate indicator for both children under 5 
years of age and school-age children (6-10 years) is height-for-age. However to 
identify areas of greatest need to target interventions to reduce food and fat 
consumption and to recommend increases in physical exercise for the same age 
group, the relevant indicator is weight-for-height. 
Choosing a relevant indicator can get complicated. Height for age is a good 
anthropometric indicator in children until age 12 and deficits may indicate long-term 
cumulative inadequacies in health and nutrition. But during adolescent years different 
children reach growth spurts and attain puberty at different times reducing the 
reliability of height-for-age indicator. Further, the indicator is of little use in 
adulthood as height is already predetermined and virtually constant throughout life of 
the individual (WHO Expert Committee, 1995). Weight can vary in the short run and 
can provide a short run indicator of nutritional status. A light person can be small and 
at the same time not underweight. Thus, weight (for a given height) can be used as an 
indicator of nutritional status in the short run. (Strauss and Thomas, 1998). One of the 
more common variants of the weight-height ratio is the Body Mass Index (BMI)4.   
                                                 
4 Body Mass Index, commonly referred to as BMI, is expressed as the ratio of weight (in kilograms) to 
height (in meters) squared. 
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It may be difficult to conjure a universal indicator for all age groups. One 
indicator that can be used under certain circumstances is the prevalence of stunting. 
WHO Expert Committee (1995) suggests that in cases where the prevalence of 
stunting is thought to be high, stunting can be used as an indicator of prior health or 
nutritional deficits. The indicator may not be able to pinpoint the exact ages when 
stunting may have occurred. Individuals having a z-score of between -2.0 and -3.0 on 
a height-for-age curve are classified as moderately stunted and those having a z-score 
less than -3.0 are identified as severely stunted. The z-score is computed using the 
formula,  
Zi= (hi – hm)/σx     (2.1) 
Where Zi = z-score for individual I, hi is height of individual I, hm is the 
median height for a healthy, well nourished child from a reference population of the 
same age and gender, and σx is the standard deviation from the mean for that 
reference population at that height and gender.  
 Variation in stunting across different groups of the population can be 
interpreted as evidence of a history of inequity that was captured in the growth 
patterns.  The height-for-age z-score is immune to short-term fluctuations in health 
(such as those caused by illnesses like diarrhea), but is affected by long-term impacts 
such as those caused by chronic nutrition inadequacy, neglect by care givers, frequent 
parasitic infections and long-term chronic diseases such as HIV/AIDS (Sahn and 
Stifel, 2002 cf  Gaiha and Kulkarni, 2005). 
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B. Height-for-age as revealed indicator to measure income pooling 
Thomas (1994) integrated a health production function with model of 
household decision-making to develop a reduced form demand model for child health 
to determine the relationship between parental education and child height. He 
hypothesized that a child’s health, as measured by his height, depends upon 
individual non-labor income (among other things), and examines data from four 
different countries. Thomas’s paper provides a methodology with which one can 
measure household resource allocation using revealed preference data. Thomas set up 
a simple model based on the common preference model of intrahousehold resource 
allocation. He modified it to include Nash bargaining setup and later simplified it for 
use as a co-operative bargaining model based on pareto-optimality. A brief account of 
Thomas’s formulation is given in Appendix II . The reduced form model that Thomas 
arrived at is as follows: 
 
hi = hi iµ( , cµ , ),',,......, 1 iMc yy ξµµ      ….(2.2) 
Where, h i = Z-score for height, µi = individual characteristics including sex 
and age, µf = family characteristics, µc = community characteristics, where 'µ = any 
elements of µ  not in the demand function.  
Note here that 
my
h
∂
∂  is not same for all members, mathematically representing 
the possibility of non-pooling. This demand schedule is responsive to changes in 
individual’s non-labor income.  
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Thomas applied this model to household survey data from the United States 
(4704 children), Brazil (1316 children for DHS data) and Ghana (990 children in 412 
households). He found significant differences in resource allocation among gender, 
which reflected both technological differences in child rearing and differences in the 
preferences of parents. Specifically, he found that mothers are devoting more 
resources toward their daughters and fathers toward their sons. For example, in 
Brazil, women’s non-labor income has a positive impact on her daughter’s health but 
does not impact her son’s health. The methodology developed by Thomas can be used 
to reveal the intrahousehold resource allocation using indicators of long-term health 
such as height (for age and gender). For example, if the height of girls depends upon 
the non-labor income of their mother, or if changes in the mother’s education cause 
changes in the daughter’s height alone, it indicates some level of interpersonal 
separability between the husband and wife and also the way in which a wife exercises 
her choice. 
 
C. Use of stunting as a health indicator 
Gaiha and Kulkarni (2005) examined high prevalence of stunting in rural 
India to study the persistence of poverty. They developed a framework based on three 
production functions as follows: 
(1) Health of an individual is a function of the nutrients consumed by the 
individual, other health-related inputs, his endowments, education of the 
individual and his mother/wife, quality of housing, and village infrastructure. 
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(2) The mortality function for the individual is linked to that person’s health. 
Mortality occurs if health falls below a threshold value (the threshold value 
can be different for different individuals). 
(3) The nutrient intake of an individual within the household depends on food 
intake, time use and capacity of mother/wife, and household environment.  
 
Based on this, Gahia et al formulated a model with the number of stunted 
children within the household as a dependent variable. They found that among other 
things, a more autonomous role for women, improvements in hygiene and sanitation 
facilities and more competitive local markets are important in reducing the stunting.  
 
 
5. Stated preference studies and intrahousehold resource allocation  
 Measurement of health outcomes represent a revealed preference method to 
assess intrahousehold resource allocation. These techniques cannot be used to 
determine the differences in preferences of individual or a glimpse into the decision-
making process, i.e., how individuals aggregate data. Both of these objectives can be 
achieved in a properly conducted stated preference experiment (Adamowicz et al., 
2005). Stated preference techniques such as Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) 
been around for the last fifty years (Smith, 2000) and have been increasingly used to 
measure the value of environmental and health-related outcomes such as forest 
conservation (Carson et al., 1994), water supply (Whittington et al., 2002), sanitation 
(Whittington et al., 1993), among other things.  These techniques use WTP or 
willingness to accept (WTA) concepts to measure incremental changes in 
compensating or equivalent variation associated with a policy intervention. Stated 
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preference studies are particularly handy in developing countries because of poor 
quality of existing secondary data. 
Stated preference studies have, however, contributed little to our 
understanding of intrahousehold resource allocation. Although stated preference 
techniques requiring response from multiple members may help us identify 
differences individual preference information, the ability for these multiple members 
to choose independently can give rise to its biggest problem—how to aggregate the 
preferences of different household members? Aggregation may require a research 
design with potentially unrealistic settings (Adamowicz et al., 2005) and impose 
various logistical constraints on the fieldwork, thus limiting the scope of use of stated 
preference methods in studying intrahousehold resource allocation. 
One of the areas where stated preference literature demonstrates potential to 
contribute to our understanding of household behavior is the literature on household’s 
WTP for health5, particularly the study of household WTP for a preventive vaccine.  
 
A. CV studies to determine household WTP 
In CV studies of household demand, the typical valuation (WTP) section of 
the survey instruments often includes either a direct referendum question on 
respondent’s WTP for the entire household for a set of vaccine characteristics 
(Cropper et al., 2004) or a two-step approach where they initially ask a referendum 
                                                 
5 Use of CVM to estimate the social benefits of health improvements is complicated by the fact that 
there are often positive externalities associated with health improvements (EPA, 2000). Unless 
designed to measure externalities, CV will almost always measure the benefits associated with an 
improvement in private well-being.  
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question for the individual WTP, followed by a question for WTP for remaining 
members within the household (Canh et al., 2003, Whittington et al., 2006). In a 
properly designed household WTP questionnaire, respondents have to state not just 
the number of vaccines (desired consumption) that they are willing to pay for but also 
for whom they plan to purchase this vaccine (desired allocation). The vaccines have 
an important advantage while studying allocation in that the good is divisible vis-à-
vis household members.  
Cropper et al. (2004) assessed the household WTP for a malaria vaccine in 
Tigray, Ethiopia. They found that the value of preventing malaria with vaccines to be 
about $36 a household a year, or about 15% of the annual imputed income. They 
found this to be about twice the expected household cost of illness. They interviewed 
a single person within a household and did not explore differences in household 
member preferences. 
Whittington et al. (2006) interviewed multiple adults from the same household 
to examine the intrahousehold differences in demand for a hypothetical HIV/AIDS 
vaccine. They used a seemingly unrelated count regression model to explore the 
differences in husbands’ and wives’ preferences. They found that although the 
number of vaccines that husbands say they would purchase is not significantly 
different from that of wives, husbands and wives do purchase vaccines for different 
household members at lower prices. Both however tended to agree (to buy no 
vaccines) at higher prices when demand choked off. This is an important finding 
which underlines the differences in preferences of an individual vis-à-vis a household 
and illustrates that due consideration should be given to the complex problem of 
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intrahousehold resource allocation. They report a mean household WTP of US$ 671. 
This model is a first step towards demonstrating how stated preference can help us 
identify differences in husband and wife preferences. 
 
6. Aggregation of individual preferences 
Aggregating differences in individual preferences remains a challenge in 
stated preference studies. There are a few studies that have attempted to aggregate 
individual preferences into household preferences. Two approaches are discussed 
here—the heuristics and behavioral approach.  
 
A. Heuristics Approach 
The heuristics approach involves aggregation of demand using “heuristic 
decision rules.” This approach was used by Whittington et al. (2006) to determine 
household WTP for a HIV/AIDS vaccine in Thailand. They examined whether 
husband and wife agreed or disagreed in their WTP for each member of the 
household. In case the husband and wife disagreed upon a household member, 
Whittington et al adopted simple rules or heuristic “decision criteria” to decide 
whether that member would receive a vaccine. This new tally of vaccines was then 
considered the dependent variable to determine aggregated household demand and 
WTP. The different decision criteria were:  
1) Either agrees: The member got a vaccine if either husband or wife agreed to 
buy a vaccine for him/her. 
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2) Both need to agree: The member got a vaccine only if both husband and wife 
agreed to buy a vaccine for him/her. 
3) Both need to agree for others: The husband or wife received a vaccine if either 
of them were willing to purchase a vaccine for themselves or for their partner. 
For other household members (including children), both had to agree.  
Table 2.3 explains the outcomes of the decision rules in a simple manner: 
Table 2.3: Decision rules adopted by Whittington et al (2006)* 
Stated demand Decision criteria and outcome  
Relation of 
member 
Husband 
willing to 
pay 
Wife 
willing to 
pay 
Both 
have to 
agree 
Either 
has to 
agree 
Both have to 
agree only for 
members other 
than the couple 
Any 1 1 1 1 1 
Any 0 0 0 0 0 
Husband or 
wife 
1 0 0 1 1 
Children 1 0 0 1 0 
*1 denotes WTP, 0 denotes not WTP. 
This is a parsimonious model in which aggregation is not based on any 
economic models of intrahousehold resource allocation or sociological theory. The 
study highlights the problems in aggregation by demonstrating that the WTP as 
computed by the upper bound demand estimates of the demand curve at $200 per 
person per vaccine is almost six times that when computed by the lower bound 
estimates.  
 
B. Behavioral Approach 
Arora and Allenby (1999) examined the preference structures of husbands and 
wives in a university town in Virginia about purchasing two products, an electric 
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oven range and a lawn mover. Husbands and wives were requested to mail conjoint 
choice questionnaires for these two products, separately first and jointly later.  
Arora and Allenby found that husbands and wives had different preference 
structures. In general, husbands were more sensitive to price than wives. While wives 
were generally more sensitive with regard to oven attributes, the husbands showed 
similar behavior regarding lawn mover. The authors further developed a hierarchical 
Bayesian model of group decision-making that takes into account individual estimates 
of influences at the product attribute level. They argued that such an inferred measure 
is more predictive than alternative measures. 
Behavioral approach is also seen in the literature on group preference 
aggregation. The simplest technique is to allow group members to discuss among 
themselves and come up with a “group” probability distribution. In the Delphi 
technique, experts are requested to make judgments separately, which are then shared 
among the group. The expert is then requested to revise his judgment. This process is 
continued until experts agree upon a probability distribution. If the experts don’t 
agree, which often is the case, their probability distributions are combined 
mathematically.  
 
C. Weakly separable function 
Adamovicz et al (2005) focus on dyads and two-person households and put 
forth a theoretical framework for aggregation of preferences. In the simplest model, 
they have utilities aggregated in an additive way (weighted average) as if a 
“representative agent” made the choice. 
  39
U*j = ±Iˆ U1j + (1 - ±Iˆ )U2j        ….(2.3) 
Where   Uij   = Utility for alternative j for person i  
         = Vij + εij, V being the deterministic component 
  ±Iˆ  = the weight which may be positive or negative 
Adamovicz et al (2005) also point out that this model suffers from parameter 
identification issues. In its simplest form, this setup is similar to the weakly separable 
household utility function proposed by Samuelson, and suffers from the setbacks of 
the common preference model. 
 
7. Risky choice experiment to measure income pooling 
Other methods suitable to study intrahousehold resource allocation in 
developing countries include choice experiments involving real money and risks. 
Bateman and Munro (2005), (2003) adopted such an approach for the first time to 
examine whether income pooling and whether member preferences conform to the 
axioms of Expected Utility theory.   
They presented a sample of 76 established couples6 with tasks involving 
binary choices between lotteries. The lotteries were designed such that both partners 
had a payoff in each choice card (refer Figure 2.2), and the response would vary 
depending upon whether the respondent were interested in income pooling within the 
household. Initially, each partner was interviewed separately where she/he had to 
make individual choices and then predict her/his partner’s responses to a different set 
of lottery questions. Finally, the partners came back together and were asked to 
                                                 
6 Bateman and Munro interviewed heterosexual couples staying in a relationship for more than a year. 
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choose as a couple for a third set of lottery questions. One of the lotteries was played 
out for real toward the end of the experiment. 
Figure 2.2: Typical lottery card used by Bateman and Munro, 2005. 
Lottery A 
For numbers 21-70 71-100 
You receive £20 £20 
Your partner 
receives 
£0 
 
£0 
 
Lottery B 
For numbers 21-70 71-100 
You receive £20 £0 
Your partner 
receives 
£0 
 
£40 
 
 
Which lottery would you choose? 
 
Bateman and Munro examined the households for income pooling, 
interpersonal separability and pareto dominance, among other things. To examine 
income pooling, Bateman and Munro present the concept of income pooling 
equivalent (IPE) lotteries. Lotteries LA and LB are income pooling equivalent if: 
B
s
B
s
A
s
A
s mmmm 2121 +=+       ….(2.4) 
Where: Aism  denotes the payment received by agent i, and s = 1,2,…S are 
different states of the lottery, and LA and LB are two different lotteries. 
An example of an IPE card is one in which wife gets £20 for numbers 
between 1-50, zero otherwise; and the husband gets £20 for numbers between 51-100, 
zero otherwise. They then combined such IPE lotteries with other lotteries that were 
safer (or riskier) to an income pooler in a single choice card. Based on the responses 
to such lotteries, they found whether the respondent favored income pooling or 
otherwise. 
They found a large proportion of individual respondents (varying from 78% to 
95% for different tasks) in favor of income pooling. Overall, Bateman and Munro 
were unable to reject income pooling, but found that only a few households were 
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unanimous in their choices. They also found that couples were more risk averse than 
individuals. For individuals, income pooling was not related to gender or marital 
status, but negatively associated with number of children and quadratic relationship 
with age (with the youngest people in their sample most likely to pool income). They 
also found financial independence to be an important factor in determining women’s 
lack of indecisiveness during joint choice. They found different financial and budget 
arrangements among households indicating some amount of decentralized decision-
making within the household. Another interesting finding was that respondents were 
often unable to predict the risk preferences of their partners. The authors contended 
that decentralization of budget along with imperfect information about partner’s risk 
preferences may be the reason why households were unable to achieve pareto 
optimality. 
Although the researchers found some evidence of income pooling, they 
largely rejected the common preferences model of intrahousehold resource allocation, 
and also a model where the group utility is a simple weighted average of utility model 
without ex-post transfers.  
Bateman and Munro provide insight into how one can examine intrahousehold 
resource allocation by offering risky choices to respondents. There are possible 
limitations to this approach especially in a developing country context. Bateman and 
Munro play a numbers game. To play this game properly, the respondent has to 
understand numbers clearly and should also have some grasp of the concepts of 
probability. Thus, implementation of such surveys in countries like India (with a low 
literacy rate of only 64% (Ministry of Finance, GOI, 2003-2004) could be difficult.  
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8. Risky choice in developing country context 
There are a few studies that have implemented risky choice experiments 
successfully in developing countries. One of the early studies in this field was 
conducted by Binswanger (1981) on 330 individuals in rural India. The people were 
offered eight choices in which higher expected return could be chosen at the cost of 
higher risk. Each choice contained a “good luck payout” and a “bad luck payout” 
with equal probability of 50%, which was decided by the toss of a coin. The game 
was actually played over a period of six weeks at four different levels. The game 
started at Rs. 0.5 level and later was played at the Rs. 5 level, Rs. 50 level and Rs. 
500 level. The choice cards for the Rs.50 level are shown in table 2.4. For Rs. 0.5 
level, the respondent was shown a card with the hundredths of the payout of the Rs.50 
level (i.e., card C became a lottery of Rs. 1.5 for good luck payout). The respondent 
did not know the number of times a game would be played or the level at which it 
would be played. He also provided respondents with a day to two weeks time 
between games. There were real payoffs at Rs. 0.5 to Rs. 50 level. The payouts were 
also large with the expected payoff of a single decision exceeding the average 
monthly income of an unskilled laborer. 
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Table 2.4: Choices shown at the Rs. 50 level with decreasing order of risk 
aversion  
Risk aversion category Good Luck 
payout 
(50% chance) 
Bad Luck 
payout 
(50% chance) 
Remarks 
Extreme O 50 50 Most risk averse 
Severe A 95 45  
Intermediate B 120 40  
Moderate C 150 30  
Slight-to-neutral E 190 10  
Neutral-to-preferred F 200 0 Most risky 
Inefficient alternatives B* 
                                     C* 
125 
160 
35 
20 
 
 
Binswanger found that as the size of the stakes increase, individuals tend to be 
less risk averse. The structure of Binswanger’s lottery game is very simple to 
comprehend, even for people with limited knowledge of probability. By using a flip 
of a coin, he does not expose the respondents to the complexities induced by 
differential probability as in the Bateman and Munro (2003) experiment. Further, a 
coin toss is more clean and reliable than say a throw of a dice, which respondents can 
fear to be biased. Binswanger was able to implement the experiment successfully in 
the midst of peasants in rural India. 
Variants of Binswanger’s technique have been used by researchers in other 
developing countries such as Northern Zambia (Wik et al., 2004) and Indonesia 
(Miyata, 2003) to study risk aversion.  
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9. Exploring gaps in the literature 
Empirical studies and theoretical advances suggest that issues of 
intrahousehold resource allocation and bargaining should be incorporated in 
economic analysis.  
Intrahousehold resource allocation can dictate the costs and benefits of actions 
that members take. For example, maternal employment may have various impacts 
within the household, including increased autonomy for women, possible increases in 
the quality of diet and healthcare that a household receives, and possible reductions in 
time available for a mother for household work, childcare and leisure. The overall 
impact of maternal employment depends not only upon the tradeoffs that mothers 
make between time and money, but also how efficiently they and their households 
utilize their time and other resources. 
A traditional approach for economic analysis based on the common preference 
model does not include issues of intrahousehold resource allocation. New approaches 
based on bargaining are more likely to depict situations closer to reality but need 
more resources and data. Evidence for bargaining is examined through income 
pooling. Tests on the marginal utility of individual and aggregated income for both 
men and women in the household can help us differentiate between different models 
of intrahousehold resource allocation—Common preferences model, Becker’s unified 
model, Co-operative or Non-cooperative bargaining based models.  
Different allocation of resources to different household members over a period 
of time can create outcomes that could reveal these differences. For example, 
differences in anthropometric indicators such as height-for-age z-score and stunting 
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can help us capture differences in long-term investment in health of children and 
hence, can be used as revealed indicators of intrahousehold resource allocation. 
Empirical evidence and theoretical advances suggest that husband and wife 
preferences may be different even in developing countries and a single person’s stated 
responses may be inadequate to represent those of the entire household. Although 
stated preference studies can observe differences in preferences and are increasingly 
common in developing countries, such studies are conspicuous by their absence in 
studying intrahousehold resource allocation. This is because preference aggregation 
in a stated preference context is difficult, could involve multiple member interviews, 
unrealistic scenarios, pose logistical problems and require more resources. Contingent 
valuation studies for household WTP  for vaccines can be used to examine 
intrahousehold resource allocation as in a carefully designed survey, respondents 
have to state the consumption and allocation of vaccines that they are willing to pay 
for household members. So far, all but one stated preference studies of household 
demand for vaccines interview only a single respondent within the household. There 
is no study yet that attempts to aggregate member preferences in a stated preference 
framework. 
The literature review also identifies the importance of data on exogenous 
changes in income and expenditure to study income pooling behavior. Exogenous 
changes of income are rare but small changes in such can be manipulated in a risky 
choice experiment with real payoffs. However, conducting such a study in a 
developing country may be challenging because of low literacy levels. 
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 Although intrahousehold resource allocation affects different household 
members in different ways, most studies utilize a piece-meal approach where they 
concentrate on only one aspect of intrahousehold resource allocation based on a 
single technique. This may be because certain techniques do certain things better than 
others. For example, revealed preference techniques can best identify differences in 
allocation of resources to household members and stated preference techniques can 
best identify differences in preferences. As a result, there is lack of an integrated 
approach to study intrahousehold resource allocation and we do not understand 
enough about the linkages in multiple dimensions of intrahousehold resource 
allocation.  
 
 CHAPTER 3  
Conceptual Framework 
 
1. Conceptual framework 
In this chapter, I develop a generic model of intrahousehold resource 
allocation, parts of which can be applied to the stated and revealed preference data. 
This model will help me take an integrated approach to the study of intrahousehold 
resource allocation. I then develop hypotheses for testing. 
The first step is a production function for individual health. This is a modified 
version of Thomas’s (1994) work (equations 2.2, Chapter 2, Appendix II) in that it 
includes the possibility that the individual can contract the disease malaria.  
Individual Health, θi = θ( Ni, π, µi, µf, µc, ηi)    …(3.1) 
Where Ni = nutrient intake, π = chance of the individual contracting disease 
malaria, µi = individual characteristics including sex and age, µf = family 
characteristics, µc = community characteristics, and ηi = individual specific 
unobserved heterogeneity in health 
Let us suppose that the decision maker within the household can reduce his 
and the household’s risk of contracting malaria by purchasing preventive care 
(vaccine), which is available in the private market at a specific price. 
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Thus, 
Individual Health, θi* = θ( Ni, Qi, πi *, µi, µf, µc, ηi)   …(3.2) 
Where  
 Q i = 1 indicates that the individual is vaccinated. 
πi
 * = (1-λ).π  if Qi = 1 
πi
 * = π  if Qi = 1 
Where λ is the efficacy of the vaccine, with a positive efficacy indicating a 
reduced risk of contracting malaria. Here, I assume that λ is exogenous and does not 
depend upon individual or community specific characteristics. 
Given the health production function in 3.1 and 3.2, the household decision 
maker, m, wants to maximize his utility subject to a budget constraint 
Vm(X, Q, l, Z; µ, ε)      …(3.3) 
Where, X = vector of goods demanded by each individual in the household, Q 
denotes the vaccines that the household member chooses to buy for different 
household members, l = vector of leisure, Z = vector of home produced quantities 
including health, µ = background characteristics such as education of all household 
members, ε = vector for unobserved tastes of members 
This will yield: 
px+pfF+ ∑
m
{Qi(pv + prRi·π i·(1-λ))  +(1-Q i)π i·(prR)}  
=∑
m
wm(Tm – Sm – lm) + ym ….(3.4) 
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Where T = amount of time available for work, S = amount of time spent ill 
with a disease, l = vector of leisure, w= vector of wages, and ym is each individual’s 
non-labor income (assumed to be exogenous). 
The left hand side shows the expected household expenditures and the right 
hand side shows income. Here the variable X is split into a numeraire good x, vector 
of Food F, an indicator variable Q showing whether preventive action (vaccine) was 
purchased, pf is the price of food, and pv is the cost of prevention. The food 
expenditures7 are shown explicitly in the equation to underscore the role of food 
intake in nutrition.  
If the individual does not purchase a vaccine, Q = 0, he has a probability, π,  
of contracting malaria disease and having to incur treatment costs. The variable R 
indicates that treatment is necessary and pr is the cost of treatment, with their product 
showing the expected costs of treatment. If the individual chooses to purchase a 
vaccine, then Q = 1, the probability of getting sick drops down to (1-λ)π and the 
expected treatment costs reduce. However, the individual has to incur additional cost 
of purchasing a vaccine at price pv. 
Solving this equation gives us the optimum demand for health, along with 
optimal nutrition and optimal prevention.  
 
A. Stated preference approach 
In the stated approach, the decision maker will attempt to buy an appropriate 
number of (hypothetical) vaccines for different household members so as to minimize 
                                                 
7 Gaiha(2003) shows that nutrient intake within the household depends on food intake, time use and 
capacity of mother/wife, and household environment. 
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the number of days that a person would spend ill with a disease. Depending upon a 
common preference or a collective approach to household decision-making, the 
demand function for a vaccine for individual i in household k model reduces to  
qik* = qik ),,,,,,,,,( ∑ iikmvmcfi ppy ξεπλµµµ     …(3.5) 
(Common preference approach) 
 or   
qik* = qik ),,,,,,...,,,( 1 ξεπλµµµ ikmvmcfi ppy     …(3.6) 
    (Collective approach) 
εik represents the individual specific heterogeneity and ξi represents the family 
specific heterogeneity.  
B. Revealed preference approach 
In the revealed model, the relevant measure of health outcome is an 
appropriate form of anthropometric indicator. As a result, the optimization reduces to 
Thomas (1994) setup and the reduced form models derived by Thomas, in which he 
used height-for-age as a measure of long-term health, are presented below:  
hi = hi ),,,,( ∑ imcfi y ξµµµ      …(3.7) 
and 
hi = hi ),,......,,,( 1 iMcfi yy ξµµµ      …(3.8) 
Once again, the symbol∑ my and y1,…, yM in models 3.7 – 3.8 represent 
mathematically the common preference approach and the collective model approach 
respectively, a notation adopted by Thomas (1994). 
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2. Hypothesis for testing 
 
This model can help us examine various aspects and impacts of 
intrahousehold resource allocation. The first thing that I can examine the model for is 
income pooling, by examining the marginal utility of income of household members 
differently. Secondly, if there are any biases within the household, then I can measure 
the differences in health outcomes for specific groups of household members, i.e., say 
daughters vs. sons or children of different birth order. I can also test for whether this 
work satisfies various economic norms such as vaccine is a normal good, or scope 
tests for price and efficacy of vaccine. We can also examine various factors that play 
a role in intrahousehold resource allocation. For example, well educated mothers are 
likely to have healthier children. We can also examine whether maternal employment, 
overall, is beneficial or not to the household. 
I now develop the following specific hypotheses for testing: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The household follows the common preference model of 
intrahousehold resource allocation 
Ho: 
1y
q
∂
∂ = 
2y
q
∂
∂ ; Ha: 
1y
q
∂
∂
≠ 
2y
q
∂
∂  
The symbol∑ my in model 3.5 and 3.7 represents mathematically 
1y
q
∂
∂ = 
2y
q
∂
∂ , 
where subscripts 1 and 2 denote two different members. The null hypothesis 
characterizes the common preference approach. Here, y denotes non-labor income. If 
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the null hypothesis is rejected, (denoted by equation 3.5 mathematically) then the 
common preference model of intrahousehold resource allocation could be rejected.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Vaccine is a normal good 
For the vaccine to be a normal good, the demand for the vaccine should increase with 
income. This can be expressed mathematically as: 
Ho: 
1y
q
∂
∂ >0; Ho:
2y
q
∂
∂ >0 
 
Hypothesis 3: Scope test for vaccine price and efficacy 
Economic theory dictates that as price increases, the demand for the vaccine 
should drop down. Similarly, as efficacy of a vaccine increases, the demand for 
vaccine should increase. 
This can be mathematically represented as: 
Ho:
vp
q
∂
∂ < 0; Ho: λ∂
∂q < 0 
 
Hypothesis 4: Educated mothers should have healthier daughters 
 The literature review suggests that better educated mothers should have 
healthier daughters. Thus mothers who have at least some level of secondary 
education are likely to have taller daughters when compared to mothers who have 
little or no education. 
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 Ho: φ
θ
∂
∂ > 0, where φ is a variable which indicates that mother has 
received at least some level of secondary education.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Impact of maternal employment on child health 
Maternal employment can affect child health in two ways. First, it can contribute to 
child health by improved nutrition intake. It can also result in reduced time available 
for childcare. Thus the sign of:
κ
θ
∂
∂  could be positive or negative depending upon the 
way maternal employment affects children health.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Impact of per-capita consumption on child health. 
Children in households with higher per-capita income are likely to be healthier. 
Ho: 
'y∂
∂θ >0, where y' = per capita consumption 
 
Hypothesis 7: Impact of maternal employment on health of eldest children 
Here, I hypothesize that the eldest daughters of women who work are likely to 
contribute toward the childcare of younger siblings. This may affect their health of 
eldest daughters but not of the eldest son. 
 OthersEldest θθ − < 0 (for daughters) and 
≥− OthersEldest θθ  0 (for sons) 
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3. Modeling stated preference 
 
In this section, I first develop a probit model to examine the factors that affect 
decision-making and subsequently model the demand in two different ways, a 
traditional count model approach and a random effects approach. This is followed by 
a mechanism to estimate the sharing weights that husband and wife welfare estimates 
should be given to compute joint household welfare estimates. 
 
A. Patterns in decision-making: The All or Nothing Approach 
One of the simple patterns in decision-making is the “all or nothing” approach 
in which the respondent either buys for all members or for no one. The choice can be 
modeled on the basis of Random Utility Theory (McFadden 1974, and Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman 1985). Each person derives a utility U by purchasing a certain number of 
vaccines based on his own income y, and individual attributes X, Price of the vaccine 
P, and member characteristics Z (which include his age, education, relationship, 
income, and other features). Thus, overall utility that a person in household i derives 
by purchasing a vaccine for all household members is 
Ui = Vi +εi        …(3.9) 
The indirect utility can be modeled as 
Vi = V(yi – P, Xi ; β)    …(3.10) 
The structural probit model can be written as: 
yi* = β Xi + εi 
yi = 1 if yi* > 0, and 0 otherwise (Greene, 2000, pp.: 837) 
       …(3.11) 
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B. A count model approach 
In the conventional approach, adopted by Cropper et al (2004), to assess 
household demand, the optimal value for equation 3.4 is the sum of the vaccines 
purchased for each member within the household. Thus demand for entire household, 
  qk* = ∑
m
mkq      …(3.12) 
Where qmk = 1 if member m in household k receives a vaccine; 0 = Otherwise. 
This model can be estimated using a variant of the Poisson Count Model, in which  
===
−
i   where!
][ n
n
enqP
i
ni
i
ii
i λλ
 0, 1, 2, 3,…..   …(3.13) 
Where λi = eXiβ,= E[ni|xi] = expected number of events per period, β = vector 
of parameters, Xi= vector of individual and household independent variables.  
The household WTP for a vaccine is the area underlying the demand curve. 
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 Where β is the vector of coefficients except the price coefficient. 
 
To determine the entire consumers’ surplus, integrate from price = 0 to 
infinity. 
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Limitations of the count modeling approach 
The count models are conceptually sound and are well established in 
literature. By the virtue of the exponent involved, they predict a positive WTP, and 
are able to predict a smooth demand curve. However, there are certain shortcomings 
associated with these models when they are used to analyze household demand for 
vaccines.   
1. Household demand can be viewed through two different lenses, a continuous 
choice where the respondent chooses the number of vaccines that he may purchase, 
and a discrete choice, which indicates the person for whom the vaccine is being 
purchased. The count models do not capture all the information that is collected in a 
stated preference survey. Specifically it does not capture the heterogeneity reflected 
by the term εik in equations 3.5 and 3.6.  For example, a person buying vaccines for 
two daughters is the same as a person buying two vaccines for sons. As a result, we 
are unable to determine household willingness-to-pay for different household 
members, or the fact that preferences may be ordered (for example, eldest son more 
preferable than all other children).  One way to resolve this problem is to run a series 
of count model with the count of a certain category of household members (say 
children) as the dependent variables. However, this approach does not account for 
correlation between demand for different age groups within each household.  
2. The poisson models predict the expected number of events per period 
(Greene, 2000). A referendum CV data analyzed by the traditional model using probit 
(or similar techniques) lets us estimate the probability that the specific person 
receives a vaccine. This probability distribution then can be used in preference 
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aggregation where multiple households are interviewed using linear pooling 
techniques (discussed later).  
 
C. A random effects approach 
The basic assumption in a random effects probit approach is that the decision 
to buy vaccines for members of the household is a combination of correlated 
decisions wherein the respondent considers each individual household member 
separately, and decides whether or not he will purchase a vaccine for that member. 
Thus the decision of a wife in a four-person household to purchase a certain number 
of vaccines is a result of four correlated yes-no decisions where she considers 
whether each individual within the household should receive a vaccine. The 
advantage of this design is that among other things, individual characteristics of 
specific household members could also be factored in the analyses. 
The Random Utility Theory (McFadden 1974, and Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
1985) can be used to model an individual’s choice of family members who receive a 
vaccine. Each person derives a utility U by purchasing a vaccine for member j based 
on his own income y, and individual attributes X, Price of the vaccine P, and member 
characteristics Z (which include his age, education, relationship, income, and other 
features).  
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Thus, overall utility that a person in household i derives by purchasing a 
vaccine for a member of household k is 
Uik = Vik +εik      …(3.15) 
The indirect utility can be modeled as 
Vik = V(yi – P, Xik ; β)   …(3.16) 
The structural probit model can be written as: 
yik* = β Xik + υj + εik 
yik = 1 if yik* > 0, and 0 otherwise (Greene, 2000, pp.: 837) 
      …(3.17) 
(Here Xik includes all parameters including price and income) 
yik = β. Xik + uj + eik    …(3.18) 
 
D. Aggregating preferences and sharing weights 
If multiple household members are interviewed, differences in preferences 
could make preference aggregation a challenge. Some preference aggregation 
mechanism such as behavioral aggregation is necessary.   
If we have aggregated household responses for household WTP for a vaccine, 
these along with separate responses of individual members can help us estimate the 
sharing weights among household members.  
The algorithm to determine sharing weights for preferences of different 
household members can be developed on the basis of the model proposed by 
Adamovicz et al (2005) (discussed in equation 2.3), in which the household utility is a 
weighted average sum of individual utilities.  
  59
Although the count model does not provide us with preference estimates, it 
does yield separate and aggregate welfare estimates in terms of WTP for a vaccine.  
Assuming that the joint WTP is a function of separate husband and wife WTP 
as follows: 
WTPJoint = ω.(WTPHusband,Separate)+ (1- ω ).(WTPWife,Separate) …(3.19) 
This equation can be estimated by OLS regression (1) without a constant and 
(2) with a constraint that the sum of weights (i.e., sum of beta coefficients) to be 
equal to unity.  
 
4. Modeling revealed preference 
In the revealed model, I express height as a function of various individual, 
household and community-based characteristics. Since there could be multiple 
children in a household, a random effects regression is more appropriate to account 
for random individual differences in children within the household. The equations 3.7 
and 3.8 are modified as follows: 
hik = hi ),,,,,,( ∑ iikmkcfi y ξεµµµµ    …(3.20) 
and 
hi = hi iikMkcfi yy ξεµµµµ ,,,......,,,,( 1  )  …(3.21) 
where kiε  = child specific heterogeneity.  
 
When subjects include a wider range of age from newborn to teenaged 
children, it is difficult to conjure a universal indicator for all age groups, such as 
height-for-age or BMI. This is because growth spurts in adolescents may take place at 
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different times for different individuals. This problem can be modeled with two 
approaches. In the first approach, we use the height-for-age z-score as dependent 
variable. This is a reliable indicator of long-term investments in health until age 10. 
We introduce a dummy variable for children older than 10 to differentiate their 
growth patterns.  
Equation 3.19 can be modified as: 
hik* = hik ),,,,( ik
m
mkcfi y ξµµµ ∑    …(3.22) 
Where hik* indicates the height-for-age z-score for individual i in household k 
 
In the second approach I use stunting (height-for-age z-score less than 2.0) as 
the dependent variable, which is appropriate when stunting is prevalent in the 
population. In such a setup, we can apply Random Utility Theory (McFadden 1974, 
and Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) to model an individual’s choice of family 
members who do not receive proper nutrition and hence are stunted.  
 yik  = 1 if hik* < -2, and 0 otherwise    …(3.23) 
Note that µf and µc vary only by household,  µi varies for each individual, ikξ  
accounts for individual specific heterogeneity. Model 3.20 can be modified on similar 
lines as follows to mathematically represents households that do not pool: 
hik* = hik ),,...,,,,( 1 ikmcfi yy ξµµµ    …(3.24) 
for individual i in household k   
  yik  = 1 if hik* < -2, and 0 otherwise.   …(3.25) 
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5. The choice experiment 
An individual’s response to tradeoff that involves income pooling can help us 
assess whether the individual is an income pooler or not. Consider a hypothetical 
scenario involving a household with a husband and wife in which, the husband has to 
make choices between three situations, P, I and N in which, both husbands and wives 
receive payoffs. Let us suppose that the payoffs are designed as follows: 
(1) Total payout for husband and wife together in state P is greater than total 
payout for husband and wife together in state N. 
N
W
N
H
P
W
P
H mmmm +>+   
 (2) Individual payout for husband in state N is less than the total payout for 
husband and wife together in state P. 
P
W
P
H
N
H mmm +<     
 (3) Individual payout for husband in state P is less than that in state N. 
N
H
P
H mm <     
 (4) Individual payout for wife in state P is greater than that in state N (follows 
from the constraints 1 and 3). 
N
W
P
W mm >     
(5) The state P and N represent two extreme payouts. The payouts for state I 
are somewhere in between as follows: 
 NH
I
H
P
H mmm <<  and 
N
W
I
W
P
W mmm >>  
   …..(3.26) 
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Where, Lim indicates the payout received by agent i in state L, and i=H and W 
indicate payouts for husband and wife respectively.  
Pooling respondents using the common preference model of intrahousehold 
resource allocation, or any variant of the Becker’s model such as the one suggested 
by Pollak (2003) in which both husband and wife have deferential preferences with 
the household utility is simply a weighted average mean of both husband and wife 
utilities, will always select the option that maximizes the utility possibility frontier of 
the household. I.e., a pooling husband will always choose a payout that yields the 
largest total payout (sum of payments to both husbands and wife). Based on the 
constraint expressed in equation 1, a pooling husband will choose state P. The same is 
not true about a non-pooling husband who will choose a payout that yields the largest 
total payout for himself. Based on constraint 3, he will choose option N. 
By examining the choices made by respondents—P, I and N, one can 
categorize the respondent as pooling, intermediate or non-pooling.  
Modeling experimental choice  
The choices, an indicator of income pooling tendency, can be modeled on the 
basis  of the random utility theory setup of McFadden (1974) and Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman (1985). Since the respondent has a chance to select any of the three choices 
presented to him, he will select the option that will maximize his expected utility. Let 
the expected utility for the individual i, be of the form,  
Vij = Xiβj + εij where  j = 1, 2 and 3 represent choices P, I and N respectively.  
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This model can be solved as a group of linked binary probits using the 
Multinomial probit model. A crucial assumption in the multinomial probit model is 
that the choices are unordered (nominal) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.  
 
If individual i is a utility maximizer, the probability that he selects a card 
represented by choice 1 is: 
Pi1 = P(Vi1>Vi2, Vi1>Vi3) 
The multinomial probit assumes that errors for εij are multivariate normal 
with mean 0 and covariance matrix.  
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β β
εεεε  …(3.27) 
Where m represents the probability of observing an outcome m given x and 
f(·) represents the density function of the multivariate normal distribution. 
As a respondent had to choose multiple times, his different responses are 
likely to be correlated to each other. In addition, the husband and wife responses are 
also likely to be correlated as they live in the same household, and share many things. 
As a result a seemingly unrelated regression multinomial probit framework, with 
robust standard errors clustered at the household level is the most appropriate model 
to produce unbiased estimates. 
  
CHAPTER 4  
Research Design, Fieldwork and Ethical Aspects 
 
1. Research design 
The research design addresses the three different components of the 
conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3. For the stated preference component 
and the choice experiment, I focused on the two-person dyad of husband and wife, 
one of whom is the head of the household. This dyad is perhaps responsible for most 
of the decision-making in the household, including decisions on health. Restricting 
the analyses to just two persons within a household provides us with several 
advantages including logistical convenience and simpler mechanisms for aggregation 
of preferences. But at the same time, it enables us to examine some of the 
fundamental questions such as whether multiple members within the household have 
similar preferences and other aspects of intrahousehold resource allocation.  
The contingent valuation module and the lottery choice experiment were 
combined in the form of a survey with two distinct components—household WTP for 
a malaria vaccine and a lottery section with real payoffs. Husbands and wives were 
invited to a central office and interviewed twice—separately first and jointly 
thereafter for their household WTP for a vaccine. They were again separated for the 
lottery question. For the revealed preference component, height and weight for each 
individual available in the household was collected. 
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The research design is summarized in the figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1: Research design  
  Invite husbands and 
wives to a central 
location for interview. 
 
Collect data on height 
and weight of household 
members#. 
  
     
Interview husbands for 
household WTP.  
   Interview wives for 
household WTP.  
    (N respondents) 
 
       (N respondents) 
  Husband and wife hold 
short joint private 
discussion. 
Interview couple for 
household WTP 
question jointly. 
  
  (N couples)   
Lottery question for 
husbands 
   Lottery question for 
wives. 
(N respondents)    (N respondents) 
N = Sample size= 422 households. 
#: Multiple trips may be necessary for collection of anthropometric data 
 
2. Site selection and malaria disease 
The research design required a study site with an endemic disease where 
respondents feel that they are at risk of getting infected and wish to take preventive 
measures such as purchasing a vaccine against that disease. For a successful stated 
preference experiment, it was also imperative that there not exist a private market for 
the vaccine. Further, the region needed to offer enough variation among status of 
women within the household to test the hypothesis for different models of 
intrahousehold resource allocation. For external validity and broader policy 
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significance of the results, it was imperative that the disease be seen as a problem, 
especially in developing countries where this research was to be conducted. 
The appropriate combination of disease and city was offered by the endemic 
nature of malaria disease in the city of New Mumbai, India located in the state of 
Maharashtra. Maharashtra is among the high malaria prevalence states in the country. 
Maharashtra is also one of the more progressive and gender equitable states in India. 
The overall literacy rate is 77% (86% for males and 68% for females) as compared to 
65% for the nation (76% for males and 54% for females), making it more interesting 
to study household bargaining. A brief note on the city of Navi Mumbai and the 
prevalence of malaria in it is given in Appendix III. A general note on malaria disease 
is given in Appendix IV.  
 
3. Design of different modules of the research 
The entire survey instrument along with all the charts, invitation letters and 
consent letters is attached in Appendix V.  
A. Willingness to Pay sequence 
Respondents were assessed for their knowledge of malaria and vaccines and 
provided information about the symptoms of the disease, how the disease spreads, 
how one can protect herself from the disease, and vaccines in general. This was 
followed up by a presentation of the hypothetical scenario. The hypothetical scenario 
for this experiment was designed on the basis of that being used by the UNC-Chapel 
Hill Economics team headed by Prof. Whittington on their work on the DOMI 
program for International Vaccine Institute (IVI). The instrument mentioned above 
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has been pre-tested and used successfully in different countries including India for 
studying the WTP for cholera and typhoid vaccines. Although the instrument was 
customized to each region, the development of hypothetical scenario testing for 
comprehension of the concept of efficacy has been well tested. The charts used in the 
experiment are attached in Appendix V within the survey instrument. 
We used the referendum question similar to the one used by Cropper et al 
(2004). Respondents initially were asked whether they would buy the available 
vaccine for one or more members of their family. If the respondent replied in the 
affirmative, he was asked who he would be wiling to pay the vaccine for. This was 
followed by questions asking the respondent why he would/or would not buy the 
vaccine. This was followed by the joint section in which the respondent husband and 
wife were asked for their household WTP jointly. They were provided with about two 
minutes for a private discussion8. The respondents were not forced to give the same 
answer as the joint responses to WTP of both husbands and wives was recorded for 
the joint interview. However, they had to respond in front of each other.  
The final prices selected after the pretests were Rs. 109, Rs. 25, Rs. 50, Rs. 
150 and Rs. 500 (approximately $0.22, $ 0.54, $1.09, $3.26, $10.87). The efficacies 
offered were 50% and 95%, whereas the duration offered was 10 years10. 
                                                 
8 In the first pretest, there was no time provided for discussion. However, I found that one of the 
husband or wife responded, and the other simply nodded. I then chose randomly a time of two minutes 
during the pretest and also added some cheap talk. We found that the interaction among husband and 
wife increased (especially if they had differences of opinion). As a result, this time of two minutes was 
maintained. We did not try different times for discussion during the other pretests. Some couples 
reached the decision faster (especially at higher prices). However, we did not keep track of how much 
time it took for couples to reach a decision. 
9 The exchange rate used in the dissertation is 1 US dollar = 46 Indian Rupees. 
10 As discussed in the Appendix, the recent clinical trial in Mozambican children of the Glaxo, RTS, 
S/ASO2A vaccine has shown efficacy of 30% for malaria and 58% for severe malaria in children. 
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B. Collecting anthropometric data 
The height was measured with the help of a wooden staff or tape, and weight 
was measured by a digital or a mechanical weigh balance (with an accuracy of 0.5 
kg). Length was measured for children younger than two years of age. Sometimes 
respondents took multiple trips to take anthropometric measurements. 
The quality of anthropometric data for children under two years of age is not 
accurate as some of the children were not co-operative and the weighing balance did 
not guarantee accuracy of weight measurements under 10 kg (22 pounds).  
 
C. Design of the lottery sequence  
Based on the conceptual framework and the constraints discussed in equation 
3.26, a lottery experiment was designed with real payouts for both husband and wife. 
The focus of the design in the lottery sequence was on the development of two 
extreme choices that could help us differentiate between poolers and non-poolers.  
I added an element of risky choice by introducing two states g and b, each 
denoting a good luck payout and a bad luck payout respectively, to be decided by a 
toss of a coin. The extreme choices A and B offered to the husband are designed such 
that the good luck payouts are as follows: 
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(These are the same equations as in 3.26, except with an added subscript g, which 
denotes payouts in good luck scenario). 
…..(4.1) 
The bad luck payout is always zero, i.e., Aibm = 
B
ibm  = 0 ∀ i 
The addition of bad luck payouts allowed us to double our sample size for the 
same resources as the expected value of payout dropped by half. Maintaining bad 
luck payout to zero reduced cognitive burden on respondents, helped us maintain a 
constant coefficient of risk aversion for all levels of payout and provided an 
opportunity to non-pooling respondents to hide their winning (by telling their partners 
that they did not win the lottery). 
Details of the actual payoffs offered to the respondents are reported in Table 
4.1. Cards P, I and N represent the pooling, intermediate and non-pooling states 
respectively of the lottery described in equation 4.1 and 3.26. The certainty equivalent 
of the lottery reduces for the income pooler from card P to N, but increases for the 
non-income pooler. The intermediate card, I serves as an opt-out for respondents who 
are not sure which card to pick. Thus, an individual can receive a maximum amount 
of Rs.65 for himself if he chooses the option I at the level 16X. This is approximately 
  70
1.4 times the daily minimum wage of Rs. 45 in the state of Maharashtra (Ganesh-
Kumar et al. 2004).  
Table 4.1: Good luck payouts for the three levels (Rs.) 
Card 
# 
Prospect Level X Level Y = 4X Level Z = 16X* 
P You win 
Your spouse wins 
2.50 
2.50 
10.00 
10.00 
40.00 
40.00 
I You win 
Your spouse wins 
3.00 
1.50 
12.00 
6.00 
50.00 
25.00 
N You win 
Your spouse wins 
4.00 
0.00 
16.00 
0.00 
65.00 
  0.00 
 
The game was played in three levels, level X, Y and Z, with the level of 
payout raised gradually for each level with a factor of 4. The game was played in 
ascending order of payout levels, i.e., the smallest payout level (X) was always 
played first and the payout level of sixteen times X played the last.  This ensured that 
interest in the lottery game stayed throughout the experiment. The good luck payouts 
for the all the cards are shown in the table 4.1. An actual lottery card used is shown in 
figure 4.2. The cards did not display the labels of the level.  
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Figure 4.2: Layout of the lottery card 
 Good Luck Payout Bad Luck Payout 
 
 
Outcome 
 
Heads Tails 
You win 2.50 0 
Your wife wins 2.50 0 
 
Each respondent had to play all the levels, irrespective of whether the 
respondent was literate or not as some illiterate respondents may be able to read 
numbers. To make sure that the respondent understood the scenario, the lottery 
module started with an explanation of the experiment and a trial run was taken with 
different cards without any real payout. The respondents were asked three questions 
based on this trial run to screen respondents who did not understand the scenario. 
The lottery experiment was offered to all the couples and played for real for 
all couples at all levels. For a particular level, all the three cards were shown 
simultaneously with no particular order. The husbands and wives were given 
coupons, which were reimbursed immediately after the end of the experiment by the 
supervisor in a sealed envelope. Those respondents who earned less than Rs. 10 were 
handed out a payment of Rs. 10. 
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D. Attitudinal and demographic variables 
Among other things, WTP for a vaccine could be dependent upon the 
respondent characteristics, household characteristics, social and cultural issues. As a 
result, the survey instrument was designed to capture some of these variables. 
Important data collected included information on composition of household 
members, gender and education of the household members, their relationship to the 
respondents, household size, etc. 
The tests of intrahousehold allocation are dependent upon the quality of 
income data. Data were collected on labor income, wage rate, the number of hours 
worked, as well as non-labor income and its source. Data were also collected on 
variables that could indicate status of women such as whether parents had land and if 
so how much. Data on indicators of household socio-economic status such as assets, 
property, utility bills and consumption expenditures as well as type of toilets, water 
connections, type of roofing, flooring, and walls, number of rooms, etc. were also 
collected. To assess the role of social and cultural norms, data was collected on 
religion and dowry. Since people were reluctant to answer whether they paid dowry 
during their wedding, they were asked whether the practice of dowry existed in their 
caste. To identify attitudes towards preferential treatment of male children, 
respondents were also asked who they feel would support them in their old age. They 
also were asked their opinion on level of education that boys and girls should attain 
and whether they saved for the education of their sons and daughters. To examine the 
level of autonomy enjoyed by women, components from National Family Health 
Survey of India, 1998-99 (IIPS and ORC-Macro (2000)) that inquired about the 
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decision role played by women in cooking, health-care, purchasing jewelry and major 
appliances, staying with siblings were incorporated in the survey. 
 
E. Language 
The slum has an ethnic mix of people coming from different geographical 
areas. The local Hindus and Buddhists were native Marathi speakers. The Muslims 
and those coming from the north were native Hindi speakers, but some did understand 
Marathi well and chose to be interviewed in Marathi. As a result, the survey 
instrument was translated into both Marathi and Hindi. The final survey instrument 
was bilingual in Marathi and Hindi. All the enumerators were fluent in both Marathi 
and Hindi. 
  
4. Fieldwork  
The fieldwork started from October 2005, and lasted until the middle of 
March 2006. A team of 12 enumerators and one supervisor was assembled. 
Enumerators were bilingual in Marathi and Hindi.  
Initially a total of three teams (of three enumerators each) were formed. At 
least one woman enumerator was always maintained with each team to interview 
female respondents. Each team also was provided with an assistant. After about a 
week into the survey, managing three teams was found to be difficult, and the number 
of teams was brought down to two. Each team was restricted from conducting more 
than eight interviews per day, so as to maintain quality of the work. There were two 
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supervisors, including myself. A consultant who had worked with a local NGO and 
had a master’s degree in social work was hired to assist in the design of fieldwork. 
 
A. Confidentiality of Responses & Field Protocol 
It was important in this study that husbands and wives didn’t know 
beforehand that they would have to respond jointly later to make sure then they didn’t 
have an incentive to align their responses based on their partner’s response. During 
separate interviews, husbands and wives were likely to answer the questions based on 
an assumption that their responses would  remain confidential from their partner. A 
joint interview could be viewed as a breach of trust that the respondent had with the 
enumerator and hence a major issue of ethical concern in the study. The weakest link 
in maintaining confidentiality is perhaps the enumerator. No matter how well trained, 
an enumerator could directly or indirectly reveal what the wife said to the husband 
(and vice-versa). Overhearing children or neighbors could also compromise the 
confidentiality of responses. 
These risks were mitigated with the help of an appropriately designed consent 
form, and taking extra steps to maintain a high level of confidentiality in the survey, 
especially the privacy of the respondent and making sure that private conversations 
remained private. 
The IRB requires that respondents be briefed beforehand without any 
deception about the tasks that they have to complete. The survey required a consent 
form that respondents not be informed about the joint interview before the separate 
interviews were completed. The IRB does allows surveyors to ask respondents 
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whether they may be interested in follow-up surveys. Although the respondents were 
not told upfront about the joint survey, there was no deception in the consent form. 
Instead, the consent form was split into two parts. The respondents were told in the 
first consent form that the project had two phases and additional information about 
the second phase would be given only after the first stage was finished. Consent was 
taken for phase 1 only. The second consent form then contained information about the 
section where respondents have to answer jointly. In case the respondents later 
refused to answer the joint section they were provided with an opportunity to quit the 
survey.  
The following fieldwork protocol was adhered to maintain both the privacy 
and confidentiality of the respondents. 
1. Every morning, the four members of each team reported to the designated field 
site. They were handed a list of the households that needed to be interviewed for 
the day. The primary responsibility of inviting respondents to the central office 
lay with the supervisors and the assistants. When there were not enough 
interviews, enumerators also went in the field to seek appointments. The 
assistants were trained to seek appointments and to fill out the first three sections 
of the questionnaire and take measurements for height and weight. For the joint 
interview, husbands sometimes went into the wives’ room and vice versa. 
2. Husbands and wives were invited to a central location for the main interview. 
Except for some basic data such as measurement of height, weight of family 
members, household composition, and some preliminary demographic 
information, all other information was collected at the central location.  
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3. Husbands and wives were interviewed in separate rooms. Sometimes if the central 
office was big, temporary partitions were erected in between. Maximum effort 
was made to ensure that husband and wife could not hear each other’s responses. 
In a couple of instances when one of the partners was not able to make it to the 
office, he/she was interviewed at home and the other partner was interviewed at 
the office, and joint interviews were conducted at home. 
4. Husbands and wives were interviewed by different enumerators. The moment 
they finished their individual responses, the survey questionnaires were returned 
to the supervisor. An enumerator, different from the above two conducted the 
joint interview. Thus, a total of three enumerators formed a single interviewing 
team. 
5. Enumerators were trained not to discuss respondent and family characteristics 
among themselves. 
6. Enumerators local to a specific area were not allowed to conduct interviews. No 
enumerator was allowed to store or transfer data. 
7. Completed questionnaires were not kept with the enumerators or in the site office 
overnight. Every evening, they were transported to the data entry office located 
away from any of the survey sites. 
8. Collection of height and weight often required multiple trips to the household. 
The section that included data on height and weight was kept separate from the 
other part of the questionnaire (with separate and joint responses) until it was 
completed. This information was later shared with the household. 
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The data entry software was generated with provisions for double data entry. 
A data entry operator was hired for one set of data entry. The second data entry was 
contracted to another agency, Caretech.  
 
5. Pretests 
A total of four pretests were conducted on 120 households (240 respondents) 
in four neighborhoods. The first couple of pretests displayed tendencies of the 
respondents to indulge in yea saying. The structure of the questionnaire was modified 
and cheap talk was introduced, which reduced the amount of yea saying in the later 
pretests. Another problem was the poor quality of discussion in the joint section. 
More often than not, only one of the respondent husband or wife responded, and the 
other simply nodded. To ensure a good quality of discussion between male and 
female respondents, husband and wife had to compulsorily spend about two minutes 
discussing with each other whether they wanted to buy a vaccine for anyone within 
the household. The enumerator did not stay in front of the husbands and wives during 
this discussion. This worked really well as couples were discussing more actively 
whether to purchase a vaccine or not.   
 
6. Sampling size and sampling frame 
The vaccine offered in the hypothetical scenario had two efficacies, (95% and 
50%), a single duration (10 years) and five prices. Assuming a cell size of about 35, 
the required sample size was about 350 households.  
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The Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation identifies areas with an annual 
parasite index (number of cases per 1000 of population) of greater than 2 as priority 
areas for malaria. A list of slums having API greater than 2.0 was compiled from the 
different urban health posts. The Khairne UHP was selected for the survey as it was 
the most severely affected by malaria. The slums Shramik Nagar and Hanuman Nagar 
(Mahape) were selected from this UHP. Officials at the Navi Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation recommended that Ramabai Nagar from Belapur UHP also be included 
in the study. A slum with a low risk of malaria, Hanuman Nagar (Turbhe Naka), was 
also selected as it was near the slums interviewed in Khairne UHP.  
Sampling in slums is always a difficult proposition. Slums change 
dynamically, both in terms of population and in the number of tenements. Local 
elected officials were wary of us using electoral lists, which is one possible sampling 
frame. This could be because of discrepancies that may exist between the population 
actually living in the slums and the population registered for elections. Since it is 
difficult to conduct fieldwork in slums without the consent of the local politicians, 
this sampling frame was rejected. 
Fortunately, each household has a “household survey receipt” whose number 
is written on the door (generally in red ink). The survey receipt that bears this number 
is considered equivalent to a “title” by the slum dwellers. If a slum is acquired for 
some government project, these survey receipts help decide the duration of stay and 
hence whether the household qualifies for any compensation. Newly painted or 
replaced doors did not display these numbers, but the dwellings were numbered 
sequentially (as best possible in a slum) and household members were willing to 
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show the survey receipt. To sample within the slum, a reconnaissance survey was 
conducted to find the starting number and the ending number for the survey receipt, 
and random sampling was conducted using the “sample” command from STATA.  
Finally, a total of 422 couples in 422 households living in these four slums 
were interviewed. The final price-cell combinations that were offered in the survey 
are reported in table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Actual price-efficacy cell combinations 
Price (Rs.) 50% effective 
vaccine 
95% effective 
vaccine 
Total 
10 41 45 86 
25 40 45 85 
50 41 43 84 
150 43 49 92 
500 35 40 75 
Total 200 222 422 
 
7. Managing logistics 
In the field, there were two particularly difficult tasks. The first one was to 
find husbands and wives together at home at the same time. The second was to make 
sure that they come to a central place where they could be interviewed within that 
time frame. 
In the pretests, the survey team found it difficult to recruit couples living in 
neighborhoods other than slums for interviews because many husbands worked full 
time, left home early and returned back late in the evening. With women enumerators 
in the team, it was difficult to work late in the evening. Similarly, it was difficult to 
recruit couples early in the morning, as they were busy getting ready to work.  
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In slums, however, recruiting was lesser of a problem because of the 
differences in the daily routine of residents. First of all, fewer numbers of slum 
dwellers had a full time job. A majority of husbands were daily wage earning 
laborers. Every morning, they turned up at a recruiting market where, if lucky, they 
got a job for the entire day (or sometimes a week). If not, they would return home 
before noon and remained free for the remaining of the day. Some husbands had 
flexible work hours (e.g. auto-rickshaw drivers) came home for their midday meal 
and a short nap and were willing to be interviewed in the afternoon. People who 
worked in quarries and construction work often had Friday as a free day whereas 
people working in factories had their Sunday off. As a result, we effectively had two 
days in a week to recruit full time workers for our survey.  
Recruiting women was not much of a problem. A majority of the women 
stayed at home where they were housewives, or managed small in-home businesses 
such as tailoring, etc. The other major group of women worked as housemaids. These 
maids generally went for work early in the morning, served in about 8 to 10 
households and returned back by late afternoon, and were available to be interviewed 
after returning home. Few women who worked full-time followed a similar schedule 
as male full-time workers, and were generally available on Fridays or Sundays. 
The field supervisor and local field workers were mainly responsible for 
recruiting couples for interview at a central place. This resulted in enumerators 
spending less time traveling and searching for houses during the peak hours when 
people would be at home. During the pretests, we found people reluctant to travel to a 
central location, if the commute was more than a ten-minute walk. As a result, we had 
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to choose multiple central offices in a single community11 so as to encourage 
participation of respondents.  
 
8. Mitigation of ethical risks 
Social and behavioral research bear risks such as psychosocial stress and 
discomfort, disruption of family relationships emanating from leak of data, and stress 
and discomfort from being asked personal questions and being deceived (Dickstein et 
al., 2004). Some of these risks could be harmful as their effects may be “less 
predictable, more subjective and variable, and less remediable than physiological 
harms.” Whittington (2004) points out some of the issues that make ethical conflicts 
even more pervasive in contingent valuation studies and that such studies can 
“mislead, confuse or worry” respondents. Information provided could be leaked to the 
public resulting in stress, discomfort and loss of reputation or livelihood. Information 
could also be used to design policies, which affect respondents adversely. Invasive 
questions not disclosed in the consent form further increase the unanticipated costs on 
the respondent. 
The risks applicable to this study other than those emanating from lack of 
confidentiality (already discussed) and the procedures adopted to mitigate them are 
described in table 4.3. 
                                                 
11 There was only a single office in Ramabai Nagar, which is a relatively smaller slum. Further, the 
terrain was such that almost everyone going in and out of the slum had to pass near the selected central 
office. 
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Table 4.3: Generic ethical risks 
Source of risk Risk Mitigation 
Hypothetical scenario 
involving vaccines 
(deception) 
Persistent belief after end of 
experiment may change 
behavioral patterns and 
increase respondent risk 
Appropriate debriefing at the 
end of the experiment 
Split sample design Psychosocial risk for fact that 
neighbors may be offered 
different prices/ scenarios 
Appropriate debriefing at the 
end of the experiment 
Inappropriate sampling Selecting specific 
respondents meeting a 
certain ethnic, racial or other 
profile 
Random sampling 
Information provided about 
malaria 
Inflicted insight (Dickstein et 
al., 2004) 
A positive externality of the 
research. 
Questions on WTP, choice of 
lottery 
Stress By including statements such 
as “no right or wrong 
answers” and cheap talk. 
Female respondents 
interviewed by male 
enumerators 
Discomfort, disregarding of 
social norms 
Make sure that there exists a 
female enumerator to 
interview a female 
respondent 
Magnitude of compensation Too high or too low No gift, lottery instrument 
acts as compensation. 
Maximum and minimum 
levels agreed upon by IRB. 
Confidentiality not 
maintained by local team 
Local team provides escape 
hatch to IRB commitments 
Pledge of confidentiality by 
the local team, proper 
training of enumerators. 
Make sure that enumerators 
don’t carry questionnaires 
home with them. Proper 
supervision of enumerators. 
Inappropriate information 
about costs of the survey to 
the respondent 
Lack of “Respect for 
persons” 
Truthful oral informed 
consent. 
Unsafe storage of data Loss of confidentiality of the 
survey 
Maintain proper storage 
procedures for storage of 
questionnaire and data. 
Personal information to be 
stored separately with a key. 
 CHAPTER 5  
Results: Profile of Sample Respondents 
 
1. Living conditions of the respondents 
The living conditions in the slums surveyed can only be termed as tough. The 
poorest within the slums used only plastic polythene for walls and roofs. Overall 
plastics covered 32% of the walls and 33% of the roofs. Two of the communities, 
Shramik Nagar and Ramabai Nagar, were relatively poorer, with 71% and 80% of the 
dwellings respectively with roofs covered with plastics. Other prominent materials in 
roofing included corrugated cement sheets (55% of dwellings) and Galvanized Iron or 
Asbestos sheets (10% of dwellings). Walls were made of plastered bricks (48% of 
dwellings), Galvanized Iron/ Asbestos (12% of dwellings), and mud (7% of the 
dwellings). The flooring material included cement floor (72%), Mosaic floor tiles 
(12%) and polished stones (10%) and mud. Only about 46% of the households had a 
window in their dwelling and a few (only 4%) of the dwellings had either an 
additional storey or an additional loft. The average number of rooms was low at 1.18 
with about 85% of the dwellings having only a single room, and another 12% with 
two rooms.  
Many dwellings included in our study lacked some basic amenities like 
electricity, piped water and sewerage. While some of the respondents had their own 
electricity connection from the utility, others rented electricity from their neighbors or 
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landlords for a monthly lump-sum fee. Again, the two communities of Shramik Nagar 
and Ramabai Nagar had lower electricity coverage of 22% and 60% respectively as 
against the other two slums, which had universal coverage. A few people in these two 
relatively better off slums did not have electricity in the house, as they could not 
afford the extra premium extorted by landlords for the electricity. For households 
having electricity and paying a monthly bill or rent for the same, the monthly 
expenditure on electricity was Rs. 298.6 (about $ 6.5) per month. Almost everyone 
(99% of the respondents) used shared piped water connections. Only four respondents 
reported having their own private water connection and one respondent reported that 
he pilfered water from a tap in a municipality water main. Water in public taps was 
available only for a few hours daily. About 31% of the households said that they did 
not have access to any toilet facilities and had to defecate in the open. 70% of the 
respondents said that they used public toilets. Some of the public toilets were not 
available for free and charged a Rupee for each use. These toilets did not have soap or 
sometimes even wash-basins for washing hands after defecation.  About 4% of the 
respondents used a port-a-potty provided by the government (which was available for 
free). Again such port-a-potties did not have any wash-basins or soap. Only one 
respondent reported using a flush water closet shared with neighbors and five 
respondents reported that they had a water closet in their house for personal use.  
About 13% of households had a telephone land line and 15% of the 
households reported having at least one member of the household possessing a mobile 
phone. Kerosene was the main fuel used in about 52% of the households. Another 
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37% relied on firewood whereas only 11% of the households used Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG). 
Ceiling fan, pressure cooker and televisions (color and black & white 
combined) were the three most commonly found assets. Table 5.1 shows some of the 
sought after assets and the proportion of households possessing them.  
Table 5.1: Assets in households 
Asset % household possessing it 
Ceiling fan 61 
Pressure cooker 49 
Grinder 35 
Color TV 29 
Black & White TV 20 
FM radio 19 
Bicycle 15 
Cabinet 15 
Portable fan 13 
Refrigerator 3 
 
About 26% of the respondents did not possess any of the above-mentioned 
assets, with most of these having no electricity. These were indeed the poorest among 
the poor.  
 
2. Demographics 
The average age of husbands and wives interviewed was 36.6 and 29.8 years 
respectively. The mean household size was higher at 4.6 (with a minimum of three 
and maximum of ten members) compared to 4.3 for the Navi Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation (Census India, 2001). Although there were on average 4.2 persons living 
in each room, the density was higher in dwellings with only a single room at 4.6 
persons. As many as 97% of the families were nuclear, i.e., only the respondent 
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couple and their children lived in the household. This is hardly surprising given the 
space, or rather the lack of it. There were a few instances of in-laws living in nearby 
or adjacent dwellings. They were not classified as household members.  
42% of husbands reported receiving no schooling at all. About 9% of the 
husbands reported receiving some level of primary education (grade 1-4), 27% 
received some level of secondary education (grade 5-9), 19% received some level of 
higher secondary education (grade 10-12). Only ten husbands had a bachelor’s degree 
and one respondent had professional education. Education levels reported by women 
were even lower with about 63% reporting no schooling, 7% reporting primary 
education, 23% reporting secondary education, and 6% reporting higher secondary 
education. No woman interviewed in the sample studied more than 12th grade. Low 
literacy levels also can be seen by the fact that about 44% of husbands and 58% of 
wives said that they were unable to read a newspaper. 
The low literacy rates for men and women made explanation of the 
hypothetical scenarios for stated preference studies challenging. To make sure that 
respondents understood the vaccine efficacy scenario, enumerators explained the 
concept of efficacy a maximum of two times and tested for respondents’ 
understanding after each round. If respondent failed after two rounds of explanation, 
the enumerator proceeded with the hypothetical scenario without explaining again. 
However a total of 94% of men and 87% of women interviewed passed the efficacy 
test, of which 84% of males and 80% of females passed the efficacy test in the first 
round. Of the 49 women who did not pass the efficacy test, 42 (86%) had never 
attended school, and another three had reported having attended only primary school. 
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About 54% of the respondents were Hindus, followed by 31% Buddhists and 
about 14% Muslims. This distribution was different from that of the state of 
Maharashtra which has 81% Hindus, 10% Muslims and 6% Buddhists for the state of 
Maharashtra. As evidenced in the data, the number of Buddhists living in slums was 
noticeably higher. The mean household size for Muslims (5.1 persons) was 
significantly higher than that for Hindus (4.6 persons) and Buddhists (4.4 persons). 
 
3. Knowledge about malaria 
45% of husbands and 14% of wives knew of someone infected with malaria. 
About 21% of husbands reported having been infected with malaria some time in 
their life as against only 3% of wives. However, only 2% of the women reported that 
their husbands had malaria in the past. 7% of husbands and 4% of wives reported that 
their children had been infected by malaria in the past. Only 8% of husbands and 2% 
of wives knew someone who died because of malaria.  
98% of husbands and 94% of wives opined that a mosquito bite could cause 
malaria. However, not everyone was sure how people are infected with malaria as 
32% husbands and 31% for wives felt that even drinking unboiled water could also 
cause malaria.  
Almost all of the husbands and wives felt that it was necessary to treat a 
person infected with malaria and that modern medicinal practices helped. About 58% 
of the husbands and 67% of the wives felt that malaria could also be cured using 
Ayurvedic practices (traditional herbal medicine). About 40% of husbands and 67% 
of wives felt that religious practices such as praying and drinking holy water could 
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also help in curing malaria. In India, chloroquine is the malarial drug of choice as 
there is little drug resistance to it. However, there was very low awareness about 
chloroquine as only 4% of husbands and 2% of wives knew about this medicine. A 
few respondents confused chloroquine with chlorine drops that are added to water as 
a disinfectant.  
Respondents were asked whether the following were effective ways of 
protecting from malaria: 1) keeping the house and environment clean/  draining wet 
areas, 2) sleeping under the bed net, 3) burning cow-dung/leaves to generate smoke, 
4) spraying household insecticide sprays, 5) applying mosquito repellent creams to 
the body, and 6) burning mosquito repellent incense (refer table 5.2).  
Table 5.2: Protection from getting malaria 
“What can we do to protect us from getting malaria” % of Husbands % of wives 
Keep house and environment clean/ drain wet areas 98 91 
Use a mosquito net 97 90 
Burn cow-dung, leaves to generate smoke 74 79 
Use household insecticide sprays  92 86 
Apply mosquito repellent cream to body 58 72 
Use mosquito repellent incense / mats12 91 85 
 
4. Knowledge about vaccines 
Almost all of the respondents (97% of husbands and 95% of wives) had heard 
about vaccines and more than 87% of the couples had vaccinated their children as 
part of the national immunization program. However, almost a third of the 
respondents didn’t know the purpose of vaccination, and another half felt that the 
                                                 
12 The popular brands used in the survey included—Tortoise  (Kachwa-chaap) for mosquito repellent 
incense and Good-Knight for mosquito repellent mats.  
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purpose of a vaccine was to prevent disease in children only. 2% of husbands and 
15% of wives thought that a vaccine helps to cure a disease.  
In addition to illiteracy, there may be reasons why respondents felt 
vaccination to be the domain of children. Almost none of the persons interviewed had 
been vaccinated against any disease and their children were generally the first 
generation recipients of vaccines in their families. They probably knew no one who 
had received any kind of vaccine as an adult. One of the successful campaigns of the 
National Immunization Programme (NIP), the polio eradication campaign, is targeted 
toward infants, and has succeeded in creating strong public awareness, thanks to 
celebrity endorsements on television and other media. For many of the slum 
members, “vaccination” was synonymous with oral drops of polio for their children 
recommended by Amitabh Bachchan, their favorite Bollywood superstar on TV. This 
may have implications for a private market for a vaccine as the potential benefits of a 
vaccine to adults may have to be explained carefully. 
Almost 16% of husbands and 25% of wives reported at least one child having 
received the hepatitis A vaccine. Husbands reported a total of 169 children (90 boys, 
69 girls) had received a hepatitis vaccine and paid an average price of Rs. 42.9 
(US$0.9) whereas wives reported about 225 children receiving a hepatitis vaccine 
(119 boys and 106 girls) and paid an average price of Rs. 46.2 (US$ 1.0).  
 
5. Occupation and income  
Poor education resulted in low quality jobs as can be seen by the occupations 
of the respondents. About 47% of the respondent husbands were daily wage 
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laborers13 and another 29% had a salaried job that required low level of skill. 6% 
were factory workers, 5% of the respondents had a salaried job that required a 
moderate amount of skill 3% were artisans and 2% were shopkeepers. Only 3% 
reported themselves as unemployed. The remaining 5% of the respondent husbands 
worked as “Mathadi” workers14, hawkers, professionals, small scale businessman, 
managerial level employees or housemaids. Among self-employed men, many were 
auto rickshaw drivers.  
About 70% of the women were housewives, with the rest having low quality 
jobs. About 14% were daily wage laborers, 10% were housemaids15 and 3% had a 
salaried job that required low level of skill. The remaining 3% of the women worked 
as shopkeepers, factory workers, hawkers, professionals, small-scale businesswomen, 
and managerial and middle level salaried employees.  
For working men, the mean daily wage rate was about Rs.113.116 and the 
median daily wage rate was Rs. 100.0 (US$ 2.2). For women, the mean daily wage 
rate was about Rs. 52.9 (US$1.2) and the median daily wage rate was Rs. 50.0 
(US$1.1). Husbands and wives who worked were working an average of 51.5 and 
42.9 hours of work per week respectively. The average monthly income (labor and 
non-labor) was Rs. 3531.1 (US$76.8) for husbands and Rs. 748.7 (US$16.3) for 
wives. 7% of men and 58% of the women did not have any source of labor or non-
                                                 
13 Daily wage earners are called “bigari mazoor” literally meaning laborers who are not on a payroll. 
14 Mathadi workers are those who specialize in heavy load lifting. They work in the nearby factories, 
are represented by unions and can earn as high as Rs.15,000 per month. 
15 Housemaid is called “Mol-karin,” which literally translated means one who works for wages.  
16 Exchange rate assumed is Rs 46 = 1 US$. 
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labor income. Most of these women were housewives. For women earning some labor 
or non-labor income, the average total income was Rs.1938.2 (US$42.1). Only 4% of 
husbands and 6% of wives owned some land or property other than their own house. 
Major sources of non-labor income included annual bonus, rent income from other 
homes or vehicles (auto rickshaws) and transfers from children or parents. Other 
minor sources included transfers from friends, interest income and income from 
insurance policy.  
 
6. Decision-making within the household 
 
Figure 5.1: Household decision-making questions asked to women 
 
 
In the survey, wives were asked how they made different household decisions. 
Figure 5.1 indicates how wives felt that decisions were made within the household. 
As expected, cooking was under the wife’s domain with almost 85% of the women 
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making cooking decision by themselves. In all other intrahousehold decision-making, 
wives reported that husbands played an important role in decision-making and 
depending upon the decision to be made, almost 43% to 52% of husbands were the 
decision makers. At the same time, the data demonstrate some households making 
decisions jointly as can be seen by the proportion of wives reporting joint decision-
making in health care (14%), purchasing major jewelry (42%), purchasing major 
appliances (31%), visiting siblings/ parents (37%), vaccination decisions for the wife 
(27%) and for children (36%). Table 5.3 shows that the proportion of women, who 
reported that they play some role in the decision-making process (those who reported 
making decisions themselves or jointly with their husbands) for our survey is 
comparable to that for the state of Maharashtra as seen in the National Family Health 
Survey, 1998-99 (NHFS-2). 
Table 5.3: Women playing some role in household decision-making 
% involved in decision-making  
(self or with husband) 
Survey Maharashtra 
(Urban) 
Items to be cooked 89 87 
Health care for herself 52 58 
Purchasing jewelry, etc. 54 55 
Staying with Parents/ siblings 46 49 
Not involved in any decision-
making 8 7 
All figures in percentages.  
* Source for Maharashtra (Urban): Center for Operations Research and Training and IIPS (2000). 
Figure 5.1 and table 5.3 also indicate how the husband-wife dyad is responsible 
for most of the decision-making taking place in the households. 
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7. Household financial arrangements 
 
To examine the issue of income pooling, husbands and wives were asked 
separately to describe the financial arrangements within their house17. These 
arrangements are reported in table 5.4. Of the 419 couples in which both answered the 
question, about 53% of the husbands and 73% of the wives said that they made 
managed household expenses jointly. However, only 39% of the couples agreed with 
their spouse’s assessment of the way household finances were managed. Both the 
reported household financial arrangements and the extent of women’s involvement in 
decision-making within the household indicate at least some level of decentralized 
decision-making within the household.  
Table 5.4 Household financial arrangements 
 
Husband's 
assessment 
Wife's 
assessment 
Joint 53% 72%
Independent 0% 3%
Except for wife's personal expense, husband looks after 
the household 8% 4%
Except for husband's personal expenses, wife looks after 
household 17% 2%
Wife given a housekeeping allowance, husband makes all 
financial decisions 22% 16%
Husband given a housekeeping allowance, wife makes all 
financial decisions 0% 3%
 
 
                                                 
17 This question was adapted from Bateman and Munroe (2003a). 
  
CHAPTER 6  
Evidence from Household Demand for Malaria Vaccine 
 
1. Module objectives 
This chapter summarizes the results of the stated preference study to 
determine household demand for a malaria vaccine. The objectives of this chapter are 
as follows: 
1) Examine whether the husband and wife have different preferences. Explore 
socio-economic factors that affect husband and wife opinions differently. 
2) Explore the impact of behavioral aggregation. Compare behavioral 
aggregation to heuristic techniques of preference aggregation. 
3) Explore different functional forms for household demand using switching 
regression. 
4) Determine the socio-economic factors associated with women who changed 
their opinion in the joint survey. 
  
2. Scenario rejecters and exclusion criteria 
To identify those who did not believe in the hypothetical scenario, 
respondents were asked the reasons why they would not purchase a hypothetical 
vaccine. Of those who refused to buy a vaccine, the main reason was affordability. 
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49% of the husbands and 57% of the wives felt that they had no money. Another 42% 
of the husbands and 29% of the wives felt that the vaccine was too expensive. About 
5% of the respondent husbands and 10% of the wives refused to be vaccinated for 
free. Some of these were respondents who dismissed the hypothetical scenario, 
whereas others were not in the market for a vaccine as they felt that they had no 
chance of getting malaria, or that malaria was not a serious disease. Since our main 
purpose is to compare husband and wife preferences, a household was excluded if 
either a husband or wife or both were scenario rejecters. As a result, a total of 17 
(about 4% of total interviewed) scenario rejecters were identified and are reported in 
table 6.1. These households were excluded from the sample. The final sample size for 
the analysis was restricted to 405 households. 
 
Table 6.1: Scenario rejecters and exclusion criteria 
Particulars Number of 
Husbands 
Number of 
Wives 
Number of 
Households 
Interviews conducted 
 
422 422 422 
Respondents who refused to purchase 
a vaccine because:    
  Vaccine might not be safe 4 0 4 
  Syringe/ container might be dirty 1 0 1 
Sub-total 5 0 5 
    
Additional respondents who refused to 
be vaccinated for free because:    
  Vaccine might not be safe 1 5 6 
  Syringe/container might be dirty 0 1 1 
  Vaccine cannot really prevent malaria 1 3 4 
  Need doctor's advice 1 0 1 
Sub-total 3 9 12 
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3. Demand for vaccines 
A. All or nothing approach 
I examined the data for patterns in the way husbands and wives answered the 
vaccine demand questions. When interviewed separately, almost 91% of the husbands 
and 88% of the wives adopted an “all or nothing” approach, i.e., either they were 
willing to pay for no vaccine at all or were willing to pay for a vaccine for everyone 
within the household. Figures 6.1 to 6.4 report the proportion of husbands and wives 
who took an “all or nothing” approach for both efficacies when interviewed 
separately. As the price increased, the number of respondents purchasing no vaccine 
for a household increased. It is likely that husbands and wives initially thought about 
whether they wanted to purchase a vaccine, and if so, wanted to purchase it for the 
entire household. 
Figure 6.1: “All or nothing” – husband (50% effective vaccine) 
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Figure 6.2: “All or nothing” – husband (95% effective vaccine) 
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Figure 6.3: “All or nothing”- wife (50% effective vaccine) 
For all or none: Wives (50% effective)
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Figure 6.4: “All or nothing”- wife (95% effective vaccine) 
For all or none: Wives (95% effective)
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However, this does not mean that all husbands and wives agreed with each 
other all the time. In fact, only 236 of the 388 couples (61%) agreed with each other 
regarding the number of vaccines that they would purchase when interviewed 
separately. About 18% of the wives reported a demand higher than their husbands and 
22% of the wives said that they were willing to pay for a lower number of vaccines 
than their husbands.  
To examine whether husbands and wives were in full agreement regarding the 
number of vaccines they said they would purchase for their household, and how their 
opinions coincided with increasing prices, I plotted the number of couples who 
agreed upon the number of vaccines that they purchased in figures 6.5 to 6.8, the 
number being zero, the full household size or some other positive number between 
zero and household size.  
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Figure 6.5: Pattern of agreement – separate interview (50% effective vaccine) 
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Figure 6.6: Pattern of agreement - separate interview (95% effective vaccine) 
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Figures 6.5 & 6.6 indicate that when interviewed separately, the number of 
respondents agreeing with their spouses increased from about 50% at the lowest price 
to about 71% at the highest price for 95% effective vaccine at 83% at the highest 
price for 50% effective vaccine. The proportion of couples who agreed to buy zero 
vaccines, increased from about 19% of the respondents at the lowest price to 80% of 
the respondents at the highest price, whereas the proportion of couples agreeing to 
purchase vaccines for their entire household decreased as price increased.  
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Figure 6.7: Pattern of agreement - joint interview (50% effective vaccine) 
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Figure 6.8: Pattern of agreement - joint interview (95% effective vaccine) 
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Following the joint discussion, there was a rise in the number of respondents 
who agreed on a positive number of vaccines for the household, including those 
willing to pay for vaccines for the entire household. Depending upon the price and 
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efficacy, 68% to 86% of the couples adopted the “all or nothing” approach, implying 
that not only did they agree upon the number of vaccines but also agreed on who 
within the household should or should not receive that vaccine.  
 
B. Differences in husband and wife stated demand 
Both husbands and wives had an opportunity to change their opinions during 
the joint interview. Overall 24% of the husbands changed opinion compared to 35% 
of the wives (table 6.2 and table 6.3). In households in which only one partner 
changed opinions, women were twice as likely to change their opinion for the entire 
sample and about 2.4 times more likely at the lowest price. Of those who disagreed in 
separate interviews, but changed an opinion to align their preferences with their 
partner, women were almost twice as likely to change opinions than their male 
counterparts for the full sample and 2.8 times more likely at the lowest price.  
Table 6.2: Respondents who changed opinion during joint interview (full sample) 
(Entire sample) Wives who 
changed their 
opinion 
Wives who 
didn’t change 
their opinion 
Total husbands 
Husbands who changed 
their opinion 
53 (13%) 46 (11%) 99 (24%) 
Husbands who didn’t 
change their opinion 
88 (22%) 218 (54%) 306 (76%) 
 
Total wives 141 (35%) 264 (65%)  
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Table 6.3: Respondents who changed opinion during joint interview (lowest price) 
(Lowest Price) Wives who 
changed their 
opinion 
Wives who 
didn’t change 
their opinion 
Total husbands 
Husbands who changed 
their opinion 
8 (10%) 11 (14%) 19 (24%) 
Husbands who didn’t 
change their opinion 
26 (33%) 35 (44%) 61 (76%) 
 
Total wives 34 (43%) 46 (58%)  
 
I examined the preference aggregation strategies and classified households 
according to how the husbands and wives behaved to arrive at their final decision. 
These aggregation strategies are noted in table 6.4.  
Table 6.4: Aggregation strategies 
Type of bargaining % of respondents 
(full sample) 
% of respondents 
(lowest Price) 
Husband and wife agree with each other, before and after 
joint interview 
50* 39@ 
Husband preferences dictate joint decision; wife changed 
opinion to agree with husband. 
22 28 
Wife preferences dictate joint decision; husband changed 
opinion to agree with wife. 
11 10 
Both agree before and after interview, but choose a 
different number of vaccines during separate and joint 
interviews. 
6 5 
Both chose different number of vaccines and stayed firm 
on their preferences before and after interview. 
4 5 
No specific aggregation strategy 7 13 
* of these, 80 % agreed to buy zero vaccines. 
@ of these, 30% agreed to buy zero vaccines 
 
As can be seen, a majority of husbands and wives agreed with each other 
during both joint and separate interviews, of which about 80% agreed to buy zero 
vaccines. At the lowest price, however, overall agreement was lower at about 39%, of 
which only 30% of the couples agreed to buy zero vaccines.  
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C. Stated demand for vaccines 
 
Table 6.5 and figures 6.9 and 6.10 show raw stated average number of 
vaccines that respondents were willing to pay, when interviewed separately and 
jointly.  
 
Figure 6.9: Stated WTP when interviewed separately 
Stated Mean Number of Vaccines that Respondents are Willing to Pay 
when Interviewed Separately
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Figure 6.10: Stated WTP when interviewed jointly 
Stated Mean Number of Vaccines that Respondents are Willing to 
Pay when Interviewed Jointly
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Table 6.5: Mean number of vaccines by price and efficacy 
Price Mean # vaccines WTP when interviewed 
separately 
 Mean # vaccines WTP when interviewed 
jointly  
(US$) Mean husband demand 
mHS 
Mean wife demand 
mWS 
Mean husband demand
mHJ  
Mean wife demand 
 mWJ 
 50% 
effective 
95% 
effective 
50% 
effective 
95% 
effective 
50% 
effective 
95% 
effective 
50% 
effective 
95% 
effective 
0.2 2.82 3.14 1.76 2.12 2.63 3.36 2.55 3.10 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.30) (0.35) (0.31) (0.36) 
0.5 2.33 1.66 1.73 1.17 2.13 2.02 2.35 1.93 
 (0.37) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) 
1.1 0.80 1.50 1.38 0.98 1.33 1.15 1.70 1.28 
 (0.27) (0.36) (0.32) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32) 
3.3 0.64 0.96 1.40 0.67 0.48 0.86 0.45 0.80 
 (0.23) (0.29) (0.33) (0.2) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.23) 
10.9 0.40 0.55 0.40 0.55 0.43 0.34 0.40 0.37 
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
The impact of price can be clearly seen for both husbands and wives for their 
separate as well as joint responses. The mean stated number of vaccines that 
respondents were willing to pay dropped down as prices increased. When offered a 
vaccine with lowest price of 22 cents and 50% efficacy and asked separately, the 
husbands and wives in each household were willing to pay for an average of 2.8 and 
1.8 vaccines respectively. At a price of $10.9, the mean number of vaccines that 
husbands and wives were willing to pay dropped down to 0.5 and 0.6 respectively. 
However, the average number of vaccines that women were willing to pay was higher 
at 50% efficacy than that for 95% efficacy for some price levels (e.g. price of $0.5 for 
wives).  
The stated WTP did not drop across the board for husbands and wives, but 
rather the husband and wife responses moved closer, with a tendency for the stated 
demand to increase after a joint interview at lower prices. The mean of absolute 
differences between husband and wife demand for 95% effective vaccine when 
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interviewed separately was 0.5. This dropped to 0.1 for both when interviewed 
jointly. At higher prices, however, the joint stated demand was more likely to drop. 
This findings support the possibility that at lower prices, husbands and wives were 
more considerate of the views of their partner and hence were willing to buy vaccines 
for other household members.  
To assess whether husbands and wives were willing to pay for the same 
number of vaccines, t-tests of mean equivalence between husband demand and wife 
demand were conducted for different combinations of price and efficacies, for both 
separate and joint responses. The tests are reported in table 6.6. Tests 1 and 2 examine 
the differences between husband and wife responses whereas tests 3 and 4 examine 
the differences between separate and joint individual responses.  
Table 6.6: t-tests of mean equivalence across sub-sample 
Efficacy 
(%) 
Price 
(US$) 
Ho: Mean separate 
husband demand = 
Mean separate wife 
demand 
Ho: Mean joint 
husband demand = 
Mean joint wife 
demand 
 
Ho: Mean separate 
husband demand= 
Mean joint husband 
demand 
Ho: Mean separate 
wife demand = 
Mean joint wife 
demand 
 
  mHS  = mWS mHJ  = mWJ mHS  = mHJ mWS  = mWJ 
  Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 
50 0.2 R** NR NR R+ 
 0.5 NR NR NR NR 
 1.1 NR NR R* NR 
 3.3 R* NR NR R* 
 10.9 NR NR NR NR 
95 0.2 R* NR NR R* 
 0.5 NR NR NR R* 
 1.1 NR NR NR NR 
 3.3 NR NR NR NR 
 10.9 NR NR NR NR 
**:α = 0.01, *:α = 0.05, +:α = 0.10.  
R = Null hypothesis rejected, NR = Null hypothesis not rejected. 
Subscripts H and W indicate Husband and Wife respectively. 
Subscripts S and J indicate that respondents were interviewed Separately and Jointly respectively. 
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In the first t-test, the mean stated demand of husbands (mHS) when interviewed 
separately was compared with that of wives (mWS) when interviewed separately. 
Overall, the data show significant differences in husband and wife demand when 
interviewed separately in three out of the ten cells. At the lowest price of 22 cents, 
husband mean stated demand was significantly higher than that for wife for both 
efficacies. Wife mean stated demand was significantly higher than that for husband 
for price of $3.3 and efficacy of 50%. However, at the highest price of $10.9, the 
notion that husband and wife demand were the same could not be rejected. This may 
be because lower prices gave husbands and wives the freedom of budget space and 
hence a chance to express their choice. At the highest price, demand was choked out, 
and the majority of husbands and wives agreed with each other not to buy a vaccine. 
This phenomenon of husbands and wives agreeing at higher prices to not buy a 
vaccine repeats itself throughout our analyses, whatever the efficacy or the nature of 
the interview (separate vs. joint). In the second t-test, the mean stated demand of 
husbands when interviewed jointly was compared with that of wives when 
interviewed jointly. The null hypothesis could not be rejected for even a single price-
efficacy combination. This brings up the possibility that more husbands and wives are 
likely to have the same stated demand for a malaria vaccine after a short private 
discussion. 
To examine the influence of the short private discussion on individual 
behavior, t-tests of mean equivalence between separate demand and joint demand 
were conducted for different combinations of price and efficacies. The stated demand 
for wife when interviewed separately was significantly different from that for wife 
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when interviewed jointly in four out of ten price-efficacy combinations. Stated 
demand when interviewed jointly was significantly higher than that when interviewed 
separately for the lowest prices of 22 cents (both 50% and 95% efficacy) and second-
lowest price of 54 cents (95% efficacy) when interviewed jointly. However, stated 
demand when interviewed jointly was significantly lower at price of $3.3 and efficacy 
of 50%. As in the case of previous t-tests, the null hypothesis of mean equivalence 
could not be rejected for the highest price level. For husbands, joint demand was 
significantly different from separate demand only for one price-efficacy combination.  
The t-tests also show that at the lowest price, stated demand was higher in the 
joint interview compared to that during a separate interview (except husband 50% 
effective vaccine), with the increase significant for wives offered a 95% effective 
vaccine and not significant for others. On the other hand, at the highest price, stated 
demand was lower in the joint interview for wives but the differences were not 
significant.  
The analyses of raw data provide evidence in the following direction: 
1) The stated number of vaccines that husbands and wives were willing to pay 
for, when interviewed separately, is significantly different from their spouses’, 
especially at lower prices. 
2) At higher prices, the demand chokes for both husband and wife, and they tend 
to agree to buy zero vaccines. 
3) At least a few husbands and wives are able to resolve their differences in a 
joint discussion, and express a WTP for the same number of vaccines. 
4) Many respondents adopted the “all or nothing” approach. 
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5) When provided with an opportunity to interact with their husbands, more 
wives (about 35% of total) changed their opinion than husbands (about 24% 
of total). 
 
4. Multivariate analyses 
A. Analysis of patterns in decision-making 
 
Because of the predominant “all-or-nothing” approach among respondents, I 
analyzed the decision pattern of whether husbands and wives were willing to pay for 
the entire household using a probit model. The summary of variables used for this and 
subsequent analyses in this section is given in table 6.7.   
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Table 6.7: Summary of variables used 
 Full sample 
(random 
effects) 
Full sample 
(probit 
model) 
Full sample 
(count 
model) 
Restricted 
sample 
higher prices 
(count 
model) 
Restricted 
sample 
lower prices 
(count 
model) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent variables           
1=Husband WTP for member 
when interviewed 
separately; 0=Otherwise 
0.32 0.47         
1=Wife WTP for member when 
interviewed separately; 
0=Otherwise 
0.27 0.44         
1=Husband WTP for member 
when interviewed jointly; 
0=Otherwise 
0.33 0.47         
1=Wife WTP for member when 
interviewed jointly; 
0=Otherwise 
0.33 0.47         
1=Husband WTP for all 
household members when 
interviewed separately; 
0=Otherwise 
  0.29 0.45       
1=Wife WTP for all household 
members when interviewed 
separately; 0=Otherwise 
  0.22 0.42       
1=Husband WTP for all 
household members when 
interviewed jointly; 
0=Otherwise 
  0.27 0.44       
1=Wife WTP for all household 
members when interviewed 
jointly; 0=Otherwise 
  0.28 0.45       
Aggregate of count of stated 
demand-husband 
interviewed separately 
    1.48 2.12 2.04 2.27 0.66 1.57 
Aggregate of count of stated 
demand-wife interviewed 
separately 
    1.22 1.92 1.52 2.05 0.77 1.61 
Aggregate of count of stated 
demand-husband 
interviewed jointly 
    1.48 2.01 2.11 2.16 0.55 1.30 
Aggregate of count of stated 
demand-wife interviewed 
jointly 
    1.49 2.03 2.15 2.19 0.52 1.27 
Independent variables           
Vaccine characteristics           
Price in US $ 2.99 3.78 3.06 3.83 3.06 3.83 0.61 0.36 6.63 3.79 
Efficacy (1= 95% effective ; 0= 
Otherwise) 
0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 
Respondent characteristics           
1=Husband has secondary 
education;  
0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.32 0.47 
1=Husband has higher 
secondary or college 
education; 0=Otherwise) 
0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.42 
Husband's age 36.95 8.40 36.83 9.03 36.83 9.03 37.06 9.38 36.14 7.98 
Husband's age squared 1436.10 698.301437.80 760.511437.85 760.521461.26 789.90 1369.41 653.78
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(Table 6.7 continued) Full sample 
(Random 
effects) 
Full sample 
(Probit 
model) 
Full sample 
(Count 
model) 
Restricted 
sample 
higher prices 
(Count 
model) 
Restricted 
sample 
lower prices 
(Count 
model) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1=Wife has secondary 
education; 0=Otherwise 
0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 
1=Wife has higher secondary 
or more education; 
0=Otherwise 
0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 
Wife’s age 30.42 6.80 30.14 7.06 30.14 7.06 29.97 7.09 30.29 6.99 
Wife’s age squared 971.47 461.75 958.30 479.22 958.30 479.22 948.44 478.27 966.06 482.94 
Household characteristics           
1=Dowry practice common in 
caste; 0=Otherwise 
0.73 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.73 0.44 
Household size 4.92 1.24 4.63 1.16 4.63 1.16 4.70 1.16 4.52 1.14 
Household size squared 25.69 13.69 22.80 12.09 22.80 12.09 23.48 12.00 21.71 12.01 
Number of children       2.68 1.17 2.47 1.13 
1=Hindu religion (Muslim 
excluded); 0=Otherwise; 
0.55 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.50 
1=Buddhist religion (Muslim 
excluded); 0=Otherwise; 
0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47 
1=Both husband and wife 
pooling; 0=Otherwise 
  0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28     
1=Husband pooling & wife 
non-pooling; 0=Otherwise 
  0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42     
1=Husband non-pooling, wife 
pooling; 0=Otherwise 
  0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42     
Risk of malaria           
1= Slum has malaria API >2.0; 
0 = Otherwise 
0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49 
1=Husband knows person 
infected with malaria; 
0=Otherwise 
0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50 
1=Wife knows person infected 
with malaria; 0=Otherwise 
0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.32 0.17 0.38 
1=At least one child in 
household is stunted; 
0=Otherwise 
  0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50     
Socioeconomic           
Monthly household income in 
1000 US$ 
0.08 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.06 
Husband total monthly income 
in 1000 US$ 
  0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.05 
Husband monthly non-labor 
income in 1000 US$ 
  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Wife total monthly income in 
1000 US$ 
  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Wife monthly non-labor 
income in 1000 US$ 
  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Land owned by husband’s 
parents   In 100 acres 
0.76 1.41 0.71 1.33 0.71 1.33 0.71 1.37 0.73 1.30 
Land owned by wife’s parents   
In 100 acres. 
  0.58 1.69 0.58 1.69 0.49 1.10 0.76 2.35 
Findep (1=Wife has no source 
of income; 0=Otherwise) 
  0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49 
Number of observations 1797  405  405  241  164  
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The probit regressions are reported in table 6.8. Specifications 1-3 show 
results of the probit model for separate interviews and specifications 4-6 show the 
results for joint interviews. I adopted the seemingly unrelated approach to account for 
any correlation that may exist between husband and wife responses (given that they 
live in the same house).  
The different independent variables considered were vaccine characteristics 
(price and efficacy), individual characteristics (education, age, age squared), 
household characteristics (religion, household size and whether the practice of dowry 
was common in their caste) and risk of getting infected with malaria (knowing people 
infected with malaria, living in a location with Annual Parasite Index>2.0).  
I also used information from other parts of our research. I used a dummy 
variable to indicate if there was any child stunted and three dummy variables to 
examine how households pool their income. I assumed that the card chosen in the 
third (highest price) level of the lottery experiment indicates pooling behavior of 
husbands and wives. I categorized respondents choosing a pooling card as “pooling” 
and those choosing any other card (intermediate or non-pooling card) as “non-
pooling”. The three dummy variables included indicate (1) pooling husband and wife, 
(2) pooling husband and non-pooling wife, and (3) non-pooling husband and pooling 
wife. Details about height related data and lottery related data are discussed in 
subsequent chapters.  
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Table 6.8: Probit model: buying for all household members 
Husband decision-making  
Dependent variable: 1= Willing to pay for all 
household members; 0= Otherwise 
Separate interview Joint interview 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price in US$ -0.132 -0.139 -0.128 -0.219 -0.226 -0.209 
 (4.97)** (5.29)** (4.91)** (4.41)** (4.52)** (4.43)** 
1=Efficacy of vaccine is 95%; 0= Efficacy  -0.011 -0.002 -0.021 0.172 0.188 0.143 
    of Vaccine is 50% (0.07) (0.01) (0.15) (1.10) (1.20) (0.94) 
1=Husband has secondary education;  -0.002 0.006 0.045 0.231 0.221 0.251 
    0=Otherwise (0.01) (0.03) (0.26) (1.23) (1.16) (1.35) 
1=Husband has higher secondary or  0.030 -0.017 0.086 0.074 0.051 0.153 
    college education; 0=Otherwise (0.15) (0.09) (0.44) (0.34) (0.24) (0.71) 
Husband's age 0.066 0.057 0.065 0.051 0.047 0.057 
 (1.16) (1.01) (1.18) (0.76) (0.70) (0.91) 
Husband's age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.23) (1.12) (1.32) (0.91) (0.86) (1.14) 
1=Dowry custom prevalent in caste;  0.383 0.395 0.421 0.367 0.386 0.404 
    0= Otherwise (2.26)* (2.32)* (2.54)* (1.98)* (2.07)* (2.26)* 
Household size 0.056 -0.019 -0.001 0.365 0.284 0.268 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.00) (0.59) (0.48) (0.45) 
Household size squared -0.015 -0.009 -0.010 -0.061 -0.055 -0.052 
 (0.41) (0.25) (0.28) (0.94) (0.90) (0.82) 
1=Husband knows person infected with Malaria;  0.028 0.020 0.036 0.245 0.254 0.249 
    0=Otherwise (0.19) (0.14) (0.25) (1.56) (1.59) (1.59) 
1=Location has high risk of Malaria (API>2.0);  0.000 0.002 -0.040 0.607 0.613 0.521 
    0=Otherwise (0.00) (0.01) (0.27) (3.80)** (3.80)** (3.24)** 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  0.331 0.243 0.266 0.617 0.553 0.533 
    0=Otherwise (1.47) (1.07) (1.16) (2.47)* (2.20)* (2.06)* 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  0.210 0.163 0.132 0.569 0.546 0.463 
    0=Otherwise (0.88) (0.68) (0.54) (2.15)* (2.06)* (1.69)+ 
1=Both husband and wife chose pooling card;  0.318 0.412 0.371 0.390 0.446 0.413 
    0= Otherwise (1.26) (1.64) (1.46) (1.37) (1.59) (1.46) 
1=Husband chose pooling card, wife did not  0.148 0.235 0.143 0.150 0.246 0.141 
    Choose pooling card; 0= Otherwise (0.78) (1.26) (0.78) (0.74) (1.26) (0.73) 
1=Husband did not choose pooling card, wife  0.022 0.086 0.052 -0.049 -0.023 -0.042 
     chose pooling card; 0= Otherwise (0.12) (0.48) (0.29) (0.25) (0.11) (0.21) 
1=At least one child stunted in household;  -0.124 -0.137 -0.135 0.013 0.013 0.017 
    0=Otherwise (0.83) (0.91) (0.91) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
Household income in 1000 $ 3.237   4.542   
 (2.30)*   (2.74)**   
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  0.502   0.411   
    0=Otherwise (3.08)**   (2.32)*   
Husband total income in 1000 $  5.988   6.961  
  (3.61)**   (3.68)**  
Husband non-labor income in 1000 $   2.918   6.271 
   (0.88)   (1.68)+ 
Constant -2.558 -1.953 -1.700 -3.543 -3.068 -2.632 
 (1.88)+ (1.48) (1.32) (1.96)+ (1.79)+ (1.56) 
Robust z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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(Table 6.8 continued) 
Wife Decision-Making  
Dependent variable: 1= Willing to pay for all 
household members; 0= Otherwise 
Separate interview Joint interview 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price in US$ -0.118 -0.118 -0.117 -0.215 -0.204 -0.204 
 (4.37)** (4.35)** (4.30)** (4.99)** (5.00)** (4.96)** 
1=Efficacy of vaccine is 95%;  -0.087 -0.092 -0.094 0.072 0.036 0.033 
     0= Efficacy of vaccine is 50% (0.56) (0.59) (0.60) (0.46) (0.23) (0.22) 
1=Wife has secondary education; 0=Otherwise 0.410 0.441 0.438 0.187 0.258 0.236 
 (2.22)* (2.40)* (2.36)* (1.02) (1.42) (1.29) 
1=Wife has higher secondary or college  0.635 0.678 0.678 -0.096 0.095 0.095 
     education; 0=Otherwise (1.96)* (2.13)* (2.13)* (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) 
Wife's age 0.269 0.262 0.263 0.114 0.131 0.127 
 (2.47)* (2.49)* (2.50)* (0.97) (1.26) (1.21) 
Wife's age squared -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (2.61)** (2.63)** (2.66)** (1.03) (1.33) (1.30) 
1=Dowry custom prevalent in caste;  -0.215 -0.192 -0.192 0.482 0.549 0.548 
     0= Otherwise (1.19) (1.07) (1.07) (2.75)** (3.17)** (3.19)** 
Household size 1.136 1.125 1.120 0.249 0.140 0.175 
 (1.66)+ (1.64) (1.64) (0.39) (0.22) (0.28) 
Household size squared -0.134 -0.133 -0.132 -0.053 -0.042 -0.045 
 (1.82)+ (1.80)+ (1.79)+ (0.78) (0.63) (0.67) 
Wife knows person infected with malaria;  0.198 0.201 0.183 0.342 0.333 0.315 
     0=Otherwise (0.86) (0.88) (0.80) (1.52) (1.51) (1.44) 
1=Location has high risk of malaria (API>2.0);  1.152 1.116 1.126 0.563 0.456 0.467 
     0=Otherwise (6.11)** (5.85)** (5.91)** (3.55)** (2.90)** (2.96)** 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  0.250 0.243 0.237 0.475 0.433 0.421 
     0=Otherwise (0.87) (0.85) (0.83) (1.96)* (1.68)+ (1.63) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  0.301 0.287 0.279 0.499 0.455 0.441 
     0=Otherwise (1.04) (0.99) (0.96) (1.93)+ (1.70)+ (1.64) 
1=Both husband and wife chose pooling card;  0.388 0.409 0.408 0.409 0.408 0.412 
     0= Otherwise (1.31) (1.39) (1.39) (1.45) (1.44) (1.46) 
1=Husband chose pooling card, wife did not  0.624 0.620 0.617 0.149 0.147 0.135 
     choose pooling card; 0= Otherwise (3.15)** (3.11)** (3.10)** (0.75) (0.77) (0.71) 
1=Husband did not choose pooling card, wife  0.009 0.011 0.012 -0.009 0.001 0.007 
     chose pooling card; 0= Otherwise (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) 
1=At least one child stunted in household;  -0.266 -0.262 -0.261 0.170 0.197 0.187 
     0=Otherwise (1.59) (1.56) (1.56) (1.10) (1.27) (1.21) 
Monthly household income in 1000 US$ 1.129   4.674   
 (0.80)   (2.73)**   
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  0.162   0.410   
     0=Otherwise (0.90)   (2.37)*   
Wife total income in 1000 US$  -2.145   -2.190  
  (0.98)   (1.16)  
Wife non-labor income in 1000 US$   -1.915   0.060 
   (0.74)   (0.02) 
Constant -7.983 -7.610 -7.627 -3.879 -3.148 -3.177 
 (3.50)** (3.45)** (3.47)** (1.81)+ (1.63) (1.64) 
Observations 405 405 405 405 405 405 
Robust z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
Since the main purpose of our research is to examine issues of intrahousehold 
resource allocation, considerable attention was given to the income variable. I ran 
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three different specifications18, each with a different indicator for income for both 
separate (specification 1, 2 and 3) and joint demand (specification 4, 5 and 6) to 
examine evidence for income pooling. I included the total household income variable 
and a variable, findep, which indicates that wife has no source of any income as 
independent variables in specification 1. In specifications 2 and 3, I used total 
individual income (labor and non-labor combined) and individual non-labor income 
respectively. Specifications 4, 5 and 6 are similar to specifications 1, 2 and 3 
respectively except that the dependent variable indicates choices made during the 
joint interview.  
To examine whether husbands and wives behaved differently from each other 
and whether they changed their behavior after the short private discussion, I 
conducted tests of equivalence of coefficients for husband vs. wife and joint vs. 
separate coefficient estimates. The tests were conducted only on the specifications 
with household income (i.e., specifications 1 and 4) and are reported in table 6.9. This 
is a more reliable method of comparing responses than the tests of mean equivalence 
conducted on raw data earlier. The last row in each column reports the test for 
equivalence of all coefficients for that specification tested jointly.  
Price was significant at 1% or less for all the specifications for both separate 
and joint responses and both husbands and wives whereas efficacy was not significant 
for any of the specifications. Husband education and age were not significant 
covariates. However, wife education was significant and positive and age was 
                                                 
18 Regressions also was run on possible instruments of bargaining power of women such as acres of 
land owned by parents, and parental education. The regressions with these variables are not included as 
the variables were not significant. 
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significant and curvilinear (both age and age squared were significant) for separate 
interview but neither variable was significant for the joint interview.  
The dummy variable for respondents living in a high risk area (malaria API > 
2.0) was positive and significant for both husbands and wives when interviewed 
jointly, implying that other things equal, people living in high risk areas were more 
likely to buy vaccines for the entire household when interviewed jointly. Religion 
variables for Hindu and Buddhist were significant and positive for both husbands and 
wives when interviewed jointly implying that on average Hindu and Buddhists were 
more likely to buy vaccines for the entire household than Muslims.  
Household income variable and variable findep were significant and positive 
for husbands when interviewed separately or jointly, but only for wives when 
interviewed jointly. Thus, other things being equal, husbands and wives living in 
households with higher income and in households in which the wife does not have 
any source of income are more likely to buy vaccines for all household members. 
Total individual income for husbands (specification 2, 5) was also significant for 
husbands in both separate and joint interviews, but not for wives during either 
separate or joint interviews.  Non-labor income was significant only for husbands at 
10 percent or less when interviewed jointly.  
Tests of equivalence of coefficients for income between husbands and wives 
when interviewed jointly showed that the coefficient for total household income for 
husbands was not significantly different from that for wives but the coefficient for 
non-labor income for husbands was significantly different from that for wives at 10% 
or less. This implies that marginal funds in hands of husbands could result in different 
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consumption patterns as compared to wives. This is evidence in favor of rejection of 
the common preference model and in favor of non-pooling. However, it should be 
noted that there is not enough resolution on the non-labor income variable for women 
with only 19% of the women reporting a non-zero non-labor income.  
None of the pooling variables were significant for husbands for models 
examining choice for all household members. However, a non-pooling wife with a 
pooling husband was on average more likely to buy vaccines for the entire household.  
Test of equivalence of coefficients in table 6.9 shows that, overall, there were 
significant differences between husband and wife decision-making when interviewed 
separately. However none of the coefficients could be rejected for equivalence when 
interviewed jointly.  
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Table 6.9: Tests for equivalence of coefficients (specification 1 & 4) 
Coefficient for  Hypothesis for   
 β(Husband 
separate demand) = 
β(Wife separate 
demand 
β(Husband joint 
demand) = β(Wife 
joint demand  
β(Husband 
separate demand) = 
β(Husband joint 
demand) 
β(Wife separate 
demand) = β(Wife 
joint demand)  
 Ηο:βHS  = βWS Ηο:βHJ  = βWJ Ηο:βHS  = βHJ Ηο:βWS  = βWJ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price NR NR R+ R* 
Efficacy NR NR NR NR 
Respondent has 
secondary education 
R+ NR NR NR 
Respondent has higher 
secondary education 
R+ NR NR R+ 
Age of respondent R+ NR NR NR 
Age squared of 
respondent 
R* NR NR NR 
Dowry R* NR NR R** 
Household size NR NR NR NR 
Household size squared NR NR NR NR 
Know a person infected 
with malaria 
R+ NR NR NR 
Slum has high malaria 
API 
R** NR R** R* 
Hindu NR NR NR NR 
Buddhist NR NR NR NR 
Household income NR NR NR R+ 
Both pooling NR NR NR NR 
Husband pooling, wife 
non-pooling 
R+ NR NR R+ 
Husband non-pooling, 
wife pooling 
NR NR NR NR 
Financially dependent 
wife 
NR NR NR R** 
Joint (all coefficients 
together) 
R** NR R** R** 
R: Null hypothesis rejected, NR: Null hypothesis not rejected. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%;  
** significant at 1%  
 
Joint responses of husbands were more consistent with their separate 
responses than joint responses of wives with wives’ separate responses as the test of 
equivalence of coefficients between separate responses and joint responses could be 
rejected only for two coefficients for husbands (price and risk) as against seven 
coefficients for wives. Since this is a stated preference experiment, it is difficult to 
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say whether true preference aggregation took place or whether wives simply 
acquiesced to their husbands’ wishes. However, analyses of raw data showed that 
some husbands also changed opinions during the joint interview. But husbands’ 
opinions after the private discussion were not significantly different from their 
opinions during separate interviews to the extent that wives’ were. Since both 
husbands and wives did change opinion after the joint interview, some level of 
preference aggregation cannot be ruled out. 
Coefficients for variable findep are significantly different for husband and 
wife demand when interviewed separately but are not significantly different when 
interviewed jointly. Further, the coefficient for findep for wife separate demand is 
significantly different from that for wife joint demand. It is likely women who are 
financially dependent upon their husbands are likely to change their opinion and 
acquiesce to their husband’s wish as the equivalence of coefficients for wife and 
husband joint demand could not be rejected. This is some evidence in favor of women 
having no source of income having less bargaining power. 
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Table 6.10: Change in predicted probability for a discrete change 
 
Husband 
separate 
Husband 
joint 
Wife 
separate 
Wife 
joint 
Price -16% -21% -10% -22% 
Efficacy  
0% 2% -1% 2% 
Respondent has secondary 
education  0% 6% 10% 5% 
Respondent has higher secondary 
education  0% 2% 17% 2% 
Age (@ 19 years) -7% -4% -10% -5% 
Age (@60 years) 8% 7% 0% 3% 
Dowry  5% 9% -5% 12% 
Household size (@ 3 members) -6% -14% -36% -8% 
Household size (@ 8 members) -5% -6% -11% -3% 
Know infected person  1% 6% 5% 10% 
High risk area  11% 14% 22% 14% 
Hindu  10% 15% 5% 12% 
Buddhist  6% 15% 7% 14% 
Both Pool  11% 11% 10% 12% 
Husband Pool, Wife Non Pool  4% 4% 16% 4% 
Husband Non Pool, Wife Pool  1% -1% 0% 0% 
Stunting -4% 0% -6% 5% 
Income  6% 7% 1% 7% 
Wife has no income  15% 10% 3% 11% 
For continuous variables, change in one standard deviation, for dummy variables from 0 to 1 
 
To examine the magnitude of impact of different independent variables on the 
probability that a respondent would buy for the entire household, I examined the 
change in predicted probability for a change in the independent variable (a standard 
deviation change in continuous variables and a change from zero to unity for a 
dummy variable). The results of this exercise are reported in table 6.10. I found that a 
unit standard deviation increase in price ($3) caused 10% to 22% reduction in the 
probability that the respondent chose to buy a vaccine for the entire household (and 
about 3-6% reduction for a dollar increase in price). Efficacy, on the other hand, did 
not have a substantial impact on the predicted probability. Among variables that are 
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significant and seem to have an impact on joint demand include living in a high risk 
area (14%), religion variables (Hindu and Buddhist dummy variables at about 12-
15%), and whether a wife had no source of income (findep at about 10-11%). A 
standard deviation increase in income ($58) increased by about 7% the probability 
that household bought for the entire household. 
Since age and household were quadrilinear, the magnitude of the impact 
depended upon the age of the individual. The size of the impact for ages 19 and 60 
years and household size of 3 and 8 households is reported in the table 6.10. The 
impact of age varied from –5% to 10% and for household size varied from –36% to –
3%. 
Among pooling variables, only households in which both husband and wife 
were pooling had an impact of about 11-12% during joint interview, but the effect 
was not statistically significant. A pooling husband with a non-pooling wife had 
significantly coefficient for demand for separate interview, however the magnitude of 
this effect was low (4%). Thus, whether a household is pooling or non-pooling does 
not have a significant impact on demand. This raises the possibility that husbands and 
wives who do not pool income may not be bargaining non-cooperatively.  
 
B. Estimation of Demand (Random Effects) 
As defined in the conceptual framework, I adopted a seemingly unrelated 
random effects probit model computed for both husbands and wives to estimate 
demand. The data were stacked so that each row represented each member within the 
household, with the binary dependent variable indicating whether a vaccine was 
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purchased for that individual by the respondent. The different variables used in the 
random effects probit models are summarized in table 6.7, and the results of the 
random effects approach are reported in table 6.11. 
The results of the random effects model were inconsistent across different 
specifications and sometimes both the magnitude and sign of the estimates were 
subject to change with a slight change in specification. This could be because of the 
high value of rho (the share of total variance that is within individual) at over 95% for 
both husbands and wives. The reason for this high rho value is perhaps the prevalence 
of an “all or nothing” approach within the respondents19. The failure of the random 
effects model restricted our analyses to the traditional count models.  
 
 
                                                 
19 The command -quadchk- run  in Stata showed that some coefficients drop by as much as 37% when 
the number of fitted quadratures change in the maximization procedure. This could be because of high 
value of rho and that the model does not fit reliably. In such cases, the Gauss-Hermite quadrature  
maximization procedure adopted in random effects models may not be appropriate. 
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Table 6.11: Results of random effects models 
 Husband Separate Demand Wife Separate Demand 
 (H1) (H2) (W1) (W2) 
Price -0.021 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 
 (11.94)** (8.60)** (9.62)** (10.28)** 
Efficacy  M 2.093 -0.516 -1.767 0.093 
 (6.17)** (1.47) (6.75)** (0.43) 
Respondent has primary    -0.787  1.913 
    education; 0=Otherwise  (0.63)  (5.16)** 
Respondent has secondary  0.883 0.969 1.026 3.125 
    education; 0=Otherwise (2.98)** (2.97)** (3.94)** (9.87)** 
1=Wife has higher secondary or  M 1.723 -0.449 2.846 2.076 
   college education; 0=Otherwise (4.05)** (1.19) (6.40)** (5.25)** 
Respondent's age (years) 0.211 0.265 0.771 0.734 
 (1.88)+ (2.43)* (5.76)** (5.52)** 
Respondent’s age squared -0.003 -0.002 -0.013  
 (1.79)+ (1.46) (6.53)**  
1=Dowry practice common in caste;  M -0.524 0.658 -1.423 -0.497 
    0=Otherwise (2.12)* (2.80)** (5.12)** (2.06)* 
1= Respondent’s spouse; 0 = otherwise -0.024 0.081 -0.231 -0.061 
 (0.10) (0.34) (0.90) (0.27) 
1=Respondent’s son; 0=Otherwise  M 0.255 0.469 0.896 0.912 
 (1.06) (1.98)* (3.77)** (4.01)** 
1=Respondents daughter; 0=Otherwise  M 0.413 0.349 0.883 0.842 
 (1.71)+ (1.40) (3.68)** (3.73)** 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  -0.048  2.490  
    0=Otherwise (0.13)  (5.63)**  
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded); -0.444  3.894  
    0=Otherwise (1.00)  (7.20)**  
Monthly household income ($ 1000) 7.834  6.530  
 (2.76)**  (2.39)*  
1=Member likely to support in old age; 0.176  0.265  
    0=Otherwise (0.82)  (1.22)  
1=Respondent knows person infected  M -0.404 2.011 2.613 2.239 
    with malaria; 0 = Otherwise (1.65)+ (6.59)** (7.30)** (6.98)** 
1=Slum has higher risk of malaria; 0.754  3.350  
    0 = Otherwise (2.43)*  (10.11)**  
Wife's age squared    -0.013 
    (6.32)** 
Parental land  0.004  -0.003 
  (3.39)**  (3.06)** 
1=Spouse; 0=Otherwise     
     
Constant -5.521 -9.194 -17.635 -13.241 
 (2.23)* (4.42)** (7.40)** (6.00)** 
Observations 1797 1797 1797 1797 
Rho value 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 
Number of households 388 388 388 388 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
M Coefficient changes sign or significance or both 
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C. Estimation of Demand (Negative Binomial Count Model) 
In the count modeling approach, the sum of the count of the number of 
vaccines that an individual was willing to pay was adopted as the dependent variable. 
The research setup let me collect four types of WTP responses—Responses by 
husbands interviewed separately, wives interviewed separately, husbands interviewed 
jointly and wives interviewed jointly. To account for any correlation between 
husband and wife demand, a seemingly unrelated regression was run using the 
“suest” command in STATA, and robust standard errors were computed at the 
household level. Because of the over-dispersion in the data, the negative binomial 
regression was preferred over a poisson regression20,21. The results of seemingly 
unrelated negative binomial count regressions for husband and wife demand for both 
separate and joint responses are reported in tables 6.12. The same three specifications 
and set of independent variables used in the probit models were used for this model. 
The sign and significance of the coefficients for most variables are consistent with 
those in the probit models. The tests for mean equivalence between coefficients were 
also conducted for these models in a way similar to the earlier probit models and are 
reported in table 6.13 
                                                 
20 A truncated poisson regression (truncating at household size) was deemed unnecessary, as none of 
the households have stated willingness to pay higher than the household size. The truncated poisson 
regression model yielded all coefficients to be significant, a finding that is counter intuitive and not in 
agreement with the results of the previously used probit model. Further, the negative binomial models 
do not over-predict demand for any households. Hence the negative binomial regression has been 
persisted with. 
21 A zero inflated poisson model was also computed. However, the model over fitted the zeros 
resulting in very low coefficient for price and very high willingness to pay for joint interview. WTP 
could not be computed for separate interviews as coefficient for price was not significant for count 
model (reciprocal of coefficient of price is needed to determine WTP). 
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Table 6.12: Seemingly unrelated negative binomial regressions 
Husband Demand   Separate interview Joint interview 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price in US$ -0.162 -0.168 -0.158 -0.203 -0.208 -0.196 
 (5.40)** (5.83)** (5.28)** (6.69)** (6.74)** (6.16)** 
1=Efficacy of vaccine is 95%; 0=  0.118 0.123 0.127 0.071 0.092 0.055 
    Efficacy of vaccine is 50% (0.73) (0.76) (0.79) (0.50) (0.66) (0.39) 
1=Husband has secondary education;  0.115 0.143 0.153 0.264 0.258 0.269 
    0=Otherwise (0.61) (0.76) (0.83) (1.57) (1.54) (1.57) 
1=Husband has higher secondary or  0.086 0.027 0.160 0.193 0.175 0.283 
    college education; 0=Otherwise (0.42) (0.13) (0.77) (1.07) (0.96) (1.46) 
Husband's age 0.008 -0.010 0.011 0.066 0.046 0.070 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.84) (0.63) (1.07) 
Husband's age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.22) (0.02) (0.32) (0.92) (0.78) (1.23) 
1=Dowry custom prevalent in caste;  0.308 0.285 0.355 0.145 0.172 0.249 
    0= Otherwise (1.71)+ (1.56) (2.00)* (0.86) (1.04) (1.49) 
Household size 0.646 0.588 0.618 0.703 0.770 0.689 
 (1.41) (1.26) (1.34) (1.41) (1.65)+ (1.38) 
Household size squared -0.052 -0.047 -0.051 -0.073 -0.080 -0.072 
 (1.13) (1.00) (1.12) (1.39) (1.67)+ (1.39) 
1=Husband knows person infected with  0.115 0.093 0.108 0.248 0.246 0.263 
    malaria; 0=Otherwise (0.70) (0.57) (0.67) (1.76)+ (1.72)+ (1.84)+ 
1=Location has high risk of malaria  0.189 0.170 0.124 0.787 0.801 0.636 
    (API>2.0); 0=Otherwise (1.02) (0.93) (0.68) (4.83)** (4.79)** (3.84)** 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  0.177 0.089 0.068 0.551 0.447 0.464 
    0=Otherwise (0.67) (0.33) (0.24) (2.34)* (1.86)+ (1.84)+ 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim  -0.091 -0.155 -0.200 0.502 0.415 0.367 
    excluded); 0=Otherwise (0.32) (0.54) (0.69) (1.95)+ (1.59) (1.38) 
1=Both husband and wife chose pooling 
card;  
0.218 0.297 0.273 0.563 0.627 0.618 
    0= Otherwise (0.81) (1.11) (0.97) (2.34)* (2.79)** (2.46)* 
1=Husband chose pooling card, wife did  0.408 0.414 0.333 0.348 0.386 0.287 
    not choose pooling card; 0= Otherwise (1.95)+ (2.04)* (1.64) (1.84)+ (2.06)* (1.52) 
1=Husband did not choose pooling card,  -0.066 -0.009 -0.019 0.004 0.034 0.037 
     wife chose pooling card; 0= Otherwise (0.32) (0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.18) (0.20) 
1=At least one child stunted in  -0.199 -0.246 -0.226 -0.004 -0.065 -0.017 
    household; 0=Otherwise (1.16) (1.40) (1.30) (0.03) (0.43) (0.11) 
Household Income in 1000 $ 3.605   5.403   
 (2.57)*   (3.84)**   
1=Wife financially dependent on  0.511   0.607   
    husband; 0=Otherwise (2.91)**   (3.58)**   
Husband total income in 1000 $  5.529   7.473  
  (3.58)**   (4.61)**  
Husband non-labor income in 1000 $   0.977   3.124 
   (0.30)   (1.01) 
Constant -2.384 -1.465 -1.521 -4.398 -3.704 -3.379 
 (1.45) (0.88) (0.94) (2.63)** (2.43)* (2.24)* 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table (continued) 
Wife Demand   Separate interview Joint interview 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price in US$ -0.136 -0.134 -0.134 -0.215 -0.207 -0.205 
 (5.05)** (4.94)** (4.90)** (7.66)** (7.13)** (6.94)** 
1=Efficacy of vaccine is 95%; 0=  -0.171 -0.191 -0.194 0.021 0.017 0.011 
    Efficacy of vaccine is 50% (1.00) (1.12) (1.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.08) 
1=Wife has secondary education;  0.290 0.320 0.300 0.041 0.158 0.115 
    0=Otherwise (1.66)+ (1.86)+ (1.73)+ (0.25) (0.97) (0.69) 
1=Wife has higher secondary or college  0.449 0.538 0.545 -0.245 0.053 0.058 
    education; 0=Otherwise (1.55) (1.92)+ (1.94)+ (0.93) (0.17) (0.19) 
Wife's age 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.150 0.178 0.170 
 (2.59)** (2.79)** (2.75)** (1.08) (1.56) (1.52) 
Wife's age squared -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (2.63)** (2.87)** (2.83)** (1.05) (1.55) (1.54) 
1=Dowry custom prevalent in caste;  -0.121 -0.087 -0.096 0.259 0.373 0.379 
    0= Otherwise (0.63) (0.46) (0.50) (1.60) (2.32)* (2.37)* 
Household size 1.933 1.933 1.968 0.570 0.396 0.483 
 (2.90)** (2.95)** (2.98)** (0.98) (0.64) (0.80) 
Household size squared -0.190 -0.190 -0.194 -0.064 -0.049 -0.056 
 (2.67)** (2.72)** (2.75)** (1.05) (0.75) (0.89) 
1=Wife knows person infected with  0.410 0.451 0.444 0.164 0.111 0.072 
    malaria; 0=Otherwise (1.74)+ (1.85)+ (1.83)+ (0.83) (0.56) (0.36) 
1=Location has high risk of malaria  1.387 1.331 1.342 0.774 0.610 0.615 
    (API>2.0); 0=Otherwise (6.71)** (6.37)** (6.48)** (4.68)** (3.75)** (3.75)** 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  0.707 0.693 0.683 0.611 0.479 0.464 
    0=Otherwise (2.01)* (1.98)* (1.95)+ (2.45)* (1.78)+ (1.70)+ 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim  0.667 0.658 0.648 0.604 0.463 0.444 
    excluded); 0=Otherwise (1.90)+ (1.87)+ (1.84)+ (2.26)* (1.66)+ (1.58) 
1=Both husband and wife chose pooling  0.330 0.344 0.353 0.635 0.678 0.681 
    card; 0= Otherwise (1.08) (1.12) (1.15) (2.72)** (2.77)** (2.80)** 
1=Husband chose pooling card, wife did  0.461 0.450 0.444 0.404 0.381 0.371 
    not choose pooling card; 0= Otherwise (2.22)* (2.20)* (2.16)* (2.16)* (2.03)* (1.97)* 
1=Husband did not choose pooling card,  -0.077 -0.073 -0.074 0.033 0.061 0.071 
     wife chose pooling card; 0= Otherwise (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.17) (0.31) (0.36) 
1=At least one child stunted in  -0.088 -0.073 -0.086 0.065 0.083 0.073 
    household; 0=Otherwise (0.50) (0.41) (0.48) (0.42) (0.53) (0.46) 
Household Income in 1000 $ 2.613   5.700   
 (1.76)+   (4.03)**   
1=Wife financially dependent on  0.163   0.653   
    husband; 0=Otherwise (0.88)   (3.87)**   
Wife total income in 1000 $  -0.353   -3.626  
  (0.18)   (1.90)+  
Wife non-labor income in 1000 $   1.390   0.068 
   (0.89)   (0.04) 
Constant -10.818 -10.452 -10.526 -5.136 -4.015 -4.114 
 (4.80)** (4.94)** (4.94)** (2.35)* (2.08)* (2.16)* 
 405 405 405 405 405 405 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
Once again, the coefficient for price was significant at 1% or less and negative 
for all specifications for both separate and joint interviews for both husbands and 
wives, indicating that other things being equal, respondents were willing to purchase 
fewer vaccines at a higher price. The coefficient for efficacy was not significant for 
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either husbands or wives for either separate or joint interviews. Husband’s education 
and age was not significant either for separate or joint interviews. The coefficient for 
age was positive and significant, and for age squared was negative and significant 
only for wives for separate interviews such that a wife with age of 30 years would 
have the maximum household demand. Household size was positive and significant, 
whereas household size squared was negative and significant for wives for separate 
interviews and for husbands only for joint interviews (specification 5 only). Knowing 
a person infected with malaria was not significant, but people living in areas with a 
higher risk of malaria (API >2.0) were more likely to be willing to pay for more 
vaccines when interviewed jointly. The coefficient for religion was positive and 
significant for Hindu husbands for joint interview, whereas for Hindu wives, was 
significant and positive for both the separate and joint interviews. The coefficient for 
dowry for husbands was positive and significant for husbands when interviewed 
separately and not significant for the joint interview. For wives, the coefficient was 
significant and positive only for the joint interview.  
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Table 6.13: Tests for equivalence of coefficients (specification 1) 
Coefficient for  Hypothesis for   
 β(Husband separate 
demand) = β(Wife 
Separate demand 
β(Husband joint 
demand) = β(Wife 
Joint demand  
β(Husband separate 
demand) = 
β(Husband joint 
demand) 
β(Wife separate 
demand) = β(Wife 
joint demand)  
 Ηο:βHS  = βWS Ηο:βHJ  = βWJ Ηο:βHS  = βHJ Ηο:βWS  = βWJ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price NR NR NR R** 
Efficacy NR NR NR NR 
Respondent has 
secondary education 
NR NR NR NR 
Respondent has 
higher secondary 
education 
NR NR NR R* 
Age of respondent R* NR NR NR 
Age squared of 
respondent 
R+ NR NR NR 
Dowry R+ NR NR R+ 
Household size R+ NR NR R+ 
Household size 
squared 
R+ NR NR NR 
Know a person 
infected with malaria 
NR NR NR NR 
Slum has high 
malaria API 
R** NR R** R* 
Hindu NR NR NR NR 
Buddhist R+ NR R* NR 
Both pool NR NR NR NR 
Husband Pool, wife 
non-pool 
NR NR NR NR 
Wife pool, Husband 
non-pool 
NR NR NR NR 
Stunting NR NR NR NR 
Household income NR NR NR NR 
Findep NR NR NR R* 
Joint (all coefficients 
together) 
R** NR R* R** 
R: Null hypothesis rejected, NR: Null hypothesis not rejected. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%;  
** significant at 1%  
 
  128
Tests of equivalence of coefficients supported the findings of the probit 
model. When both are interviewed jointly, the null hypothesis that the coefficient for 
husband demand is equivalent to coefficient for wife demand (column 2) could not be 
rejected for any of the coefficients. This was not the case when interviewed separately 
(column 1) where the coefficients for age, age-squared, dowry, household size, 
household size squared, religion and whether the slum was located in a high risk area 
were significantly different for husbands and wives. This suggests that husbands and 
wives had different preferences when interviewed separately, but were able to sort out 
some their differences and aggregate their preferences during the joint interview. This 
is evidence in favor of behavioral aggregation. 
To identify those among husbands and wives who did change their behavior, I 
compared the individual coefficients before and after the joint meeting for husbands 
and for wives. The results for husbands are documented in column 3, and for wives in 
column 4. It can be seen that the joint equivalence of all the coefficients for separate 
and joint demand for husbands is rejected at 5% or less and for wives is rejected at 
1% or less. A further inspection of tests between separate and joint coefficients 
reveals that the equivalence of coefficients for husbands could be rejected only for 
coefficient for slums located in high-risk areas and Buddhist families, where as for 
wives, the equivalence of coefficients could be rejected for coefficients for price, 
higher education, dowry, household size, whether the slum had a higher API and 
whether wife had any source of income (findep). This indicates that more factors 
affect wives differently than husbands while making a decision after the joint 
interview as compared to making a decision during the separate interview. 
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The coefficient of income deserves special inspection in this study. The 
coefficients for both total household income (specification one) and variable findep 
were positive and significant for husbands when interviewed separately and jointly. 
However, for wives, they were positive and significant only when interviewed jointly. 
This may be because couples were more aware of their budget constraints when 
discussing jointly. However, hypotheses of equivalence of coefficient for any of the 
four tests discussed in table 6.13 could not be rejected for the household income 
variable in husband and wife demand.  
The next variable tested for equivalence for husband and wife demand was the 
total individual (sum of labor and non-labor) income. The coefficient for husband’s 
(individual) monthly income (specification two) was positive and significant at 1% or 
less for both separate and joint interviews. However, the coefficient for (individual) 
income for wives was not significant for separate interview, but was significant and 
negative at 10% or less for joint interview. Usually, husbands and wives having 
coefficients for income significantly different from each other would be evidence 
enough to reject the common preferences model of intrahousehold resource allocation 
as it indicates that marginal funds in the hands of husbands could result in different 
consumptions patterns when compared to wives. The result seems counter intuitive in 
that it implies that other things being equal, a wife with higher individual income is 
likely to buy fewer vaccines than a wife with lower income, which refutes the 
possibility of vaccine being a normal good and violates the principles of construct 
validity. This may be because household income rather than individual income is the 
appropriate budget constraint for some wives implying that income pooling does take 
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place. On the other hand, wives with more income may be better at taking other 
precautions resulting in reduced risk of the disease for household members and the 
negative coefficient may be indicative of bargaining within the household.  
Unlike in the probit model, non-labor income was not significant for either 
husbands or wives and I was not able to confirm existence of bargaining within the 
household on the basis of the count model.22  
Table 6.14: Marginal effects of unit increase in independent variable on 
predicted demand 
 
Husband 
separate 
Wife 
separate 
Husband 
joint 
Wife 
joint 
Price -0.74 -0.39 -0.79 -0.84 
Efficacy 0.14 -0.13 0.07 0.02 
Respondent has secondary education 0.14 0.23 0.28 0.04 
Respondent has higher secondary 
education 0.10 0.41 0.20 -0.22 
Age (@ 19 years) 0.01 -0.63 -0.30 -0.45 
Age (@60 years) 0.16 0.03 0.35 0.19 
Dowry 0.34 -0.09 0.14 0.24 
Household size (@ 3 members) -0.40 -0.66 -0.30 -0.19 
Household size (@ 8 members) 0.37 0.25 0.37 0.33 
Know infected person 0.14 0.36 0.25 0.17 
High risk area 0.22 0.97 0.74 0.73 
Hindu 0.21 0.52 0.54 0.60 
Buddhist -0.11 0.57 0.55 0.68 
Both Pool 0.28 0.28 0.71 0.84 
Husband pool, wife non-pool 0.54 0.39 0.38 0.45 
Husband non-pool, wife pool -0.08 -0.06 0.00 0.03 
Stunt -0.24 -0.07 0.00 0.06 
Income 0.24 0.11 0.31 0.33 
Wife has no income 0.58 0.12 0.57 0.62 
For continuous variables, change in one standard deviation, for dummy variables from 0 to 1 
 
                                                 
22 Other proxies for income such as land owned by parents were not significant for either separate or 
joint interviews (specifications 3 and 4). However, this could be because of lack of enough resolution 
on these variables. Other variables such as parental education were also not significant, mainly because 
of the lack of variation in the level of education achieved by parents 
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To determine the policy impact of the independent variables, I estimated the 
change in the predicted number of vaccines for a unit change in the independent 
variables. For continuous variables the impact of a standard deviation change was 
computed and for dummy variables, the impact of the change in variable from 0 to 1 
was computed. The marginal impacts are reported in table 6.14. As in the analysis 
using the probit model, price variable had a high impact with a standard deviation 
increase in price reducing the demand for husbands and wives by 0.7 and 0.3 vaccines 
respectively during separate interviews and about 0.8 vaccines for both during joint 
interviews (the impact of a dollar increase in price was 0.1 and 0.2 vaccines for 
husbands and wives respectively when interviewed separately and 0.2 vaccines for 
both during the joint interview. Other significant variables that also had an impact on 
predicted demand include risk (+0.7 for joint interviews for both), wife having no 
source of income (findep) (+0.1 to +0.6), a pooling husband and non-pooling wife 
(+0.4 to +0.5) and religion dummies(-0.1 to 0.7). Since age and household size were 
curvilinear, the impact depended upon the age of respondent and household size. The 
impact of a unit standard deviation ($57) increase in monthly household income 
variable was about +0.3 vaccines for the joint interview.  
Since specification 1 was the most compelling one, I used it in subsequent 
analyses. The WTP for husbands and wives for separate and joint interviews for 
specification 1 is reported in Table 6.15. The mean as well as median values of WTP 
after the joint interview are lower than those for a separate interview, for both 
husbands as well as wives. The median values are lower than the mean values 
indicating a flatter tail for the demand curve at higher prices.  
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Table 6.15: Mean and median household WTP (US$) 
 Mean household WTP Median household WTP 
 Separate Joint Separate Joint 
 50 95 50 95 50 95 50 95 
Husband 12.36 
(11.82-
12.90) 
13.91 
(13.30-
14.52) 
10.87 
(10.20-
11.55) 
11.68 
(10.95-
12.40) 
12.25 12.28 10.01 11.03 
Wife 14.15 
(12.97-
15.35) 
11.93 
(10.93-
12.94) 
11.00 
(10.31-
11.70) 
11.23 
(10.52-
11.95) 
10.64 9.23 10.93 11.57 
All figures in US$ 
Figures in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals for mean Household WTP. 
 
The Mean and Median WTP values for a 95% vaccine were computed for 
different children/sons/daughters within the household. To do this, negative binomial 
regression was performed with the count of the number of vaccines purchased for 
children/sons/daughters as the dependent variable. The values are reported in 6.16. 
The expected WTP value was divided by the average number of 
children/sons/daughters within that household to arrive at the value of WTP per child, 
reported in columns 5-8. The median WTP for sons is higher than that for daughters 
for both husbands and wives, for both separate and joint interviews. While the median 
WTP for children dropped after a joint interview, the median WTP for daughters 
actually increased.  
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Table 6.16: Median WTP (US$) for children (95% effective vaccine) 
 Median WTP Median WTP per child 
 Husband Wife Husband Wife 
 Separate Joint Separate Joint Separate Joint Separate Joint 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Son 2.89 2.59 2.62 2.54 2.28 2.17 2.53 2.07 
Daughter 1.91 2.25 1.80 2.20 1.89 2.01 1.72 1.99 
Children 
6.34 5.92 6.14 6.13 2.67 2.66 3.28 2.70 
 
Overall, the results did follow the norms of principles of economics and did 
not violate the principles of construct validity. Joint demand dropped with an increase 
in price and increased with increase in household income. The scope test on efficacy 
failed as the coefficient for efficacy was not significantly different from zero. 
 
5. Switching regression 
To explore any differences in the pattern of behavior (and bargaining) at 
higher prices and lower prices, I formulated a switching regression model.  
To check for discontinuity in preferences, the sample was divided into two 
bins on the basis of price. Respondents who were offered the lower three prices 
($0.22, $ 0.54, $1.09) were pooled in restricted sample one, whereas respondents 
offered the higher two prices ($3.26, $10.87) were pooled in restricted sample two. 
The analyses were restricted to joint demand. The results of the switching regression 
conducted for responses to the joint interview are presented in table 6.17. The full 
sample results for joint demand from the previous tables are also reproduced for 
convenience. Price was significant for the lower price bins, but not significant for the 
higher prices, for both husbands and wives.  
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Table 6.17: Results of switching regression 
Husband’s Coefficients Restricted sample with 
lower prices 
Restricted sample with 
higher prices 
 (1) (2) 
Price in US $ -1.003 -0.070 
 (4.60)** (1.43) 
Efficacy (1= 95% effective ; 0.067 0.146 
      0=Otherwise) (0.49) (0.42) 
1=Husband has secondary education;  0.412 0.855 
      0=Otherwise (2.41)* (2.06)* 
1=Husband has higher secondary or 0.327 0.531 
      college education; 0=Otherwise (1.90)+ (1.11) 
Husband’s age 0.015 0.413 
 (0.21) (1.79)+ 
Husband’s age squared -0.000 -0.006 
 (0.27) (1.96)* 
1=Dowry practice common  0.124 0.227 
       in community; 0=Otherwise (0.78) (0.56) 
Household size 1.091 1.723 
 (2.37)* (1.26) 
Household size squared -0.107 -0.199 
 (2.23)* (1.41) 
1=Husband knows person infected  0.243 -0.169 
      with malaria; 0=Otherwise (1.66)+ (0.44) 
1= Slum has malaria API >2.0;  0.574 1.408 
      0 = Otherwise (3.42)** (3.55)** 
1=Hindu religion (Muslim excluded); 0.444 -0.211 
      0=Otherwise; (1.94)+ (1.92)+ 
1=Buddhist religion (Muslim  0.307 0.318 
      excluded); 0=Otherwise; (1.21) (2.10)* 
Monthly household income  2.528 7.050 
      in 1000 US$ (1.93)+ (2.12)* 
Constant (husband) -2.937 -12.790 
 (2.01)* (2.94)** 
Robust z statistics in parentheses   
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table 6.17 continued  
Wife’s Coefficients Restricted sample with 
lower prices 
Restricted sample with 
higher prices 
 (1) (2) 
Price in US $ -0.817 -0.072 
 (3.77)** (1.40) 
Efficacy -0.034 0.460 
 (0.25) (1.28) 
1=Wife has secondary education; 0.207 0.045 
      0=Otherwise (1.50) (0.10) 
1=Wife has higher secondary or -0.026 -0.093 
   more education; 0=Otherwise (0.10) (0.09) 
Wife’s age 0.175 -0.033 
 (1.18) (0.16) 
Wife’s age squared -0.003 -0.000 
 (1.08) (0.12) 
1=Dowry practice common  0.119 0.846 
       in community; 0=Otherwise (0.78) (1.73)+ 
Household size 0.930 4.815 
 (1.74)+ (2.64)** 
Household size squared -0.095 -0.578 
 (1.69)+ (2.73)** 
1=Wife knows person infected with 0.099 -0.387 
      malaria; 0=Otherwise (0.56) (0.78) 
1= Slum has malaria API >2.0;  0.558 1.439 
      0 = Otherwise (3.29)** (3.21)** 
1=Hindu religion (Muslim excluded); 0.274 1.058 
      0=Otherwise (1.04) (0.33) 
1=Buddhist religion (Muslim  0.230 1.251 
      excluded); 0=Otherwise; (0.82) (0.48) 
Monthly household income  2.830 8.604 
      in 1000 US$ (2.55)* (2.01)* 
Constant (wife) -4.742 -12.313 
 (2.24)* (2.62)** 
Number of Observations 241 164 
Robust z statistics in parentheses   
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
The tests for equivalence of coefficients are reported in table 6.18. The last 
row of this table reports the results for tests of equivalence for coefficients conducted 
jointly for all coefficients. The joint test of equivalence is rejected for tests between 
coefficients for lower price bins and higher price bins for both husbands and wives. 
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Table 6.18: Test of equivalence of coefficients: switching regression 
Coefficient for  Hypothesis for Joint Demand#  
 β(Husband @ 
lower prices) = 
β(Husband @ 
higher prices) 
β(Wife @ lower 
prices) = β(Wife @ 
higher prices) 
β(Husband @ 
lower prices) = 
β(Wife @ lower 
prices)  
β(Husband @ 
higher prices) = 
β(Wife @ higher 
prices) 
 βHL  = βWL βHH  = βWH βHL  = βWL βHH  = βWH 
Price R** R** NR NR 
Respondent has higher 
secondary education 
NR NR NR NR 
Age of respondent R+ NR NR R* 
Age squared of 
respondent 
R+ NR NR R+ 
Dowry NR NR NR R+ 
Household size NR R* NR R* 
Household size squared NR R* NR R* 
Location has higher risk 
of malaria 
R+ R+ NR NR 
Hindu NR NR NR R+ 
Buddhist NR NR NR NR 
Monthly household 
Income 
NR NR NR NR 
Joint (all coefficients 
together) 
R** R** NR NR 
# For βXY, the first suffix X, indicates husband/wife and second suffix Y, indicates high or low prices. 
The tests show that the coefficient of price for lower prices is significantly 
different from that for higher prices. A non-significant coefficient for price could be 
because demand for the vaccine has choked (slope for price equal to zero) and that 
the price set during the pretest was accurate. The demand curve at higher price bins 
has some significant coefficients implying that there may be some other factors that 
influence demand even when price ceases to have an impact. Thus, for example, even 
at high price, a husband having at least some higher secondary education is likely to 
have a significantly higher stated demand than an illiterate husband, other things 
being equal. The non-significant coefficient for price is accompanied with a 
significant coefficient for the constant term which may raise a concern that there is 
some amount of yea-saying in the data. However, this constant could be a result of 
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other independent variables, some of which are also significant. To test for existence 
of yea-saying, I estimated demand for a representative household that is likely to have 
the least demand. Such household had a Hindu husband with no formal education, 
aged 60, knew people infected with malaria, did not live in a high risk area, belonged 
to a community where dowry was common, had a household size of 8 and was 
offered a 50% effective vaccine at a price of $10.9. As per the switching regression, 
the estimated demand for such household was 0.0001 vaccines (although significantly 
different from zero). This implies that the constant term is the result of other variables 
and yea saying can be ruled out. Efficacy is not significant in any specification 
implying that scope test for efficacy fails for both lower and higher price bins.  
 The results present evidence in favor of splitting the demand curve. However, 
whether a switching regression should be used can only be guided by underlying 
economic theory. If there is reason to believe that household members will approach 
bargaining in a different manner at higher prices (i.e., the residual error terms at 
higher prices and lower prices are different in structure) then switching regression 
should be adopted. If bargaining approaches remain the same, discontinuity can be 
introduced if necessary in the form of a high-price dummy variable and maintaining a 
uniform structure for the error term. 
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Figure 6.11: Predicted demand (simple vs. switching regression) for 95% 
effective vaccine 
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0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50
# Vaccines/HH
Pr
ic
e 
($
)
Husband-Full sample Wife-Full sample
Husband-Sw itching regression Wife-Sw itching regression
 
Figure 6.12: Predicted demand (simple vs. switching regression) for 50% 
effective vaccine 
Predicted number of Vaccines that Husbands are Willing to Pay (50% 
effective vaccine)
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The predicted demand curves for full sample regression vs. a switching 
regression are shown in figures 6.11 and 6.12. The figure confirms that the switching 
regression predicted demand curve is more sensitive to price at lower prices 
compared to the full sample predicted demand curve. At lower prices, the predicted 
demand is higher for a switching regression model. At higher prices, demand is less 
sensitive to price as compared to the full sample predicted demand.  
Since the coefficient for price at higher price is not significant, WTP could not 
be computed for the switching regression (as the formula for WTP has reciprocal for 
the coefficient for price). 
 
6. Women who changed their opinion 
To identify the characteristics of women who changed their opinion, I created 
a dummy variable for women who changed their opinion and ran a probit with 
individual characteristics of wives as the independent variables. The results of this 
regression are reported in table 6.19. To study the impact of independence of women 
on their decision-making, I closely examined the impact of education and economic 
independence of the women. To study the impact of education, of wife relative to her 
husband, I included a dummy variable equal to unity when wife had more education 
than her husband and indicator of wife’s income. To study the impact of income, I 
formulated two specifications—specification one with a variable “findep,” which is 
equal to unity when wife has no source of income and specification two with a 
dummy equal to unity if the wife were a housewife. To assess the influence of the 
husband’s bargaining power, the (individual) income of the husband was also 
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included as a dependent variable in specifications 3 and 4. To account for the fact that 
more women and men are likely to agree with each other at higher prices, price was 
also included as a dependent variable.  
Table 6.19: Women who changed their opinions   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price in US$ -0.060 -0.063 -0.064 -0.066 
 (3.17)** (3.27)** (3.33)** (3.40)** 
Efficacy (%) -0.050 -0.050 -0.033 -0.032 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.24) (0.23) 
Number of children -0.140 -0.132 -0.139 -0.134 
 (2.16)* (2.00)* (2.13)* (2.03)* 
Age of wife  0.204 0.199 0.195 0.189 
 (2.75)** (2.66)** (2.61)** (2.52)* 
Age of wife squared -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (2.63)** (2.48)* (2.50)* (2.36)* 
1=Wife had more education than  0.289 0.277 0.268 0.263 
   husband; 0= Otherwise (1.30) (1.24) (1.19) (1.17) 
1 = Religion is Hindu; 0= otherwise 0.379 0.372 0.373 0.359 
 (Muslim excluded) (1.77)+ (1.74)+ (1.72)+ (1.66)+ 
1 = Religion is Buddhist; 0= otherwise 0.112 0.121 0.138 0.136 
 (Muslim excluded) (0.48) (0.52) (0.59) (0.58) 
1= Wife’s occupation is housewife;  0.413  0.373 
  0 = Otherwise  (2.61)**  (2.32)* 
1=Wife completely financially 0.250  0.278  
   dependent upon husband; 0=Otherwise (1.75)+  (1.93)+  
Total monthly income of husband(‘000$)   4.806 4.248 
   (3.00)** (2.66)** 
Constant -3.699 -3.825 -3.941 -3.944 
 (3.06)** (3.16)** (3.24)** (3.25)** 
# of observations 405 405 405 405 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.     
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable equals unity if wife changed her opinion in a joint interview.  
 
Both the variables findep and housewife were significant and positive 
indicating that if the wife did not have any source of income or if she was a 
housewife, she was more likely to change her opinion in the joint interview. This is 
indirect evidence in favor of some level of bargaining taking place in households 
where women earned some income, and weak evidence against the common 
preference model of intrahousehold resource allocation in households where women 
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earn something. Wives having a higher education than husbands did not behave in a 
manner significantly different from those who did not have higher education than 
their husbands for any of the specifications 
The variable for number of children was negative and significant at 10% or 
less, implying that a woman with more children was more likely to not change her 
opinion. Coefficient for age was positive and significant and for age squared was 
negative and significant. The coefficients were such that a woman aged about 34 is 
most likely to change her opinion in a joint interview than women who are older or 
younger than she is, other things being equal. The coefficient for monthly income of 
husband was positive and significant, implying that other things being equal, a wife 
with a husband with higher monthly income was more likely to change her opinion. 
The coefficient for price was negative and significant, as fewer wives had to change 
their opinion at higher prices when demand for both husbands and wives was choked 
out. 
 The coefficient for Hindu women was significant and positive indicating that 
Hindu women were more likely to change opinion than Buddhist or Muslim women. 
In other specifications I had included the coefficient for dowry but it was not 
significant. 
 
7. Estimating sharing weights 
As discussed in the conceptual framework, I ran the OLS regression,  
WTPJoint = α.(WTPHusband,Separate)+  β .(WTPWife,Seperate)  
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without a constant and with a constraint that the coefficient of husband 
separate WTP and wife separate WTP sum to unity (α+β = 1). I found the weight, α, 
to be significant at 1% or less with a value of 0.7. Thus, if we have demand curves for 
husbands and wives interviewed separately, we can compute  their WTP estimates 
and the resulting household WTP can be obtained by weighing husband’s WTP by 
0.7 and wife’s WTP by 0.3. 
 
Table 6.20: Estimating sharing weights  
Independent variables Husband joint WTP as 
dependent variable 
Husband separate WTP (US$)  0.67 
 (32.8)** 
Wife separate WTP (US$) 0.33 
 (16.2)** 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
** significant at 1% 
Value of constant was forced to zero. 
Value of sum of coefficients constrained to be unity.     
 
Thus, 
WTPJoint = 0.7.(WTPHusband,Separate)+  0.3 .(WTPWife,Seperate)  
 
8. Comparing with heuristic rules 
I will now examine how the joint response compares with aggregation based 
on heuristic rules developed by Whittington et al (2006). In households where 
husbands and wives disagree upon who receives a vaccine, I used five rules—
husband dictator (husband separate demand), wife dictator (wife separate demand), 
either husband or wife agrees, both husband and wife need to agree, and both need to 
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agree for other household members only—to decide which individual household 
member receives a vaccine. In addition, I developed two more heuristic criteria—(1) 
a husband or wife was chosen randomly (with equal weights) to be the decision-
maker. This process was repeated 5000 times and the mean stated demand was 
computed and (2) one of the first five rules mentioned above was selected randomly 
to be the decision-making criteria. This too was repeated 5000 times to compute mean 
stated demand.  
Figure 6.13 shows the different stated demand curves obtained using the 
different rules for a 95% effective vaccine. The stated demand as a result of these 
heuristic rules is tabulated in table 6.21. The figure shows that the “either agree” 
criteria yields the upper bound of household WTP whereas “both have to agree” 
yields the lower bound of household WTP. The remaining criteria yield demand 
curves somewhere in between. 
Table 6.21: Comparing husband’s joint demand with heuristic rules (95% 
effective vaccine) 
Price 
US 
($) 
Husband 
dictator 
Wife 
dictator 
Either 
agrees 
Both 
have to 
agree 
Both have 
to agree 
for other 
members
(1) & (2) 
randomly 
selected
(1) to (5) 
randomly 
selected 
Husband 
(joint) 
Wife 
(joint) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
0.2 3.14 2.12 3.64 1.62 2.38 2.63 2.58 3.36 3.10 
0.5 1.66 1.17 2.15 0.68 1.37 1.42 1.41 2.02 1.93 
1.1 1.50 0.98 2.18 0.18 1.03 1.24 1.18 1.15 1.28 
3.3 0.96 0.67 1.41 0.22 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.80 
10.9 0.55 0.55 1.03 0.11 0.45 0.55 0.54 0.34 0.37 
 
 
To find the differences between the different demand curves, the stated 
demand was tested for mean equivalence with behavior aggregated stated demand 
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(joint stated demand for husband) for different prices for both husband and wife. The 
results for 95% effective vaccine are reported in table 6.22.  
 
Table 6.22: Tests of mean equivalence, husband’s joint demand and heuristic 
rules (95% effective vaccine) 
Test of mean equivalence between stated husband joint demand and stated demand when 
Husband 
dictator 
Wife 
dictator 
Either 
agrees 
Both have 
to agree 
Both have 
to agree 
for other 
members 
(1) & (2) 
randomly 
selected 
(1) to (5) 
randomly 
selected 
Price 
US ($) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.2 NR R** NR R** R** R* R* 
0.5 NR R+ NR R** R+ R+ R+ 
1.1 NR NR R** R** NR NR NR 
3.3 NR NR NR R* NR NR NR 
10.9 NR NR R* R+ NR NR NR 
R: Null hypothesis rejected at **:α = 0.01, *:α = 0.05, +:α = 0.10. NR: Null hypothesis not rejected. 
 
Figure 6.13: Comparing behavioral aggregation and heuristics 
Average number of Vaccines that Husbands are Willing to Pay (95% 
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The upper bound estimate (either agrees, column 3) is significantly higher 
than joint husband demand at middle and highest price, where as the lower bound 
estimate (both have to agree, column 4) is significantly lower than joint husband 
demand at all price levels.  
The heuristics represented by column 6 help us simulate the conditions under 
which surveys are generally conducted—husbands or wives selected randomly from 
the household for interview. Inspection reveals that the test of mean equivalence is 
rejected at lower prices, with a random survey underestimating the stated demand 
curve at lower prices. At higher prices, where demand is likely to have choked out, 
the mean equivalence could not be rejected.  This trend continues in case of most of 
the other decision rules where WTP is underestimated at lower prices implying that in 
reality, husbands and wives are more considerate of their partner’s choices when not 
constrained by the budget set. 
 
9. Conclusions 
The research provides insights into how husbands and wives make household 
decisions. In the analysis based on a probit model that assessed the willingness of a 
respondent to pay for vaccines for the entire households, coefficients for age (and age 
squared), education, dowry and risk of getting infected with malaria were 
significantly different for husbands and wives. In the analysis of demand based on a 
count model, coefficients for age (and age squared), dowry, household size (and 
household size squared), risk of getting infected with malaria and being a Buddhist 
were significantly different for husbands and wives. Thus, different socio-economic 
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coefficients affect husband and wife demand in a different manner (although causality 
cannot be established through a stated preference technique). Coefficient for price 
was significant (generally at 1% or less) and negative for both husbands and wives for 
both separate and joint interviews. The same cannot be said for efficacy, which was 
not significant throughout the analysis. Overall, the coefficients were significantly 
different for husband and wife demand for the joint interview. The research shows 
that differences in stated demand of husbands and wives can be reduced by a short 
private discussion. Although a stated preference cannot establish for a fact whether 
behavioral aggregation took place or whether wives simply acquiesced to their 
husbands’ wishes, data suggest that some form of behavioral aggregation cannot be 
ruled out, as both husbands and wives did change their stated opinion during a joint 
interview.  
A majority of the respondents adopted an “all or nothing” approach, more so 
after the short private discussion implying that couples were agreeing on the total 
number of vaccines that they were willing to pay for as well as the allocation among 
household members.  
I found evidence of bargaining in the probit model that examined respondent 
behavior to purchase vaccines for the entire household as the coefficient for non-labor 
income was significant for husbands and not significant for wives. Results in a count 
model were mixed.  
Variables such as price, age, household size, living in a high risk area and 
wife having no source of income were not only significant in some of the multivariate 
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results, but also high in terms of the magnitude of their impact on stated demand vis-
à-vis other variables.  
I examined the characteristics of women who changed their opinion and found 
that women without any source of income, who had fewer children, were aged about 
34 years, had high-earning husband and were Hindu were more likely to change their 
opinion. 
Other than these findings, I also examined some technical aspects of the 
analyses. The random effects probit model failed but that may be simply because of 
the nature of decision-making in the households. Comparison of joint stated demand 
with that produced by heuristic criteria randomly selecting husband and wife separate 
demand found that normal survey procedures in which either a husband or wife is 
interviewed randomly from each household are likely to underestimate stated demand 
at lower prices. This may be because individuals are more likely to accommodate 
their spouse’s demand when they have space of budget constraint to do so.  
The switching regression displayed a lot of promise in that the slope of the 
demand curve did differ at higher and lower prices. A non-significant coefficient for 
price at higher prices indicates that demand has choked out at that price. Although, 
adoption of the switching regression to determine private benefits can only be 
justified on the basis of underlying economic theory, the switching regression model 
can help us identify the threshold price where demand chokes off, i.e., the coefficient 
for price is not significant for the higher price bin. 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 7  
Evidence from revealed data 
 
1. Module objectives 
 
This chapter summarizes the results of the revealed preference module of the 
research. It examines the data on health status outcomes for gender discrimination 
among children in the slums of Navi Mumbai, India.  
 
2. Exclusion criteria 
The analyses use both z-score for height and stunting as an indicator of 
intrahousehold resource allocation within the household. A person having a height-
for-age z-score of less than –2.0 was classified as stunted. The height-for age z-scores 
were computed using the “zanthro” command in Stata23, with reference to the 2000 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) growth reference height-age data. 
The CDC data were preferred over the UK data (also available in Stata command) as 
they were collected more recently. 
The CDC growth reference has height data for individuals from age 2 to age 
20 and length data for children less than age 2. However, the data collected for 
children under the age of 2 were not accurate as some young children did not 
                                                 
23 The “zanthro” function transforms height data to height-for-age z-scores computed with respect to 
two reference data—the 1990 British growth reference and 2000 CDC Growth Reference (Vidmar et 
al., 2004). 
  149
cooperate while measuring length and sometimes measuring the height of children 
under 2 in slums proved to be a difficult task. As a result, the z-scores were not 
computed for individuals younger than 2 years and older than 20 years. Out of a total 
of 1092 children24 in 422 households, 84 (8%) were younger than 2 and 34 (3%) were 
older than 20. Since adolescent children may reach their growth spurts at different 
points in time, the analysis was restricted to children only until the age of 12. As a 
result, another 258 children were dropped and the final sample size for the analysis 
was 716 children in 337 households. 
Height data were missing for another 47 children (4%), thus reducing the 
available dataset to 669 children. As per the recommendations of the World Bank 
Technical Note #2 on Antropometrics (World Bank, 2007), I dropped another 50 
children (5%) with extreme z values of less than –5 (42 observations) or greater than 
3 (8 observations)25 to eliminate outliers.   
Another 13 children (1%) from six households were dropped as the age of 
wife during first birth was deemed to be too low (less than 13 years) thus questioning 
the reliability of these responses. This left a total of 606 children from 308 
households for our analyses, of which 51% were sons.  
 
 
                                                 
24 In this analysis, the use of “children” refers to children by relation and not a specific age group. As a 
result, some children may be older than 20 . 
25 The extreme z-score limits were set as values beyond these limits were susceptible to measurement 
error. Inclusion of these data did not have any significant impact on the stunting regression. There were 
10 respondents with z-value between –5 and –6, 7 between –6 and –7, 15 between –7 and –8, 1 
between –8 and –9, 7 between –9 and –10 and 8 with z-score less than –10. 
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3. Evidence of stunting? 
In our restricted sample of 606 children, sons and daughters had an average 
height (not controlled for age) of 110.4 cm and 110.5 cm respectively. The average z-
score for daughters at –1.6 was significantly higher (at 5% or less) than that for sons 
at –1.8. The median z-score was also higher for daughters at –1.6 than that for sons at 
–1.8. The cumulative distrubution of z-scores for sons and daughters in the restricted 
sample is shown in figure 7.1. The negative values for mean and median z-scores, 
along with the cumulative density function (CDF) curve showing subjects in excess 
of 80% with a negative z-score implies that overall the population was shorter than 
the reference population in the CDC growth data. The CDF curve also shows that for 
almost all cumulative probabilities, the z-score for daughters is higher than the z-
score for sons. This implies that when compared with a well nourished population of 
a similar age and gender, the daughters were taller than sons.  
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Figure 7.1: CDF for z-score (height-for-age) for children 
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The stunted population is indicated by the part of the cumulative distribution 
to the left of the vertical dotted line (representing a z-score of –2) shown in figure 7.1. 
In the restricted sample, about 39% of daughters and 45% of the boys were stunted, 
whereas about 16% of the daughters and 20% of the sons were severely stunted (z-
score less than –3). The proportion of stunting is lower than that found by Gaiha and 
Kulkarni (2005)26 for young children in rural India and higher than that found in 
middle class adolescent boys in Kolkata by de Onis et al. (2001). The stunting rates 
for Gaiha et al and de Onis et al are reported in table 7.1.  
 
                                                 
26 Gaiha studied children under 5 years, whereas our sub-sample includes children from age 2 to 20 
years. 
  152
Table 7.1 Prevalence of stunting in other studies 
 
 Navi Mumbai, 2007: 
current dataset 
(age 2-20) 
de Onis et al., 
2001, Kolkata 
(age 7 – 16) 
Gaiha and Kulkarni, 
2005, rural India (age 
<5) 
 Sons Daughters Boys Boys Girls 
Severely stunted 20.0 15.6 - 43.4 42.4 
Moderately stunted 25.1 23.8 9.4 16.4 14.8 
Total stunted 45.1 39.4 - 59.8 57.2 
 
 
The proportion of stunting varied by gender and slum. The proportion of 
children stunted is reported by slum and gender in table 7.2. In a healthy population 
with normally distributed heights, only about 2% of the population, are likely to have 
a z-score of less than –2, indicating that stunting in the surveyed area is pervasive. 
Hence, as per the directive of WHO Expert Committee (1995), stunting can be used 
as a dependent variable in our analyses.  
 
Table 7.2: Proportion of children stunted 
 Shramik 
Nagar 
Hanuman Nagar-
Mahape 
Ramabai 
 Nagar 
Hanuman Nagar-
Turbhe 
Proportion of sons stunted (%) 45 55 50 38 
Proportion of daughters stunted (%) 38 54 30 35 
 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
As discussed in the conceptual framework (equation 3.19, 3.20, 3.23 and 
3.24), I ran (1) a random effects regression with z-score for height (for age) as a 
continuous dependent variable and (2) a random effects probit regression with 
stunting as a binary dependent variable. Data were stacked with each row 
corresponding to a child within a household. Thus, a household with data on height of 
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three children was stacked in three rows. Summary statistics for different variables 
used in the regression are reported in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Summary of variables used 
Variable All children 
Children in 
families with at 
least two 
children 
Daughters in 
families with at 
least two children 
Sons in families 
with at least two 
children 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Z-score (height for age) -1.69 1.39 -1.69 1.39 -1.60 1.42 -1.79 1.35
1=Child is stunted; 0= Otherwise 0.42 0.49       
Sex: 1= Child is male; 0=Child is female 0.49 0.50       
Age of child in years 6.84 2.95 6.85 2.84 6.89 2.83 6.80 2.85
Age of child squared 55.53 42.44 54.90 40.68 55.42 40.46 54.33 40.99
Age of mother during childbirth 21.97 4.65 21.86 4.74 22.07 4.98 21.63 4.46
Age of mother during childbirth squared 504.31 227.99 500.28 232.84 511.73 247.97 487.55 214.54
Log of consumption (Rs.) per capita 6.30 0.49 6.27 0.48 6.27 0.46 6.26 0.50
Height of father 163.21 7.40 163.26 7.55 163.65 7.65 162.84 7.43
Height of mother 150.39 9.46 150.46 9.91 150.52 9.90 150.39 9.95
1=Mother has at least some secondary 
education; 0=Otherwise 0.28 0.45       
1=Women have no source of 
income;0=Otherwise 0.61 0.49       
1=Location has high risk of malaria; 
0=Otherwise 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.50
1=Height of at least one sibling missing; 0= 
Otherwise 0.45 0.50       
Interaction: Educated mother dummy & 
daughter dummy 0.12 0.33       
Interaction: Educated mother dummy & son 
dummy 0.16 0.37       
Interaction: Not educated mother & 
daughter dummy 0.38 0.49       
1=Both Husband and Wife Pooling; 0= 
Otherwise 0.09 0.29       
1=Husband pooling, wife non-pooling; 
0=Otherwise 0.18 0.39       
1=Husband non-pooling, wife pooling; 
0=Otherwise 0.21 0.41       
Interaction: Mother with some source of 
income dummy & daughter dummy 0.19 0.39       
Interaction: Mother with some source of 
income dummy & son dummy 0.20 0.40       
Interaction: Mother without some source of 
income dummy & daughter dummy 0.32 0.47       
Interaction: Log consumption per captia & 
findep variable 3.84 3.08       
Interaction: Log consumption per captia & 
(1-findep) 2.45 3.10       
Interaction: Non-housewife & daughter 
dummy 0.15 0.36       
Interaction: Non-housewife & son dummy 0.15 0.36       
Interaction: Housewife & daughter dummy 0.35 0.48       
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Interaction: Eldest child and (1-findep)    0.11 0.31     
Interaction: Other children and findep    0.40 0.49     
Interaction: Other children and (1-findep)    0.28 0.45     
Interaction: Eldest daughter and (1-findep)      0.16 0.37  
Interaction: Other daughters and findep      0.36 0.48  
Interaction: Other daughters and (1-findep)      0.21 0.41  
Interaction: Eldest son and (1-findep)        0.18 0.38
Interaction: Other sons and findep        0.30 0.46
Interaction: Other sons and (1-findep)      0.24 0.43
Number of children 606  528  278 250 
 
 
Results of random effects regression with z-score as dependent variable are 
reported in table 7.4 and random effects probit regression with stunting as dependent 
variable are reported in table 7.5. The specification in table 7.4 and 7.5 is identical, 
except for the dependent variable (z-score for height-for-age vs. binary variable 
indicating stunting) and type of regression (random effects vs. random effects probit).  
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Table 7.4: Results of random effects regression  (all children) 
Z-scores (height for age) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sex: 1= Child is male;  -0.241       
    0=Child is female (2.33)*       
Age of child in years -0.009 -0.051 -0.005 -0.052 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.10) (0.57) (0.05) (0.57) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) 
Age of child squared 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.67) (0.70) (0.53) (0.73) (0.58) (0.59) (0.58) 
1=Mother has at least some secondary -0.105       
    education; 0=Otherwise (0.68)       
1=Women have no source of  0.032       
    income;0=Otherwise (0.23)       
Interaction: not educated mother &   0.318 0.317     
    daughter dummy  (2.58)** (2.61)**     
Interaction: educated mother dummy   -0.030 0.050     
    & daughter dummy  (0.15) (0.25)     
Interaction: educated mother dummy   -0.043 0.029     
    & son dummy  (0.23) (0.16)     
Interaction: mother without some     0.335 0.318 0.315  
source of income & daughter     (2.46)* (2.37)* (2.35)*  
Interaction: mother with some source     0.269 0.183 -1.275  
of income dummy & daughter     (1.48) (1.03) (0.73)  
Interaction: mother with some source     0.156 0.056 -1.403  
of income dummy & son     (0.89) (0.33) (0.81)  
Interaction: housewife & daughter        0.209 
       (1.67)+ 
Interaction: non-housewife &        0.213 
daughter        (1.13) 
Interaction: non-housewife & son        -0.097 
       (0.52) 
Age of mother during childbirth 0.383  0.364  0.366 0.362 0.365 
 (4.31)**  (4.13)**  (4.15)** (4.10)** (4.14)**
Age of mother during childbirth  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
squared (3.93)**  (3.78)**  (3.77)** (3.70)** (3.75)**
Height of father 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.029 
 (3.08)** (3.03)** (3.00)** (3.15)** (3.02)** (3.03)** (3.06)**
Height of mother 0.005 0.004  0.003    
 (0.75) (0.53)  (0.38)    
Log of consumption (Rs.) per capita 0.027 0.095 0.051 0.068 0.043  0.038 
 (0.19) (0.67) (0.37) (0.49) (0.32)  (0.28) 
Interaction: log consumption per       -0.055  
capita & findep variable      (0.31)  
Interaction: Log consumption per       0.174  
capita & (1-findep)      (0.85)  
1=Location has high risk of malaria;  -0.255 -0.268 -0.234 -0.284 -0.243 -0.254 -0.245 
0=Otherwise (1.81)+ (1.86)+ (1.70)+ (1.98)* (1.77)+ (1.84)+ (1.76)+ 
1=Height of at least one sibling  -0.226 -0.103  -0.112    
missing; 0= Otherwise (1.62) (0.73)  (0.80)    
1=Both husband and wife pooling;   0.062  0.079    
0= Otherwise  (0.25)  (0.32)    
1=Husband pooling, wife non-  -0.249  -0.259    
pooling; 0=Otherwise  (1.35)  (1.41)    
1=Husband non-pooling, wife   0.082  0.102    
pooling; 0=Otherwise  (0.46)  (0.58)    
Constant -12.064 -7.486 -11.372 -7.407 -11.400 -10.756 -11.387
 (5.22)** (3.58)** (5.52)** (3.53)** (5.55)** (4.91)** (5.53)**
Number of children 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 
Number of households 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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In specification 1, I included children characteristics such as their sex, age and 
square of age and household characteristics (including parental characteristics) such 
as mother’s and father’s height to account for genetic variations, age of mother during 
childbirth.(and its square), log of per capita consumption 27 and whether the slum was 
located in a high risk location (API > 2.0) as independent variables. The education 
variable for children was not considered as most of the children went to school 
resulting in high correlation between child education and child age. I included two 
variables that might be associated with bargaining power of women: (1) a dummy 
variable for mother’s education (secondary or higher) and (2) a dummy variable for 
mothers who did not have any source of income (findep:1=mothers have no source of 
income;0=otherwise). In addition, I included a variable, which indicated that the z-
score for at least one of the siblings in the household could not be included in the 
analysis. This could be because the sibling was older than 12 years or younger than 2 
years, or the height data for him/her was missing.  
In specification 1 for the height-for-age model (table 7.4), I found that sex was 
negative and significant, implying that girls were on average taller than the referred 
well nourished population than boys, when controlled for age. This is a surprising 
result given the literature and empirical evidence pointing towards the gender bias 
against women in South Asia. In their analyses of anthropometric data from rural 
India, Gaiha and Kulkarni (2005) did find a higher proportion of male children 
                                                 
27 I ran different specifications (not reported) with different indicators for income such as total 
household income, total income of fathers and mothers, non-labor income of fathers and mothers, and 
land (in acres) of grandparents, per capita consumption, log of per capita consumption. I found the log 
of per capita consumption to be the only variable with a relatively high p-value and all regressions are 
reported with this variable.  
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stunted vis-à-vis female children. However, the effect was not significant in the 
multivariate analyses.  
Among other variables, I found that mother’s age during birth had a 
curvilinear relationship with the z-scores of children with both age at birth and its 
square significant at 1% or less. Children born when their mothers were about 27 
years old are likely to be the tallest compared to mothers who were younger or older 
then 27 years during childbirth, other things being equal. Height of mother was 
positive but not significant, but height of father was positive and significant implying 
that taller fathers were, on average, more likely to have taller children. The coefficient 
for log of consumption per capita was positive but not significant. The variable that 
indicated the risk of getting malaria was significant and negative. It may be possible 
that some of the stunting may be the result of illnesses in the slums and that slums 
with higher risk of malaria may also have high risk of other diseases (although there 
is no additional data to substantiate that claim).   
To investigate why girls are likely to be taller, I interacted the gender variable 
with the education variable (specifications 2 and 3) and findep variable (specification 
4, 5 and 6) and housewife variable (specification 7). I added information from other 
parts of our research. This includes variables indicating pooling status of the 
household. As was the case in analyses of household demand data, I added dummy 
variables indicating whether the household had (1) pooling husband and wife, (2) 
pooling husband and non-pooling wife or (3) non-pooling husband and pooling wife, 
with pooling defined as those respondents who chose a “P” card in the highest payout 
level of the lottery question, in specifications 2 and 4. In specification 2 and 4, I 
  158
removed age of mother during childbirth and in specification 3. In specification 6, I 
interacted the findep variable with the log of consumptions per capita variable. 
I found that in specifications 2 and 3, the interaction of a daughter with a non-
educated mother was positive and significant at 1% or less, indicating that daughters 
of women who had primary education or less were more likely to be taller than the 
reference population compared to their sons. Coefficient for interaction term for 
daughters with less-educated (primary education or less) mothers was significantly 
different from that for daughters with more-educated mothers with less-educated 
mothers more likely to have taller daughters compared to women with higher 
education. Similarly, in specifications 4, 5 and 6, the interaction of a daughter with a 
mother who had no source of income was positive and significant at 10% or less, 
indicating that women who did not have any source of income were more likely to 
have daughters taller than their sons (with respect to reference population). 
Interacting the gender of the child with mother occupation (housewife) also yielded 
similar results with the coefficient for the interaction of housewife and daughter being 
positive and significant at 10% or more. 
The other results in specifications 2-5 were consistent with findings of 
specification 1. Log of consumption per capita remained positive but not significant, 
the variable that indicated risk of malaria remained negative and significant, and age 
of mother during childbirth remained curvilinear with women aged 26 during 
childbirth most likely to give birth to taller children. 
I also ran regressions with variables for infrastructure (such as electricity) and 
assets but these variables were not significant. I also ran all the specifications with a 
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dummy variable indicating missing data for children height within the household and 
religion dummies but these variables were not significant in any of the regressions28. 
The value of the coefficient for random effects regression with z-score as 
dependent variable also indicates the marginal impact that a unit increase in the 
independent variable will have on the z-score. The mean z value (one standard 
deviation) for girls gradually increases from about 3.5cm at the age of 2 to about 7.5 
cm at the age of 12 and then remain almost constant at about 6.5 cm. Variables such 
as being a daughter of a mother without some source of income, a daughter of a 
mother with little education, living in a slum with high risk of malaria, age of mother 
during childbirth and per capita consumption have a higher impact on the z-score in 
terms of magnitude than variables such as age of child and height of the mother.  
                                                 
28 Missing data for children height include (1) height for children aged 0-2, which could not be 
included because of measurement error and because the CDC data does not have information to 
compute z-scores in this age range, (2) height for children who could not be found in spite of multiple 
trips. This included children who were living with relatives (permanently or for vacation) or were 
funded for (primary or secondary) studies by charitable organizations and lived in hostels. 
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Figure 7.2: Height difference between daughters having mothers with and 
without income 
Height difference (wrt reference population) between daughters having mothers 
without and with income (cm)
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In figure 7.2, I plotted the average difference in height of daughters with 
mothers having no income and those with mothers having some income. I found that 
at the age of 2 years, daughters of mothers having no source of income were on 
average taller by about 0.5 cm (specification 5). This difference peaked to about 1.0 
cm at age of 12. 
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Table 7.5 Results of random effects probit regression (all children) 
Dep. Variable: Child Stunted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sex: 1= Child is male;  0.171       
    0=Child is female (1.43)       
Age of child in years 0.025 0.053 0.016 0.056 0.022 0.024 0.021 
 (0.24) (0.52) (0.15) (0.55) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) 
Age of child squared -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.94) (0.92) (0.78) (0.98) (0.87) (0.88) (0.88) 
1=Mother has at least some secondary 0.122       
    education; 0=Otherwise (0.81)       
1=Women have no source of  0.012       
    income;0=Otherwise (0.09)       
Interaction: not educated mother &   -0.269 -0.285     
    daughter dummy  (1.90)+ (1.97)*     
Interaction: educated mother dummy   0.134 0.049     
    & daughter dummy  (0.63) (0.23)     
Interaction: educated mother dummy   -0.001 -0.079     
    & son dummy  (0.01) (0.41)     
Interaction: mother without some     -0.314 -0.305 -0.303  
    source of income & daughter     (2.05)* (1.97)* (1.95)+  
Interaction: mother with some source     -0.215 -0.133 1.489  
    of income dummy & daughter     (1.16) (0.71) (0.85)  
Interaction: mother with some source     -0.261 -0.157 1.465  
    of income dummy & son     (1.45) (0.86) (0.84)  
Interaction: housewife & daughter        -0.149 
       (1.04) 
Interaction: non-housewife &        -0.117 
    daughter        (0.58) 
Interaction: non-housewife & son        0.110 
       (0.56) 
Age of mother during childbirth -0.343  -0.332  -0.332 -0.326 -0.331 
 (3.49)**  (3.37)**  (3.39)** (3.33)** (3.40)**
Age of mother during childbirth  0.006  0.006  0.006 0.006 0.006 
    squared (3.23)**  (3.13)**  (3.13)** (3.05)** (3.12)**
Height of father -0.037 -0.036 -0.037 -0.038 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 
 (3.77)** (3.68)** (3.71)** (3.85)** (3.77)** (3.79)** (3.81)**
Height of mother -0.010 -0.009  -0.008    
 (1.50) (1.31)  (1.15)    
Log of consumption (Rs.) per capita 0.113 0.067 0.101 0.097 0.111  0.113 
 (0.82) (0.49) (0.73) (0.72) (0.82)  (0.83) 
Interaction: Log consumption per       0.224  
    capita & findep variable      (1.23)  
Interaction: Log consumption per       -0.032  
    capita & (1-findep)      (0.16)  
1=Location has high risk of malaria;  0.107 0.113 0.107 0.128 0.116 0.129 0.125 
    0=Otherwise (0.77) (0.81) (0.77) (0.93) (0.84) (0.93) (0.90) 
1=Height of at least one sibling  0.151 0.048  0.060    
    missing; 0= Otherwise (1.09) (0.35)  (0.44)    
1=Both husband and wife pooling;   -0.099  -0.127    
    0= Otherwise  (0.42)  (0.54)    
1=Husband pooling, wife non-  0.142  0.154    
    pooling; 0=Otherwise  (0.80)  (0.87)    
1=Husband non-pooling, wife   -0.213  -0.246    
    pooling; 0=Otherwise  (1.25)  (1.43)    
Constant 10.806 6.577 9.531 6.560 9.555 8.799 9.481 
 (4.34)** (3.17)** (4.17)** (3.17)** (4.22)** (3.70)** (4.22)**
Number of children 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 
Number of households 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Results of the stunting model (table 7.5) were generally consistent with the z-
score based model with the sign generally opposite of the z-score (higher probability 
of a tall child implies lesser probability of stunting), except that standard errors were 
slightly higher resulting in lower p-values and less number of significant variables. 
The coefficients for the gender variable in specification 1 and variable denoting risk 
of malaria in a particular location in all specifications were not significant. However, 
interaction between daughters and non-educated mothers and between daughters and 
mothers without sources of income was negative and significant (at 5-10% or less for 
various specifications), a result consistent with our previous models. Age and age 
squared of mother during childbirth was significant at 1% or less and height of 
mother was significant at 5% or less (10% or less in specification 5). Coefficient  for 
log of consumption per capita was not significant. Age of mother during child birth 
was curvilinear and significant with children born when mothers are about 27-29 
years old most likely to have the tallest children, other things being equal. 
 
5. Impact of parental occupation and birth order 
Overall, the data suggest that employment of women may be having a 
negative welfare effect on daughters. This raises some new questions. Is this negative 
welfare effect a result of reduced time that a mother spends with her children? If so, 
do other family members, including elder children take care of younger siblings? If 
so, how does it affect the health of elder children? Further, are children of mother’s 
working on daily wages worse off than those of mother’s working as housemaids? 
What is the impact of father’s occupation on the decision of mother’s to work or on 
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children height? Unfortunately, the data cannot causally answer any of these 
questions. However, I have tried to examine the association between birth order and 
occupation and the height of children. 
 
A. Impact of birth order 
If the eldest child provides childcare when her mother is working, it may 
create negative welfare effects for this child. To examine whether height of the eldest 
child of a working mother is significantly different from that of a non-working 
mother, I created a dummy variable for the eldest child in the household (having at 
least one younger sibling) and interacted it with the dummy variable findep (1= 
mother has no source of income;0=otherwise). I ran a random effects regression with 
z-score as a dependent variable for households which had at least two children in 
specification 1. The results are reported in table 7.6.  
In addition, I examined the birth order of girls and boys separately, i.e., 
whether the height of the eldest daughter is significantly different from that of other 
female siblings (specification 2) and whether the height of the eldest son is different 
from that of other male siblings (specification 3), by restricting the analysis to girls 
and boys respectively.  
The other independent variables used in this analysis include child 
characteristics such as age (and age squared), household characteristics such as age of 
mother during childbirth (and square of age during childbirth), log of consumption 
per capita, height of mother (specification 1-3) and height of father and locations with 
risk of malaria (specification 4-6).   
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Table 7.6: Regression results for daughters  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interaction: eldest child and (1-findep) -0.034   -0.035   
 (0.15)   (0.16)   
Interaction: other children and findep -0.088   -0.130   
 (0.53)   (0.78)   
Interaction: other children and (1-findep) -0.108   -0.170   
 (0.51)   (0.81)   
Interaction: eldest daughter and (1-findep)  -0.526   -0.523  
  (1.99)*   (1.97)*  
Interaction: other daughters and findep  -0.276   -0.307  
  (1.20)   (1.33)  
Interaction: other daughters and (1-findep)  -0.153   -0.185  
  (0.54)   (0.66)  
Interaction: eldest son and (1-findep)   0.434   0.360 
   (1.65)+   (1.39) 
Interaction: other sons and findep   0.010   -0.048 
   (0.04)   (0.20) 
Interaction: other sons and (1-findep)   -0.095   -0.218 
   (0.35)   (0.83) 
Age of child in years 0.083 0.157 -0.036 0.078 0.136 -0.012 
 (0.84) (1.07) (0.23) (0.79) (0.92) (0.08) 
Age of child squared -0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.33) (0.53) (0.15) (0.43) (0.49) (0.10) 
Age of mother during childbirth 0.383 0.411 0.281 0.386 0.392 0.321 
 (3.76)** (3.05)** (2.14)* (3.83)** (2.91)** (2.50)* 
Age of mother during childbirth squared -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
 (3.42)** (2.82)** (1.87)+ (3.54)** (2.72)** (2.28)* 
Log of consumption (Rs.) per capita 0.112 0.227 0.008 0.071 0.187 -0.028 
 (0.70) (1.10) (0.04) (0.45) (0.92) (0.16) 
Height of mother 0.005 0.005 0.005    
 (0.66) (0.55) (0.55)    
Height of father    0.029 0.023 0.032 
    (2.77)** (1.79)+ (2.74)**
1=Location has high risk of malaria;     -0.314 -0.266 -0.358 
    0=Otherwise    (1.98)* (1.33) (1.98)* 
Constant -8.426 -9.554 -6.093 -11.878 -11.760 -10.482
 (4.26)** (3.76)** (2.56)* (5.07)** (3.87)** (3.93)**
Observations 528 278 250 525 275 250 
Number of households 230 179 175 229 178 175 
Dependent variable is z-score for height 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
The interaction term between mothers who had some source of income and 
the eldest child (specification 1, 4) was not significant but interaction of mothers who 
had some source of income was significant and negative for eldest daughters at 10% 
or less (specification 2, 5) and significant and positive at 10% or less for eldest sons 
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(specification 3) or not significant for eldest sons (specification 6). This indicates that 
eldest daughters of women who have any source of income are more likely to be 
shorter (or more likely to be stunted) than the eldest daughters of women who do not 
have any source of income. Eldest sons of women who have some source of income, 
on the other hand, are no more likely to be shorter than those of women who have no 
source of income. Data reveal gender disparities between sons and daughters.  
 
Figure 7.3: Height difference between eldest daughters of women with and 
without income 
Predicted Mean Height difference (wrt reference population) between the eldest 
daughters of women without income and women with some income (cm)
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The average differences in height of the eldest daughters of women who do 
not work and women who work for different ages are reported in figure 7.3. The 
difference is the least at age 2 at about 1.8 cm and gradually increases to about 3.9 cm 
at age 12.  
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B. Impact of occupation on child stunting 
To assess the impact of occupation, I tabulated proportion of children stunted 
and total children by mother’s and father’s occupation (tables 7.7 and 7.8 
respectively). Table 7.7 shows that, for example, 48% of all children had their fathers 
working as laborers for daily wages, but only 44% of the stunted children had their 
fathers working as laborers for daily wages.  The tables show that the proportion of 
stunted children and total children is very similar for different parental occupations. 
In addition, I used various mother and father occupation dummies in the previously 
conducted multivariate exercise, but none of the coefficients was significant.  
  
Table 7.7: Stunted children tabulated by father’s occupation 
Father’s occupation 
Proportion of stunted 
children 
Proportion of total 
children 
Unemployed 2% 2% 
Laborer/daily wages 44% 48% 
Mathadi 2% 1% 
Artisan 4% 4% 
Shopkeeper 1% 2% 
Worker 7% 5% 
Professional 1% 1% 
Small business 1% 1% 
Upper level job 1% 1% 
Mid-level job 4% 5% 
Low-level job 33% 30% 
Housemaid 0% 0% 
 100% 100% 
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Table 7.8: Stunted children tabulated by mother’s occupation 
Mother’s occupation 
Proportion of stunted 
children 
Proportion of total 
children 
Housewife 74% 71% 
Laborer/ daily wages 9% 11% 
Shopkeeper 0% 1% 
Worker 1% 1% 
Professional 1% 1% 
Trader 1% 0% 
Small business 0% 1% 
Mid-level job 0% 0% 
Low-level job 2% 2% 
Housemaid 12% 11% 
 100% 100% 
 
 
6. Height certificate as a “gift” 
Because of resource and ethical constraints, researchers struggle to arrive at 
the right “gift” to offer to respondents in a survey. I found a majority of our 
respondents eager to learn their exact weight and height and appreciated the concept 
of a height certificate for safe-keeping. In my opinion, this represents a perfect gift, 
which is not expensive to give, is appreciated by respondents, and at the same time 
provides the research team with invaluable data.  
 
7. Conclusions 
I found evidence that daughters of women who had no source of income or 
who had little education (primary education or less) were significantly taller 
(compared to their reference population) than other children. Further, the eldest 
daughters (with at least one younger sibling) of women who have some source of 
income were on average shorter compared to their reference population as against 
other daughters whereas the eldest son (with at least one younger sibling) was taller.  
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None of the income variables were a significant indicator of height. Further, 
the per capita consumption in households in which women had some source of 
income was not significantly different from that in households in which women did 
not have any source of income. This may be because women working in low-paying, 
low-quality jobs did not receive sufficient compensation to counteract the detriment 
effects of their absence from their home on the well-being of their children, especially 
daughters. Further, eldest daughters were more likely to be shorter than other 
daughters, but the same could not be said about the eldest sons. This may be because 
the eldest daughter assumes responsibility for the childcare of younger siblings or 
may be contributing in some way in household work. Because of the nature of the 
data, however, causality cannot be established.  
 
 
  
CHAPTER 8  
Evidence from Risky Choice Experiment 
 
1. Module objectives 
This chapter summarizes the results of the risky choice module of the 
research. The objectives of this chapter are: 
1. To examine the differences in pooling behavior of husbands and wives. 
2. To examine whether all households can be classified as pooling or non-
pooling, or whether there exists a variety of pooling behavior displayed by 
different households.  
3. To examine the impact of increased levels of payout on risky choice and 
income pooling behavior. 
 
2. Exclusion criteria 
 Of the interviewed couples, 20 husbands (5% of the sample interviewed) and 
65 wives (15% of the sample interviewed) were unable to comprehend the lottery. 
About 75% of these husbands and 80% of these wives did not have even a single year 
of formal education. Further, two husbands and nine wives refused to play the game. 
As a result, a total of 79 households representing about 19% of the sample were 
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excluded from the analyses. The final analysis was restricted to 334 households. 
Details of exclusion criteria are reported in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 Exclusion criteria for the lottery experiment 
Households where respondents did not 
understand the lottery 
Respondents who did not 
understand the game 
Additional respondents  who 
refused to play the game 
Husband only 14 0 
Wife only 58 8 
Both Husband and wife 7 1 
Total Households excluded 79 9 
 
3. Individual responses to the lottery question 
 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 display the proportion of respondents choosing the 
pooling (P), intermediate (I) and non-pooling (N) choice for both husbands and wives 
at levels X, 4X and 16X. The stacked tubes show the proportion of respondents who 
chose a particular lottery option. The bold white and gray horizontal arrows show the 
proportion of respondents who did not display a change in their income-pooling 
tendency while moving from one level to the next level, whereas the thin diagonal 
arrows show respondents who selected a different card in the next level.  
From level X to level 4X, the proportion of respondents displaying pooling 
behavior by choosing option P dropped from 40% to 38% for husbands and from 37% 
to 34% for wives, with the drop not significant for either husbands or wives. This was 
associated with a significant increase (at 10% or less) for husbands choosing a non-
pooling card (card N) from 32% to 38% and a non-significant drop for wives from 
35% to 32%. From level 4X to level 16X, the proportion of respondents choosing a 
pooling card dropped significantly to 33% for husbands and to 30% (not-significant) 
for wives). This was associated with a non-significant drop with 38% of the husbands 
choosing a non-pooling card and a significant increase (at 1% or less) for wives 
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choosing the non-pooling card. The proportion of respondents changing their opinion 
as they moved to the next level (aggregate of the respondents represented by thin 
diagonal arrows) declined overall as stakes grew from 4X to 16X (51% for both 
husbands and wives) as compared to when the stakes grew from X to 4X (59% and 
64% for husbands and wives respectively). This may be because many respondents 
were not decided at the 4X level. 
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Figure 8.1: Trend in husband's lottery choices 
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Note: Figures may not aggregate to 100 because of round off errors. 
 
Figure 8.2: Trend in wife’s lottery choices 
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Note: Figures may not aggregate to 100 because of round off errors. 
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Table 8.2: Respondent card choices (raw data) 
 All three levels Levels Y & Z only 
 Husbands Wives Husbands Wives 
 # % # % # % # % 
         
Respondents who chose same card          
    Card 3 (Non-income pooler) 24 7 26 8 67 20 50 15 
    Card 2 (Intermediate) 11 3 9 3 33 10 32 10 
    Card 1 (Income pooler or co-operative   
                Bargainer) 
36 11 16 5 62 19 38 11 
         
Sub-Total 71 21 41 15 162 49 120 36 
         
Respondents who chose different cards         
         
   Leaning toward non-pooling extreme at higher 
stakes 97 29 91 27 78 28 122 37 
   Leaning toward pooling extreme at higher stakes 70 21 65 20 93 23 91 27 
   Others (not decisive) 95 29 126 38     
Sub-Total  262 79 282 85 171 51 213 64 
Total 333 100 333 100 333 100 333 100 
         
         
Non-pooling or leaning toward non-pooling 121 36 117 35 145 48 172 52 
Pooling or leaning toward pooling 106 32 81 25 155 42 129 38 
Others 106 32 125 40 33 10 32 10 
Total 333 100 333 100 333 100 333 100 
(percentages are with respect to total respondent husbands or wives, i.e., 333) 
 
Table 8.2 shows raw data on the pattern of card choices for all three levels. 
Respondent choices for the last two levels are also displayed separately. Only 21% of 
the respondent husbands and 15% of the respondent wives chose the same card all 
three times though. This implies that a substantial majority of the respondents did 
change the type of card that they selected at least once as the level of stakes 
increased.  
To understand underlying patterns in the behavior of respondents who did not 
choose the same card all three times, I examined their tendency to decisively move in 
the direction of a particular extreme (i.e., toward the P or N card). Respondents who 
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chose card P at lower levels and card I or card N at higher levels were classified as 
those with tendency to non-pool as the stakes rise. Respondents who chose I at lower 
levels but N at higher levels were also classified in this group. Thus, respondents who 
chose P-I-I, P-I-N, P-N-N, I-I-N or cards in similar sequence for the levels X-4X-16X 
were classified into this group. These are respresented by the respondents who 
followed the upward moving arrow in figures 8.1 and 8.2 at least once but never 
followed the downward moving arrow. Similarly, respondents who chose card N at 
lower levels and card I or P at higher levels were classified as those with tendency to 
pool as stakes rose. These are respresented by the respondents who followed the 
downward moving arrow in figures 8.1 and 8.2 at least once but never followed the 
upward moving arrow. The remaining respondents such as those who chose P-N-I, N-
P-I, N-P-N, or cards in similar sequence were those who did not decisively move in a 
particular direction and were classified as undecided. These are respondents who 
chose both the upward and the downward moving arrows once in figures 8.1 and 8.2. 
Overall, husbands tend to pool their income more often as seen by the fact that 
about 11% of the husbands who pooled consistently in all the three cards and another 
21% showed a tendency to pool at higher stakes, as compared with only about 5%  of 
wives who pooled consistently and another 20% who tended to pool at higher prices. 
A higher proportion of husbands (compared to wives) did not change their preference 
for a particular type of card, which resulted in a lower proportion of husbands 
(compared to wives) who were not decisive in their tendency to pool income.   
Although, I could identify some trends in individual tendencies towards 
pooling, I was not able to categorize households into pooling or non-pooling 
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categories. This is because husband and wife made the same choice for each level 
only 14 (4%) times. Of these, only two couples chose the P card consistently all three 
times, and a single couple chose the N card consistently. 
When data from only the last two levels were analysed, the proportion of 
respondents choosing consistently for the last two levels increased to 49% of 
husbands and 36% of wives. Overall, wife behavior was not significantly different 
from that of husband’s with about 52% of wives likely to be either non-pooling or 
leaning to non-pooling compared to 48% of husbands and 38% of wives likely to be 
either pooling or leaning towards pooling as against 42% of husbands. The proportion 
of wives choosing non-pooling or tending to choose the non-pooling card was 
significantly higher than those choosing a pooling card or tending to pool. However, 
equivalence of proportion of husbands choosing non-pooling card or tending to non-
pooling and those choosing pooling card or tending to pooling could not be rejected. 
Of the 333 couples, only 40 husbands selected the same cards as their wife for the last 
two levels. Of these, 9 chose the pooling card, 2 chose the intermediate card and 11 
chose the non-pooling card consistently at each level.  
 
4. Choosing a different card 
The raw data establish that a majority of respondents did not choose the same 
card all the three times. This may be because some of the respondents may be 
learning the experiment at the lower levels. I have examined this possibility of 
learning in two ways. First, I study the differences in multivariate results for each 
level separately. I also examine the impact of education on card switching. 
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A. Multivariate results for each level 
I conducted multivariate analysis for each level in form of a multinomial 
probit model with the dependent variable equal to 1, 2 or 3 if a Pooling, Intermediate 
or Nonpooling card was chosen respectively and examined the standard errors of the 
covariates and the trend in the proportion of variability in our data that is explained 
by the econometric models (pseudo R2). I hypothesized that higher learning should 
result in lower standard errors and higher R2 and higher number of significant 
variables.  
The different independent variables considered were education levels of 
husbands and wives, respondent’s age and age squared, religion dummies. Consistent 
with the specifications used in other analyses in the dissertation, I used aggregate 
household income and variable findep (a dummy variable indicating that wife did not 
have any source of income). I included a dummy variable, which indicated at least 
one child in the household was stunted. I also included the predicted WTP for joint 
response of the respondent for a 95% effective vaccine.  
The Pseudo R2 and number of significant variables for the three levels are 
reported in table 8.3 and the multivariate results for wives and husbands are posted in 
tables 8.4 and 8.5 respectively. I found that the R2 for wife was highest at the card Z 
level for the highest payout. The R2 for husbands remained almost the same. Thus, 
there may be some learning going on for wives.  
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Table 8.3: Variance levels for card X,Y,Z 
 Wife Husband 
 Card X: 
lowest 
payout 
Card Y: 
intermediate 
payout 
Card Z: 
highest 
payout 
Card X: 
lowest 
payout 
Card Y: 
intermediate 
payout 
Card Z: 
highest 
payout 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 
# of 
significant 
variables 
4 0 8 0 5 3 
Note that standard errors for variables remained almost the same. 
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Table 8.4: Multinomial probit results for wife choices (one card at a time) 
 Card X: 
lowest payout 
Card Y: 
intermediate payout 
Card Z: 
highest payout 
Outcome P, Base N    
1= Husband has secondary education or more;  0.215 -0.058 0.064 
     0=Otherwise (0.91) (0.24) (0.26) 
Wife has secondary education or more; 0=Otherwise -0.156 0.124 -0.982 
 (0.61) (0.49) (3.69)** 
Wife's age 0.093 -0.056 -0.277 
 (0.84) (0.49) (2.28)* 
Wife's age squared -0.001 0.001 0.004 
 (0.71) (0.51) (2.41)* 
Number of children -0.019 0.377 0.017 
 (0.05) (1.10) (0.05) 
Number of children squared -0.004 -0.055 -0.002 
 (0.07) (1.07) (0.04) 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  -0.298 0.074 -0.333 
    0=Otherwise (0.85) (0.21) (0.95) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  -0.392 0.150 0.112 
    0=Otherwise (1.08) (0.41) (0.31) 
1=Household with at least one child stunted;  0.404 -0.135 0.297 
    0=Otherwise (1.82)+ (0.60) (1.31) 
Monthly household income in ’000$ -1.672 -1.411 0.257 
 (0.71) (0.59) (0.11) 
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  0.287 -0.106 0.698 
    0=Otherwise (1.17) (0.42) (2.67)** 
Predicted wife joint WTP (95% effective) 0.003 -0.011 0.026 
 (0.10) (0.42) (0.96) 
Constant -1.625 0.674 3.373 
 (0.92) (0.37) (1.78)+ 
Outcome I, Base N    
1= Husband has secondary education or more;  0.101 0.086 0.376 
     0=Otherwise (0.41) (0.36) (1.52) 
Wife has secondary education or more; 0=Otherwise -0.205 -0.040 -0.950 
 (0.77) (0.16) (3.55)** 
Wife's age 0.101 -0.031 0.003 
 (0.87) (0.27) (0.02) 
Wife's age squared -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.67) (0.43) (0.16) 
Number of children -0.746 0.266 0.111 
 (2.14)* (0.78) (0.31) 
Number of children squared 0.107 -0.039 -0.004 
 (2.02)* (0.77) (0.08) 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  -0.417 0.012 0.592 
    0=Otherwise (1.11) (0.03) (1.47) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  -0.008 0.111 0.895 
    0=Otherwise (0.02) (0.30) (2.13)* 
1=Household with at least one child stunted;  0.349 -0.173 0.390 
    0=Otherwise (1.51) (0.77) (1.68)+ 
Monthly household income in ’000$ -1.755 -0.689 -1.343 
 (0.72) (0.30) (0.55) 
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  0.764 -0.149 0.298 
    0=Otherwise (2.87)** (0.59) (1.17) 
Predicted wife joint WTP (95% effective) 0.040 -0.007 0.040 
 (1.44) (0.25) (1.48) 
Constant -1.808 0.199 -2.223 
 (0.98) (0.11) (1.05) 
# Observations 333 333 333 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table 8.5: Multinomial probit results for husband choices (one card at a time) 
 Card X: 
lowest payout 
Card Y: 
intermediate 
payout 
Card Z: 
highest payout 
Outcome P, Base N  5 3 
1= Husband has secondary education or more;  0.143 -0.544 -0.181 
   0=Otherwise (0.57) (2.20)* (0.72) 
1=Wife has secondary education or more;  -0.073 0.081 -0.136 
0=Otherwise (0.29) (0.33) (0.54) 
Husband's age -0.005 0.057 0.014 
 (0.06) (0.61) (0.15) 
Husband's age squared 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.13) (0.70) (0.18) 
Number of children  -0.310 -0.388 -0.048 
 (0.80) (1.15) (0.13) 
Number of children squared 0.075 0.073 -0.005 
 (1.22) (1.45) (0.08) 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  -0.068 -0.488 0.081 
    0=Otherwise (0.19) (1.39) (0.23) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  -0.143 0.042 0.382 
    0=Otherwise (0.40) (0.12) (1.04) 
1=Household with at least one child stunted;  0.235 0.044 -0.260 
    0=Otherwise (1.07) (0.20) (1.17) 
Monthly household income in '000 US$ -1.172 -6.201 -4.312 
 (0.49) (2.50)* (1.77)+ 
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  0.030 0.130 -0.437 
    0=Otherwise (0.12) (0.52) (1.73)+ 
Predicted husband joint WTP (95% effective) -0.004 0.049 0.026 
 (0.14) (1.98)* (1.05) 
Constant 0.432 -0.193 0.297 
 (0.25) (0.11) (0.17) 
Outcome I, Base N    
1= Husband has secondary education or more;  0.222 -0.189 -0.430 
   0=Otherwise (0.86) (0.71) (1.70)+ 
1=Wife has secondary education or more;  -0.033 0.251 -0.144 
0=Otherwise (0.12) (0.93) (0.56) 
Husband's age 0.092 -0.033 -0.023 
 (0.94) (0.33) (0.24) 
Husband's age squared -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.92) (0.64) (0.23) 
Number of children -0.271 0.579 0.177 
 (0.67) (1.42) (0.52) 
Number of children squared 0.051 -0.044 -0.011 
 (0.79) (0.72) (0.23) 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  0.040 -0.890 -0.197 
    0=Otherwise (0.11) (2.40)* (0.57) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  -0.345 -0.317 -0.109 
    0=Otherwise (0.92) (0.83) (0.30) 
1=Household with at least one child stunted;  -0.133 0.191 -0.277 
    0=Otherwise (0.58) (0.81) (1.23) 
Monthly household income in '000 US$ 1.780 -3.188 -0.737 
 (0.73) (1.31) (0.31) 
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  0.100 0.146 -0.299 
    0=Otherwise (0.38) (0.55) (1.17) 
Predicted husband joint WTP (95% effective) -0.018 0.061 0.022 
 (0.71) (2.31)* (0.89) 
Constant -1.585 -1.444 0.481 
 (0.86) (0.77) (0.27) 
# Observations 333 333 333 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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B. Impact of education on card choice switching 
The concern about learning is a valid one particularly because of the lottery 
choice being essentially a numbers game and the high proportion of illiterate women 
within the household. In other words, is switching of cards by less literate persons a 
genuine response or is the data the result of a random process? However, regression 
analysis in tables 8.4 and 8.5 demonstrates that higher education variable is not 
significant. Thus, higher educated respondents, who are more likely to understand the 
experiment, have switched in a manner not significantly different from less educated 
respondents.  
 
5. Multivariate results 
Since the value of payout at level X was very low, I discarded this from the 
analyses. To explore the possibility of learning, I ran the multinomial probit models 
for level Y and Z data pooled together (666 observations, specifications 1 and 2) and 
for level Z only (333 observations, specifications 3 and 4). 
I used the same set of independent variables that I used to examine learning. 
Consistent with the specifications used in other analyses in the dissertation, I used 
different variables for income. In specification 1 and 3, I used aggregate household 
income and variable findep (a dummy variable indicating that wife did not have any 
source of income) and in specification 2 and 4, I used respondent’s total income 
(labor and non-labor) as the independent variable.  
The sample characteristics of the variables used for the exercise are reported 
in Table 8.6. The results for the multinomial probit regression for husbands and wives 
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for outcome P vs. N (with N= Non-pooling as base category) and outcome I vs. N 
(with N=Non-pooling as base category) are reported in tables 8.7 and 8.8 
respectively29.  
Since each respondent chose a card two times (for level Y and Z combined), 
one for each level, I had three responses that were stacked one above the other. A 
seemingly unrelated multinomial probit regression was utilized to account for 
correlation between husband and wife responses, and robust standard errors were 
predicted at the household level. 
By the nature of this particular setup of the multinomial regression with three 
discrete choices, there are two sets of non redundant coefficients associated with each 
independent variable, (1) for P vs. N outcome and (2) for I vs. N outcome. I will 
discuss the results of specifications 1 and 2 initially and 3 and 4 subsequently.  
In specification 1 and 2, the payout variable was not significant for husbands 
but was significant and negative for wives (at 10 % or less for outcome P, base N and 
1% or less for outcome I, base N). This implies that when payout increased from level 
Y to level Z, only wives were on average, more likely to choose a non-pooling card 
vis-à-vis a pooling or an intermediate card. The variable indicating respondent 
possessing secondary education or more was significant and negative for both 
husbands and wives in specifications 1 and 2 for both the P vs. N outcome and I vs. N 
outcome. This implies that both husbands and wives who had primary education or 
less were more likely to choose a pooling card. It should be noted that spouse’s 
                                                 
29  To test for violation of the assumption of IIA, Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) and 
Small and Hsiao’s test (Small and Hsiao, 1985) were conducted for both husbands and wives. The null 
hypotheses that IIA is maintained could not be rejected in either of the cases.  
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education variable was not significant for either husbands or wives. Both household 
income and individual total income were significant and negative for husbands for P 
vs. N outcome implying that husbands in households having higher household income 
as well as those earning higher (total earned and unearned) incomes were on average 
more likely to non-pool income. Household income was not significant for wives 
(specification 1), but total income of wives was significant and negative for wives for 
the P vs. N outcome (in specification 2) implying that wives having higher individual 
incomes were more likely to non-pool. Age was significant and curvilinear for wives 
for both the P vs. N outcome and the P vs. I outcome with the coefficient for age 
being negative and that for age squared being positive. The coefficient for age 
squared however was very low implying that older women were more likely to not-
pool income. The dummy variable for Hindu religion was negative and significant for 
husbands for the I vs. N outcome implying that Hindu husbands were more likely 
than Muslim husbands to choose the non-pooling card vis-à-vis the intermediate card. 
The dummy variable for Buddhist religion was significant for wives for specification 
2 only, implying that Buddhist wives were more likely to choose the pooling card 
when compared to Muslim wives. The variable for predicted WTP for a 95% vaccine 
was positive and significant for husbands for the P vs. N outcome. 
When only the choices for level Z were considered (specifications 3 and 4), 
the sign of the coefficients for both husbands and wives remained identical for most 
of the variables. However, the significance of coefficients dropped down for 
husbands with only household income and findep variable (specification 3) and total 
income variable (specification 4) significant for the P vs. N outcome. Only the 
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coefficient for husband’s secondary education was negative and significant for the I 
vs. N outcome. For wives results were identical to those with level Y and Z, except 
for varaible findep and total income. This is evidence against additional learning 
occuring between level Y and Z and in favor of a possibility that wives were indeed 
switching choices to a more non-pooling extreme when payout levels increased. The 
variable findep was negative and significant for husbands and positive and significant 
for wives in the P vs. N outcome implying that wives who did not have any source of 
income were more likely to pool income but their husbands were more likely to not 
pool their income, other things equal. 
I tested the the coefficients of husband and wife for the P vs. N outcome for 
equivalence. The tests of mean equivalence for coefficients is reported in table 8.9. 
The last row indicates tests where all coefficients were tested jointly to be equal..  
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Table 8.6: Sample characteristics for restricted sample 
Variables Level Y and Z  
(666 observations) 
Level Z only  
(333 observations) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Card chosen by husband (1=P chosen, 2= I 
chosen, 3=N chosen) 
2.02 0.85 2.05 0.84
Card chosen by wife (1=P chosen, 2= I chosen, 
3=N chosen) 
2.05 0.83 2.11 0.85
Payout in US $ 1.09 0.65 1.74 0.00
1= Husband has secondary education or 
more;0=Otherwise 
0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50
1=Wife has secondary education or more; 
0=Otherwise 
0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47
Age of husband 35.70 8.35 35.70 8.36
Age of husband squared 1343.95 687.28 1343.95 687.80
Age of wife 29.42 6.91 29.42 6.91
Age of wife squared 913.38 472.90 913.38 473.26
Number of children 2.60 1.18 2.60 1.18
Number of children squared 8.14 7.83 8.14 7.83
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded); 
0=Otherwise 
0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded); 
0=Otherwise 
0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45
1=Household with at least one child stunted; 
0=Otherwise 
0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50
Predicted husband joint WTP (95% effective) 12.40 6.52 12.40 6.52
Predicted wife joint WTP (95% effective) 11.50 5.69 11.50 5.70
Household income in’000$ 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06
Husband total income in ’000$ 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05
Wife total income in ’000$ 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
1=Wife completely financially dependent on 
husband; 0=Otherwise 
0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47
1=Location is Shramik Nagar; 0=Otherwise 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45
1=Location is Mahape; 0=Otherwise 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44
1=Location is Belapur; 0=Otherwise 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28
 
  185
Table 8.7: Multinomial probit results (outcome P vs. N) 
Husband’s results (Outcome P, Base N) Level Y and Z Level Z only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Payout in US $ -0.089 -0.090   
 (0.92) (0.93) . . 
1= Husband has secondary education or more;  -0.361 -0.328 -0.181 -0.175 
   0=Otherwise (1.79)+ (1.62) (0.73) (0.70) 
Wife has secondary education or more; 0=Otherwise -0.028 -0.057 -0.136 -0.160 
 (0.14) (0.28) (0.53) (0.62) 
Husband's age 0.036 0.024 0.014 0.011 
 (0.54) (0.37) (0.15) (0.12) 
Husband's age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.65) (0.51) (0.18) (0.13) 
Number of children -0.253 -0.164 -0.048 -0.010 
 (0.91) (0.62) (0.14) (0.03) 
Number of children squared 0.040 0.026 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.98) (0.66) (0.09) (0.17) 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  -0.215 -0.142 0.081 0.111 
    0=Otherwise (0.79) (0.53) (0.23) (0.31) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  0.195 0.227 0.382 0.367 
    0=Otherwise (0.70) (0.82) (1.05) (1.01) 
1=Household with at least one child stunted;  -0.103 -0.099 -0.260 -0.238 
    0=Otherwise (0.59) (0.57) (1.18) (1.08) 
Monthly household income in '000 US$ -5.193  -4.312  
 (2.65)**  (1.68)+  
Husband total income in ’000$  -5.294  -6.414 
  (2.39)*  (2.28)* 
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  -0.158  -0.437  
    0=Otherwise (0.80)  (1.73)+  
Predicted husband joint WTP (95% effective) 0.037 0.027 0.026 0.030 
 (1.89)+ (1.53) (1.08) (1.30) 
Constant 0.199 0.234 0.297 -0.004 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.00) 
Wife’s results (Outcome P, Base N)     
Payout in US $ -0.222 -0.220   
 (1.96)+ (1.95)+   
1= Husband has secondary education or more;  -0.009 -0.016 0.064 0.066 
     0=Otherwise (0.05) (0.09) (0.27) (0.28) 
Wife has secondary education or more; 0=Otherwise -0.401 -0.384 -0.982 -0.949 
 (2.07)* (1.99)* (3.71)** (3.58)** 
Wife's age -0.156 -0.157 -0.277 -0.271 
 (1.84)+ (1.85)+ (2.13)* (2.11)* 
Wife's age squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 (2.01)* (2.01)* (2.26)* (2.22)* 
Number of children 0.200 0.182 0.017 -0.041 
 (0.74) (0.68) (0.05) (0.12) 
Number of children squared -0.029 -0.026 -0.002 0.006 
 (0.71) (0.64) (0.04) (0.13) 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  -0.135 -0.164 -0.333 -0.420 
    0=Otherwise (0.54) (0.65) (0.95) (1.22) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  0.107 0.097 0.112 0.076 
    0=Otherwise (0.41) (0.37) (0.31) (0.21) 
1=Household with at least one child stunted;  0.077 0.058 0.297 0.246 
    0=Otherwise (0.47) (0.36) (1.29) (1.09) 
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Monthly household income in ’000$ -0.567 -4.645 0.257 -6.099 
 (0.39) (1.91)+ (0.11) (1.63) 
Wife total income in ’000$     
     
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  0.279  0.698  
    0=Otherwise (1.52)  (2.71)**  
Predicted wife joint WTP (95% effective) 0.008 0.008 0.026 0.028 
 (0.40) (0.44) (0.94) (1.07) 
Constant 2.135 2.396 3.373 4.046 
 (1.61) (1.86)+ (1.67)+ (2.07)* 
# Observations 666 666 333 333 
Robust z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table 8.8: Multinomial probit results (outcome I vs. N) 
 
Husband’s results (Outcome I, Base N) Level Y and Z Level Z only 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Payout in US $ 0.144 0.146   
 (1.33) (1.34)   
1= Husband has secondary education or more;  -0.327 -0.316 -0.430 -0.445 
    0=Otherwise (1.70)+ (1.66)+ (1.73)+ (1.80)+ 
Wife has secondary education or more;  0.036 0.028 -0.144 -0.136 
    0=Otherwise (0.18) (0.14) (0.56) (0.53) 
Husband's age -0.022 -0.028 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.30) (0.38) (0.24) (0.25) 
Husband's age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.48) (0.55) (0.22) (0.25) 
Number of children 0.325 0.364 0.177 0.185 
 (1.20) (1.36) (0.50) (0.53) 
Number of children squared -0.021 -0.028 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.54) (0.72) (0.22) (0.21) 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  -0.519 -0.486 -0.197 -0.185 
    0=Otherwise (1.93)+ (1.84)+ (0.57) (0.55) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  -0.200 -0.186 -0.109 -0.122 
    0=Otherwise (0.72) (0.67) (0.31) (0.35) 
1=Household with at least one child stunted;  -0.055 -0.050 -0.277 -0.256 
    0=Otherwise (0.31) (0.29) (1.23) (1.13) 
Monthly household income in ’000$ -1.936  -0.737  
 (1.03)  (0.32)  
Husband total income in ’000$  -1.502  -0.438 
  (0.75)  (0.18) 
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  -0.081  -0.299  
    0=Otherwise (0.41)  (1.18)  
Predicted husband joint WTP (95% effective) 0.040 0.036 0.022 0.025 
 (2.10)* (2.00)* (0.86) (1.07) 
Constant -0.627 -0.632 0.481 0.164 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.28) (0.10) 
Wife’s results (Outcome I, Base N)     
Payout in US $ -0.296 -0.296   
 (2.58)** (2.59)**   
1= Husband has secondary education or more;  0.221 0.213 0.376 0.369 
    0=Otherwise (1.29) (1.25) (1.54) (1.53) 
Wife has secondary education or more;  -0.489 -0.496 -0.950 -0.933 
    0=Otherwise (2.67)** (2.70)** (3.62)** (3.55)** 
Wife's age -0.025 -0.022 0.003 0.013 
 (0.34) (0.31) (0.02) (0.10) 
Wife's age squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.66) (0.59) (0.16) (0.06) 
Number of children 0.162 0.186 0.111 0.103 
 (0.69) (0.80) (0.33) (0.31) 
Number of children squared -0.019 -0.024 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.54) (0.70) (0.08) (0.09) 
1=Religion is Hindu (Muslim excluded);  0.221 0.251 0.592 0.577 
    0=Otherwise (0.82) (0.96) (1.48) (1.50) 
1=Religion is Buddhist (Muslim excluded);  0.414 0.444 0.895 0.899 
    0=Otherwise (1.55) (1.69)+ (2.22)* (2.28)* 
1=Household with at least one child stunted;  0.109 0.102 0.390 0.369 
    0=Otherwise (0.68) (0.64) (1.69)+ (1.61) 
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Monthly household income in ’000$ -0.886  -1.343  
 (0.58)  (0.52)  
Wife total income in ’000$  -0.289  -4.195 
  (0.17)  (1.23) 
1=Wife financially dependent on husband;  0.093  0.298  
    0=Otherwise (0.51)  (1.13)  
Predicted wife joint WTP (95% effective) 0.016 0.010 0.040 0.036 
 (0.86) (0.59) (1.48) (1.51) 
Constant -0.409 -0.391 -2.223 -2.127 
 (0.34) (0.34) (1.08) (1.07) 
Observations 666 666 333 333 
Robust z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 
Table 8.9: Tests of mean equivalence of coefficients for husband and wife (P vs. 
N outcome) 
Coefficient for Hypothesis : β(husband) = β(wife) 
 Level Y and Z Level Z only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Payout NR NR - - 
Respondent has higher 
secondary education 
NR NR R* R* 
Respondent’s spouse 
has higher education 
NR NR NR NR 
Age of respondent R+ NR R+ R+ 
Age squared of 
respondent 
R* R+ R+ R+ 
# children NR NR NR NR 
# children squared NR NR NR NR 
Hindu NR NR NR NR 
Buddhist NR NR NR NR 
Stunted NR NR R+ NR 
Household income R+ - NR - 
WTP NR    
Respondent income - NR - NR 
Findep NR - R** - 
Joint (all coefficients 
together) 
NR NR NR NR 
R: Null hypothesis rejected at **:α = 0.01, *:α = 0.05, +:α = 0.10. NR: Null hypothesis not rejected. 
 
I found that only the coefficient for age squared was consistently significantly 
different for husbands and wives and age was significantly different in 3 out of 4 
specifications. Equivalence for coefficient for household income was rejected for 
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specification 1 but not for specification 3 and for variable findep was rejected for 
specification 3 but not for specification 1. Equivalence of coefficient for education 
was rejected for specifications 3 and 4. Specification 1 (level Y and Z pooled) 
suggests that household income and age may affect husbands and wives in a different 
manner while making pooling choices, whereas specification 3 (level Z only) 
suggests that whether wives earn any income, age and education may affect husbands 
and wives in a different manner. Although the coefficient for payout was significant 
for wives and not significant for husbands, the equivalance of coefficient for payout 
for husbands and wives could not be rejected. Joint equivalence of coefficients could 
be rejected only for specification 3. 
 The predicted probabilities (not reported) for both choosing a pooling card 
and choosing a non-pooling card were positive and significantly different from zero 
for all specifications. This implies that it is difficult to categorize all households as 
either income pooling or non-pooling.  
 
A. Impact of different variables 
To distill the amount of information produced by the multinomial probit, 
discrete change coefficients were computed and Discrete Change (DC) plots were 
plotted for both husbands and wives. The results of these plots for levels Y and Z 
together are shown in figure 8.3. In DC plots, the independent variables are 
represented on a separate row. If a letter is to the right of another letter, increases in 
independent variable make the outcome at the right more likely. In each figure, the 
  190
plots for the husband are on the top and for wife are on the bottom. The same scale 
was adopted along the horizontal axis to facilitate comparison.   
In a DC plot, the horizontal axis displays the change in predicted probability 
that a pooling card (P), Intermediate card (I) or a Non-pooling card (N) are chosen for 
a unit  increase30 in a particular independent variable. For example, for a husband 
with other things being equal, an increase in payout by a standard deviation 
(US$0.70) is likely to increase the predicted probability of a husband choosing card I 
by about 3%, mainly at the expense of reduction in probability of choice of card P 
(and small reduction in the probability of choice of N). For a wife, the same increase 
in payout is likely to increase the probability of her choosing card I by about 5% at 
the expense of reduction in probability of choice of card P by about 3%. Thus, for 
both husbands and wives, as the payout increases, the probability that a P card is 
chosen drops down. 
My interest is in comparing the change in probability of choices P vs. I as 
these are the two extremes of the choice spectrum that the respondents can make. 
 
                                                 
30 For continuous variables like payout and income the chart displays effects of a unit standard 
deviation change in these variables. For dummy variables, it displays the effect of a change in the 
variable from zero to unity. 
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Figure 8.3: Husband and wife discrete choice plots (levels Y & Z) 
-std denotes a change of one standard deviation, 0/1 represents change in dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
Examination of the DC plot for husband choices revealed that an increase in 
independent variables education, being a Hindu (as compared to being a Muslim), 
higher household income and having a wife with no income are likely to increase the 
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chances that a non-pooling card is chosen. On the other hand, being a Buddhist is 
likely to increase the chances that a husband chooses a pooling card. The plot also 
demonstrates that age and number of children impact husband choices in a curvilinear 
manner. The magnitude of impact for the P vs. N comparison can be measured by 
identifying variables in which the distance between the letter P and N is higher. The 
magnitude of impact of the education variable and the household income variable are 
the highest for the P vs. N comparison as a unit increase in these independent 
variable, the change in probability of P is at behest of the change in probability of I. 
Some variables such as being a Buddhist or having an educated wife have little 
impact on the probability of choice N and cause tradeoffs between choice I and N.  
For women, the DC plot shows that an increase in unit standard deviation of 
payout results in about 6% increase in the probability of a wife choosing a non-
pooling card, at the expense of both pooling and intermediate cards. The magnitudes 
of the impact of age and age squared and number of children and number of children 
squared are of an opposite sign vis-à-vis husband. There are also some similarities 
with husband behavior. For example, increase in education of self is likely to increase 
the probability of choosing a non-pooling card, and the effect is significant. Increase 
in household income is likely to increase the probability of wife choosing a non-
pooling card vis-à-vis a pooling card. However, the magnitude is much less for wives 
(about 1% increase in the probability of non-pooling for an increase in unit standard 
deviation of household income, about US$58) as against husbands (about 3% increase 
in probability of choosing a non-pooling card). The impact of household income, 
however, is not significant for wives. Like husbands, the impact of increase in spousal 
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education on the outcome is of a lower magnitude than the impact of self education 
and not significant. The magnitude of the impact for P vs. N comparison is higher for 
variables such as education, age, age squared, and having a wife with no income. 
Except for payout, higher education of wife and age, none of the P vs. N coefficients 
are significant.  
Comparison between husband and wife plot reveals that the impact of higher 
education on wife and husband is about the same. Impact of age and age squared is 
almost three times for wife as compared to the husband and of opposite sign 
(however, the net impact of age and age squared combined is difficult to find). Impact 
of number of children and number of children squared is about the same for husbands 
and wives but of opposite sign. The impact of religion variables is slightly higher for 
husbands and of the same sign for the P vs. N comparison. Impact of household 
income for the P vs. N comparison is very small for wives as compared to husbands. 
The magnitude of variable findep is about the same for both husbands and wives, but 
of opposite sign. Overall, the variable education seems to have the most and 
significant impact for both husbands and wives. The impact of payout is about half 
that of education for wives and very small for husbands. 
In addition to the analysis of significance of coefficients, I also examined how 
much a unit standard deviation increase (unit increase for dummy 1-0) variables) 
affected the probability of the outcome. Husbands with higher education are likely to 
have about 12% higher probability of choosing a non-pooling card compared to less 
educated husbands and wives are likely to have about a 15% higher probability of 
choosing a non-pooling card compared to less educated wives. The effect is 
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significant for both husbands and wives. Individuals in households with higher 
aggregate income  are more likely to choose a non-pooling card. A US$ 58 (standard 
deviation) increase in the household income is likely to increase the probability of 
choosing a non-pooling card by about 8% for husbands and about 1% for wives. The 
effect is significant only for husbands. If a wife has no source of income, her 
probability of choosing a pooling card increases by about 7% and her husband’s 
probability of choosing a pooling card drops by about 5%. The effect is significant for 
husbands only. Older women were more likely to not pool income. 
 
6. Conclusions  
The data reveal that a specific rule of intrahousehold resource allocation does 
not apply universally to all households. There are some that will pool and others that 
will not pool income. Overall the results indicate that both husbands and wives with 
higher individual income or higher household income are more likely to choose a 
non-pooling card. An older woman is more likely to choose a non-pooling card. 
Differences in husband and wife behavior with respect to parameters such as income 
and education provide evidence in favor of bargaining and against common 
preference model of intrahousehold resouce allocation.  
 Although it is difficult to test if learning takes place at each stage, given the 
consistency of most of the coefficients between model involving two levels (Y and Z) 
and the fact that almost half of the educated respondents also switched cards, 
switching of cards cannot be ruled out as a genuine choice.  
 
  
CHAPTER 9  
Conclusions 
 
1. Findings 
This research presents a multidimensional approach to study intrahousehold 
resource allocation. I examined data on demographics, socio-economic aspects, 
women’s autonomy, household financial arrangements, anthropometrics and 
responses to a stated preference survey and a (lottery) choice experiment. A few 
variables stood out in terms of significance and magnitude of impact in this analysis 
of bargaining and household decision-making. These include income, financially 
dependent women, education and age. 
A. Income:  
In the probit model that analyzed respondent WTP for a malaria vaccine, the 
coefficients for individual’s labor and non-labor income were both positive and 
significant for husband when interviewed jointly but not significant for wife when 
interviewed jointly. In the negative binomial regression models, non-labor income 
was not significant for husbands and wives. Total income, however, was significant 
and positive for husbands and significant and negative for wives, not a decisive 
verdict on non-pooling because of the normal good characteristics of a vaccine. In the 
analysis of decisiveness of women, I found that women with husbands having higher 
income were more likely to change their opinion during the joint interview. 
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In analysis of stunting data, income or per-capita income was not a significant 
determinant of height. However, per capita consumption was significant in one of the 
specifications indicating that households having higher per capita income, were on 
average likely to have taller children.  
In the lottery experiment, I found that husbands in households having higher 
income were more likely to choose a non-pooling card. Individuals having higher 
income were also more likely not to choose a pooling card.  
 
B. Financially dependent women 
 
Throughout the analysis, I used the variable “findep”, which is equal to unity 
when the wife has no source of income and is completely financially dependent on 
someone else (generally the husband). This variable had an impact throughout the 
analysis, sometimes with surprising results.   
As expected, in the study of decisiveness, women who did not have any 
source of income were more likely to change their opinion during a joint interview 
and to acquiesce to their husbands’ wishes. In the risky choice experiment, I found 
that women who did not have any source of income were more likely to choose a 
pooling card, but their husbands were more likely to choose a non-pooling card.  
However, I also found that husbands in households in which women did not 
earn any income were on average more likely to purchase vaccines for every member 
within the household and also more likely to purchase a greater number of vaccines, 
other things being equal. The most surprising impact of the variable findep can be 
observed in the analysis of revealed data. I found that daughters of women who did 
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not have any source of income were more likely to be taller (compared to reference 
population) than sons and daughters of women who had some source of income. I 
also found the eldest daughters of women who had some source of income to be 
shorter (compared to reference population) as compared to younger daughters, though 
the same did not apply to eldest sons. It is likely that women who stay at home were 
able to provide their daughters with better nurture and nutrition because of additional 
time at their disposal in the household. It is also likely that when women were 
working, day care responsibilities were taken by the eldest daughter. There is 
however, no information to substantiate these speculations. 
 
C. Education 
 
Higher education was associated with higher demand for vaccines for women, 
but not for men. However, education did not seem to affect the decisiveness of wives 
during the joint interview. Respondents who were more educated were more likely to 
not pool income in the lottery experiment. 
To an extent, education behaved like findep variable in the analysis of 
revealed preference data. Women having little education (primary or less) were more 
likely to have taller daughters (compared to reference population) than sons or 
daughters of women with more education. It should be noted that overall, the 
education of women in our sample was low with a majority of the respondents 
illiterate, and none having any college education. As a result, the jobs that this 
education fetched were most likely to be those in the informal sector with low pay.  
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D. Age 
 
In the analysis of household demand, I found age to be quadratic and 
significant for women, with women aged 30 likely to have maximum household 
malaria vaccine demand. However, the variable was not significant in joint demand or 
for husbands. In study of decisiveness, I found age to be significant and quadratic, 
with women aged 34 most likely to change their opinion during a joint interview.  
Age of mother during childbirth was significant and quadratic with children of 
women aged 28 during childbirth likely to be the tallest compared to other children. 
In the lottery experiment, I found older women more likely not to pool income 
than younger women. 
 
2. Conclusion 
 
My first conclusion is that an integrated approach to study intrahousehold 
resource allocation is necessary. In my study, I found that daughters in general, and 
eldest daughters in particular, are likely to suffer the most when a mother joins the 
workforce. This may be because the eldest daughter takes up a role in housework and 
provides childcare for other children. Women who work were, however, less likely to 
change their stated responses during the follow-up joint interview, indicating that they 
were less likely to align their responses with their husbands’ and probably had more 
autonomy in decision-making. This research demonstrates why it is necessary for an 
analyst to take intrahousehold resource allocation into account. While a job may 
improve a woman’s autonomy in the household, the quality of job and the wages 
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should be good enough to compensate the mother for any ill effects that arise from 
lesser time available for cooking or childcare. 
My second conclusion is that, overall, the common preference model of 
intrahousehold allocation can be rejected. In the probit model where I examined the 
willingness to take up an “all or nothing” approach, I found that marginal utility of 
labor and non-labor income is different for a husband and wife during a separate 
interview. This is evidence in favor of at least some bargaining taking place within 
the household. However, the marginal utility of income was not significantly different 
for husband and wives for all other analysis (negative binomial regression, seemingly 
unrelated regression, etc.). In the lottery experiment, I found that different households 
behave in a different manner in regard to pooling behavior, and it is difficult to 
classify all households as pooling or non-pooling. Having said that, the variables 
income, findep, education and age did impact outcomes in a variety of ways, 
indicating that common preference model of intrahousehold model does not apply. In 
the analysis of height data, I found that women having some work did alter the 
allocation of resources. Further, many household members reported different 
financial arrangements (e.g., separate budget arrangements), and varying levels of 
decision-making for women, implying that there was some degree of decentralization 
in decision-making.  
In my survey I found that husbands and wives have significantly different 
stated demands when interviewed separately. I also found a short private discussion 
to be a useful technique to reduce differences in stated demand of husbands and 
wives. If the husbands and wives have significantly different demands and if the 
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common preference model is to be rejected, what then are the implications for results 
of willingness-to-pay surveys that have been conducted? Is it necessary to, 
henceforth, interview multiple respondents in the household? I found that normal 
survey procedures for WTP for a vaccine, in which a husband or wife is interviewed 
randomly from each household, are likely to underestimate stated demand at lower 
prices. Hence, welfare estimates based on traditional analysis are likely to be 
conservative. 
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Appendix 1 
Models of intrahousehold resource allocation 
 
The profession of economics is motivated by the behavior of the individual. 
At the same time, data are often acquired at the household31 level. Researchers that 
measure only aggregate consumption or aggregate income in the household, or those 
who interview only a single respondent for household demand, implicitly use the 
common preference model in their work. In this section, I will describe the common 
preference model of intrahousehold resource allocation, followed by a discussion on 
other models and then summarize how to differentiate among them. 
A. Common preferences model 
The common preference model enables us to utilize the household as the unit 
of analysis. It treats the household like a black box. For example, one does not know 
who makes the consumption decisions. But the parsimony of this model affords us 
several benefits, notably the ability to apply tools of economic theory to this 
household as if it were a single individual with pooled household income as the 
budget constraint (Doss, 1996). All this comes at the cost of an extremely restrictive 
assumption that either all the household members have homothetic preferences32, or 
that there exist some simple rules33 to aggregate the individual utility functions into a 
                                                 
31 In general, households can be defined as a group of two or more closely related persons living 
together (Kirchler, 1988) or simply those that share a kitchen.  
32 Recent advances in the literature on intrahousehold resource allocation have challenged the 
assumption of homothetic preferences. This literature is discussed in subsequent sections. 
33 Arrow (1951) has demonstrated that preference aggregation under some set of rules is possible only 
if we sacrifice some preference information (such as assuming that a household member is a “dictator” 
who makes all the decisions. 
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household one (Doss, 1996). The common preference model asserts that households 
respond to only changes in aggregate household income. Different sources of income 
(labor or non-labor) will have the same impact on demand.  
Thus, 
1y
g
∂
∂ =
2y
g
∂
∂       ….(A1.1) 
Where, g = any demand equation, and y1, y2 = labor or non-labor incomes of 
different members.  
The parsimony of the model can be seen in Samuelson’s (1956) paper on trade 
where he develops the social welfare function of the government. Samuelson imposes 
a weakly separable household utility function, with the individual’s utility functions 
as sub-utility functions translating into a simplistic formulation of a common 
preference model, with the primary objective being the ability to continue with 
demand analysis without examining issues of intrahousehold resource allocation 
(Lundberg and Pollack, 1993).  
 
B. Unified household model 
The unified household model created a paradigm shift in the way economists 
looked at households and is based on the “Rotten Kid theorem” put forth by Becker, 
(1974), (1981). At the heart of the theorem is an altruistic parent (or husband) who 
has egoistic but rational rotten kids (or wife). The parent manipulates the transfers 
such that each kid, no matter how selfish, behaves in such a manner that household 
income is maximized.  In his review of Becker’s contributions to family and 
household economics, Pollak (2003) summarizes the following assumptions that 
make the Rotten Kid theorem restrictive: 
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1. All goods can be bought and sold. 
2. There is a single time period. 
3. Parents (or husband) provide gifts to children (or wife) and choose after the 
children (or wife) choose in a two-stage game.  
4. There is no scope for bargaining, commitments or threats.  
Pollack also develops a simple formulation of Becker’s model with egoistic 
wife and altruistic husband. Their utility function can be represented as:  
Uw(Y) = U*w(Yw)      ….(A1.2) 
Uh(Y) = Uh(Yh, Yw) = Wh(Yh, U*w(Yw))   ….(A1.3) 
Where  Uw and Uh are wife and husband’s utilities respectively, and  Yw and 
Yh are their consumption vectors. 
Becker’s model has been critiqued widely (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988, 
Bergstorm, 1989, Bruce and Waldman, 1990). However, this model was the first 
attempt to give structure to the household decision-making process. It made 
economists think beyond the individual. It incorporated both production and 
consumption decisions and  households made decisions subject to a production 
possibility frontier (Doss, 1996). 
Pollak (2003) promotes the use of the term “deferential” preferences for the 
husband over the often-misunderstood “altruistic” preferences, and a house in which 
both husband and wife care about their own utility and other’s self-regarding utility as 
shown below: 
Uh(Y) = Wh[U*h(Yh), U*w(Yw)] and Uw(Y) = Ww[U*h(Yh), U*w(Yw)]  
...(A1.4) 
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This setup is similar to the Samuelson-Bergson social welfare34 function. 
Economists studying family decisions based on the Becker’s model often use some 
variant of the Samuelson-Bergson household social welfare function (Pollak, 2003).  
 
C. Co-operative Bargaining Models 
Bargaining models (McElroy and Horney, 1981, Manser and Brown, 1980)  
provided the first real alternative to Becker’s collective choice model. These models 
assume both the husband and wife to be independent entities with their own rational 
preferences and individual utilities that depend upon their own consumption. The 
husband and wife indulge in a game of Nash Bargaining. If they do not come to an 
agreement until they reach the “threat point,” then they fall back on their default 
utilities.  
In her paper, “The Empirical content of the Nash-Bargained Household 
Behavior,” McElroy (1990) has explained the formulation of the Nash model of 
household behavior in detail.  
Let mU 0 (x0,x1,x3) and 
fU 0 (x0,x2,x4) be the male and female utility function 
before marriage respectively, where m and f are two unmarried individuals,  x1 and x2 
are goods consumed by m and f respectively,  x3 and x4 are leisure times of m and f 
respectively and x0  is a private good that will become a household commonly owned 
good after marriage. 
                                                 
34 Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, W: RI Æ R, assigns utility values to possible vector 
(U1,….UN) ∈ RI (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). It lets us define a representative customer for aggregated 
demand function. 
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If not married, both m and f maximize their separate utilities subject to income 
constraints,  PX = Im + p3T  for m, and similarly for f.      …(A1.5) 
Optimizing to obtain their respective individual indirect utility functions, 
  mV0 ( p0,p1,p3,Im;αm) and 
fV0 ( p0,p2,p2,If;αf).   …(A1.6) 
Further, if these two people get married to each other, they indulge in a two-
person, cooperative Nash game, to jointly decide the allocation of goods.  
N ≡ [ mU0  -  
mV0 ( p0,p1,p3,Im;αm)][
fU0 - 
fV0 ( p0,p2,p2,If;αf)]   ...(A1.7) 
Subject to full household expenditures equaling full household income, 
P’X = (p3 +p4)T + Im + If      …(A1.8) 
mV0 and 
fV0  are their respective threat points. α’s are the extrahousehold 
environmental parameters, changes in which can affect the individual utility obtained 
before marriage. mU0 and 
fU0 are the nonnegative utilities defined over own and 
spouse’s consumption after marriage. The solution to this optimization is a system of 
demand equations,   
xi = hi(p,Im,If;αm,αf),  i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.    ….(A1.9) 
As it can be seen, the husband and wife solve a Nash problem where the 
solution depends upon the utilities that husband and wife receive at the “threat point”; 
with a higher utility at threat point implying a higher utility at Nash solution. In these 
models, the household maximizes gains from joint decisions of production and 
consumption and the solution generated is a Pareto efficient outcome. 
The appropriate threat point 
Much consideration has been given to determine the appropriate threat point. 
The threat point depends on various “extrahousehold environmental parameters” 
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(McElroy, 1990) such as institutional, demographic and legal factors and gender 
specific environmental factors (Folbre, 1982 cf Pollak, 2003). McElroy and Horney 
(1981) defined the threat point as the utility derived outside of marriage. While most 
initial models focused on divorce as the threat point, subsequent versions use threat 
points with less drastic results as each disagreement may not result in a divorce 
(Bergstorm, 1996). McElroy (1990) also acknowledges the fact that in certain 
countries like India, divorce may be a non-existent option for the women. However, 
many women do choose to return to their parent’s family. In such cases, the 
extrahousehold environmental parameters could include her parent’s wealth, or 
unexpected increment in their wealth.  
Lundberg and Pollack (1993) put forth the “Separate Spheres Bargaining” 
framework in which the threat point is some inefficient non-cooperative outcome 
rather than divorce. Here, the couple bargains over gains from marriage such as joint 
production of household goods and children indicating that it is important to assess 
the power structure inside of the marriage rather than the incomes that the husband 
and wife will receive if they split. This model also acknowledges the role played by 
gender, social norms and commonly owned goods. For example, men may provide 
housing and women may provide childcare, something that reflects social norms 
rather than preferences. The commonly owned goods may be underprovided as they 
are to be provided voluntarily and reflect “socially sanctioned allocation of marital 
responsibilities.” There is no pooling of income. 
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D. Collective household model 
The cooperative bargaining models that solve for a Nash solution require 
information difficult to acquire (Chiappori, 1988a, 1991). Particularly difficult is the 
data on extrahousehold environmental parameters that would determine a threat point. 
Chiappori suggests that simply focusing our energy on a co-operative bargaining 
solution which results in a pareto efficient outcome rather than a specific Nash 
equilibrium is sufficient to generate testable restrictions on labor supply functions and 
recover individual preferences and outcomes (Chiappori, 1992, 1988b). The 
collective model enables us to recover the “sharing rule” from household expenditure 
data, if we have private goods, caring preferences, members’ sub-utility function 
separable with respect to consumption and at least one assignable private good (cf 
Doss, 1996). The collective bargaining model is relatively easy to formulate and test 
for compared to Nash equilibrium as information about a specific threat point is not 
required. Chiappori initially focused on labor supply, but the collective model has 
been extended to describe household consumption (Browning et al., 1994)  and 
household production (Chiappori, 1997).  
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Analytics of the Collective model 
In his work on the analysis of household survey data (in developing 
countries), Deaton (2000) described the collective model in detail.  
Let vA(qA, z) and vB(qB,z) be the utility functions of two household members A 
and B, where qA and qB are private consumption vectors and z is a vector of public 
goods. 
The collective model requires that allocation is efficient. Thus optimizing for A, 
Max vA(q, z ) s.t. pA.q = θA (p, pz, y)      ….(A1.10) 
Where  z  is the optimal choice of public good, pA is price of goods consumed 
by A, θA(p, pz, y)  = sharing rule, a function that decides how much A gets 
conditional on the prices of goods. 
This optimization results in the following set of demand equations for A, 
],),,,([ zpyppgq Az
A
i
A
i θ= .    ….(A1.11) 
At the same time, B tries to optimize his utility subject to his budget 
constraint, resulting in the following sharing rule for B: 
AA
zz
B qpzpyypp −−= .),,(θ .   ….(A1.12) 
Note the nature of the budget constraint. The model specification clearly 
displays the efficiency criteria that one person could not be better off without making 
other person worse-off.  
To develop a testable hypothesis, Deaton assumes a situation where total 
income, y is made of three components, 
y = yA + yB + yO.     ….(A1.13) 
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Where yA and yB is individual income, and yO is income pooled from jointly 
owned assets. 
Eliminating yO to consider the effects of yA and yB, the household demand for 
good i can be written as, 
  )],,([)],,([ yyyygyyygq BAABi
BAAA
ii θθ −+=  ….(A1.14) 
Differentiating with respect to yA and yA, simplifying and generalizing across 
all goods,  
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   ji,∀       ….(A1.15) 
This implies a constant ratio of income effects across all pair of goods. A1.15 
is a test of efficiency. If this equation does not hold then the collective and 
cooperative bargaining models are rejected. When a household pools income, it does 
not matter who the source of income is, and either side of the above equation reduces 
to unity. 
  
E. Non-cooperative bargaining models 
As the name suggests, non-cooperative bargaining models (Chen and Wooley, 2001) 
use a non-cooperative bargaining framework such as Cournot-Nash bargaining, where 
each person maximizes his or her welfare, given the expected actions of others and 
their own resource constraints. This model has the least restrictions as individuals 
have different preferences, do not pool their income, and make their own 
consumption and production decisions. 
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Appendix II 
Height-for-age as revealed indicator to measure income pooling 
 
Thomas (1994) defined a health production function as follows: 
Child health, θi = θ( N, µi, µf, µc, ηi)    ….(A2.1) 
Where, N = nutrient intake and the quality and quantity of childcare, µi = 
individual characteristics including sex and age, µf = family characteristics, µc = 
community characteristics, and ηi = individual specific unobserved heterogeneity in 
health. 
Each household member m = 1,…,M wants to maximize his utility 
Vm(x, l, θ; µ, ε)           ….(A2.2) 
Where, x = vector of goods demanded by each individual in the household, l = 
vector of leisure, θ = vector of home produced quantities (child health), µ = 
background characteristics such as education of all household members, and ε = 
vector for unobserved tastes of members. 
By the common preferences model, household welfare function is maximized 
as 
px =∑
m
wm(Tm – lm) + ym     ….(A2.3) 
Where T = amount of time available for work, w is a vector of wages and ym 
is each individual’s non-labor income (assumed to be exogenous).  
This optimization results in a value of household demand for each of x, l and 
θ. Thomas particularly looks at height (θ). Thus, 
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hi = hi iµ( , cµ , ),,∑ imc y ξµ      ….(A2.4) 
Where iξ  = individual specific heterogeneity such as family specific health 
variation. 
Income pooling can be clearly seen in this setup. The source of different 
individual non-labor income does not matter. Thomas denotes this by using  ∑ym 
instead of y1, y2…ym. It is the pooled income that counts. 
Thus, 
1y
h
∂
∂ = 
2y
h
∂
∂       ….(A2.5) 
Thomas applied the Nash Equilibrium model of McElroy and Horney (1981) 
where each individual seeks to maximize the difference between the utility achieved 
by co-operation and some other reservation utility (Vm). Thus the household 
maximizes:  
∏= −1 ),,(),;,,(m
i
mmmm ypVlxv µεµθ       ….(A2.6)  
 
It is difficult to implement this model without enough information about the 
reservation utility, as mentioned in the previous sections of the literature review. 
Following Chiappori (1988), Thomas assumed pareto-allocation instead of imposing 
Nash equilibrium. In such as scenario, there exists welfare weights, w, such that the 
household welfare function could be written as the sum of all individual utility 
functions. Relaxing the assumptions of the household model in this direction,  
hi = hi iµ( , cµ , ),',,......, 1 iMc yy ξµµ      ….(A2.7) 
where 'µ = any elements of µ not in the demand function.
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Appendix III 
Navi Mumbai & malaria 
 
 
A. The city of Navi Mumbai 
The city of Navi Mumbai is a satellite town located north east of the city of 
Mumbai, located on the mainland between the Thane creek on the west and small 
hills running along the east. Traditionally an agrarian economy, the area has rapidly 
urbanized and industrialized over the past few decades. Development accelerated in 
the mid and late 90s after the commissioning of the Mankhurd-Vashi mass transit rail 
link to mainland Mumbai. (http://www.cidcoindia.com, accessed Friday, May 19, 
2006)35. According to the 2001 census preliminary report, the city had a population of 
about 722,000 and a floating population of about 75,000. Approximately 40% of the 
city’s population lives in slums. 
 
B. Malaria in Navi Mumbai 
Although malaria has declined steadily, in general, over the past few years in Navi 
Mumbai, it has risen or remained constant in certain pockets. For example, the 
number of cases of malaria grew about 15% last year in Khairne and above 80% in 
Airoli. Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (NMMC) analyzes blood samples 
collected in the field or from any person reporting with fever to one of the fourteen 
primary health care centers to collect incidence data on the disease (known as Urban 
                                                 
35 More information about Navi Mumbai is available on the cidcoindia.com Website. 
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Health Posts (UHPs)36). The case incidence rates are understated as they include 
blood samples tested only by the urban health posts, mainly frequented by the poor 
and the lower middle class. Instances of malaria occurring in the more affluent classes 
often go unreported as they visit private physicians, who are not required to report 
positive cases of malaria. The number of positive cases confirmed by blood tests is 
reported in the table A1. Recently, there has been a rise of other vector borne diseases 
such as Dengue in the region. 
Table A1: Number of positive malaria cases 
Annual Number of malaria Positive Cases Year 
Plasmodium 
Vivax 
 
Plasmodium 
Falciparum 
Mix Total 
Annual parasite 
index (total 
number of cases 
per 1000 of 
population) 
1997 5060 3869 95 9024 18.0 
1998 4383 2157 53 6593 11.6 
1999 2576 1078 40 3694 6.0 
2000 1760 1033 30 2823 4.0 
2001 1824 907 48 2779 3.9 
2002 1524 525 31 2080 2.6 
2003 1497 349 32 1878 2.3 
2004 1406 299 20 1725 2.0 
Source: NMMC 
                                                 
36 The city of Navi Mumbai has a three-tier health care system with about fourteen primary health care 
centers called Urban Health Posts (UHPs), five secondary health care centers call Maternity and 
Children Hospitals (MCH) and a single tertiary general hospital. If a person is sick with a fever, she is 
generally treated by the UHPs. Each UHP also has a Malaria cell, which carries Anti Larva activities, 
Surveillance, and Follow-up of active cases.  
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Figure A1: Number of Malaria Cases in Navi Mumbai 
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Source: NMMC 
Figure above shows the endemic nature of malaria in Navi Mumbai, and how 
infections peak during the monsoon season (July to October), and stays high during 
the early months of winter. The survey was conducted in the months of January and 
February, during which there is a relative lull in the malaria menace. 
There are various factors that contribute to the nuisance of mosquitoesin 
general, and malaria in particular in Navi Mumbai. The sub-tropical humid climate 
and marshy land contribute to the availability of ample breeding sites within the city. 
The female Anopheles mosquito lays eggs in fresh pools of stagnant water, which are 
available aplenty especially during the monsoon season. As is common in other 
Indian cities, Navi Mumbai does not have a twenty-four hour water supply. People, 
especially those living in slums, have to store water in drums, which are sometimes 
left open and not emptied regularly. Slum dwellings often use plastic polythene as a 
roofing material. To provide protection to this fragile roofing from winds, households 
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often place tires on the top of such roof. Such open tires provide ample space where 
rainwater collects and stays stagnant. Further, these polythene roofs sag because of 
the weight of rainwater, once again providing a pool of stagnant water. People living 
in affluent neighborhoods contribute to the pools of standing water by not replacing 
the petri dishes under regularly watered indoor plant pots. Poor sanitation and 
inadequate drainage of storm water in slums and quarries further contributes to the 
pools of stagnant fresh water during monsoon. 
Rapid development also has contributed by providing a steady pool of 
immigrant and temporary workers in nearby construction, quarry sites and 
agricultural produce wholesale markets. These workers have the least immunity 
against the disease but are the most exposed to it because of poor working conditions 
and inadequate preventive procedures, such as abundance of open water tanks that are 
not emptied regularly, or sleeping in the open or temporarily built construction 
camps. 
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Appendix IV 
A note on malaria 
 
Malaria on the global scene 
 
Malaria is caused by a one-cell parasite called plasmodium, which is 
transmitted from person to person through the bite of a female Anopheles mosquito, 
which requires blood to nurture her eggs. We can avoid the spread of malaria if we 
can prevent mosquitoes from biting people. The Roll Back Malaria (RBM) campaign 
has compiled a comprehensive report on the issues related to malaria in the World 
Malaria Report, 2005 (Roll Back Malaria et al., 2005). Some of the key highlights of 
the global burden of malaria as mentioned in the World Malaria Report are as 
follows: 
 Worldwide, 3.2 billion people in 107 countries live in areas at risk of malaria 
transmission.  
 About 350 – 500 million episodes of malaria occur each year, caused by P. 
falciparum and P. vivax infection.  
 The falciparum malaria infection kills at least one million people each year, 
with the poor people being the most affected by the disease (ibid). This is a 
conservative estimate of the number of deaths because of the indirect effects 
on nutrition and health. (Greenwood et al., 2005). The menace is worst in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. About 80% of these deaths occur in Africa.  
 Malaria also causes anemia in children and pregnant women, low birth 
weight, premature birth and infant mortality. 
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 Malaria accounts for about 25-35% of all outpatient visits, 20-45% of hospital 
admissions and 15-35% of hospital deaths in malaria endemic countries in 
Africa, thus imposing a huge burden on the health care systems. 
 In Africa alone, the disease costs about US$12 billion every year, with the 
poor disproportionately bearing a higher burden of the disease (Barat et al., 
2004 cf Greenwood et al., 2005). 
 Over the last 35 years, the countries endemic with malaria have shown a 2% 
slower growth of rate than other countries with similar background (Sachs and 
Malaney, 2002 cf Greenwood et al., 2005). 
 The RBM campaign asserts that adults infected with HIV, children under 5 
years of age, and pregnant women should be targeted for malaria-based 
interventions. 
Because of the high level of morbidity and mortality associated with the 
disease, controlling malaria is one of the key policy targets set up by the millennium 
development goals37. The Millennium Development goals also has identified 
indicators such as prevalence of death rates associated with malaria, and proportion of 
population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment 
measures. The RBM campaign goals are more ambitious, and plans to halve malaria 
associated mortality by 2010 and again by 2015. 
 
Treatment, vector control and drug resistance 
 
                                                 
37 Target 8 of the Millennium Development Goals: To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
incidence of malaria and other major diseases.  
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There are essentially two strategies for malaria control, viz., treatment and 
vector control.  The traditional method of treatment for malaria infection was the use 
of drugs such as chloroquine and sulfadoxine-primethamine. The traditional method 
of vector control included indoor residual spraying and larviciding.  
One of the emerging issues in malaria is the increasing drug resistance to the 
above-mentioned traditional methods of treatment, especially by the P. falciparum 
infection. In a study of reemergence of malaria in India, Sharma (1996) found that the 
traditional approaches to vector control have become redundant as malaria vectors 
have become resistant to insecticide and the parasites are becoming resistant to 
chloroquine. With due regard to the increasing drug resistance, the Roll Back Malaria 
(RBM) campaign (Roll Back Malaria et al., 2005) has modified the key strategies for 
the control of malaria disease (such as use of Artimisinin-based combination therapy) 
and vector control. In addition, the RBM campaign also recommends monitoring of 
the malaria situation and taking timely actions to reduce the onslaught of malaria 
epidemics. 
 
Development of a malaria vaccine 
 
In a review article on malaria vaccines, Targett (2005) has looked at different 
malaria vaccine technologies currently employed in clinical trials. Among different 
vaccine candidates, the recent clinical trial in Gambian adults and Mozambican 
children of the Glaxo, RTS, S/ASO2A vaccine has shown encouraging results with a 
reported efficacy of 30% for malaria and 58% for severe malaria in children (ibid). 
Targett assesses that the goal of prevention of all parasite development remains 
elusive, and expresses doubt over whether any of the current vaccine candidates have 
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the efficacy and long-term effectiveness to justify wide scale use. He feels that the 
first generation vaccine would be used only to supplement strategies of vector control 
and on the basis of existing scientific evidence does not foresee a vaccine good 
enough to be an effective alternative to treatment for the next two decades. 
 
Malaria situation in India 
 
The Indian health system is in “transition” with declining mortality and 
fertility rates, aging population, and a shift in pattern of illness from malnutrition and 
communicable diseases to chronic illnesses of adulthood (Peters et al., 2002). In spite 
of this transition, a high proportion of the population continues to suffer and die from 
preventable infections, pregnancy and childbirth related complications (ibid). Malaria 
is one such infection, which is a major public health problem in India.  
Of the 5 million confirmed cases of malaria outside of Africa, about 3 million 
are from India and Pakistan (India- controlling malaria in India). Nationwide, the 
reported incidence of laboratory confirmed cases of malaria stood at 1.78 million in 
2003, down from 3.0 million in 1996 (Roll Back Malaria et al., 2005). About 45% of 
the cases are infected with the P. falciparum. About 1000 people die annually from 
malaria (ibid). 
In India, 20% of the population accounts for about 80% of the cases of 
malaria. The remaining 80% of the population lives in an area with low incidence of 
malaria (The World Bank, 2005). The case rate was lowest for children under 15 
years of age. A further look at malaria cases reported by age by the World Malaria 
report shows that case rate increased with age similar to the rates in countries like 
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Bhutan, Cambodia and Nepal. In countries such as Bangladesh, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Sri Lanka, children under 5 years had the highest case rate.  
Table A2: Reported malaria cases by age (year 2002) 
Age # of cases % of total 
 # of cases 
< 5 years 150605 8% 
5 – 14 years 462062 25% 
15+ years 1229352 67% 
Total 1842019* 100% 
Source: Roll Back Malaria et al. (2005) 
* With a population of about a billion, this amounts to annual parasite index of about 1.84 per 1000 of 
population. 
 
 
The malaria situation varies by states and also by season. The high burden 
states include Orissa, Gujarat, West Bengal, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Jharkand, and Maharashtra (India- controlling malaria in 
India). The state of Maharashtra accounted for about 4% of the total cases reported in 
year 2002.  
 
Malaria and gender 
According the World Malaria Report 2005, about 59% of the people infected 
with malaria in India were males. The higher number of infections among males is 
consistent with the rest of Asia. In seven Asian countries that have data on the gender 
of those infected with malaria, the proportion of males infected varied from 52% to 
71% (ibid). The NFH Survey of 1998-99, on the other hand, found that the incidence 
rate did not vary much by gender (3734 for males vs. 3658 for females).  
There are various ways in which malaria could infect males and females 
differently. In urban areas, males often sleep outside their tenements thus having a 
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higher risk of infection. Migrant labor (generally males) with low immunity working 
in swampy areas may be exposed to the risk of malaria. The World Malaria report 
notes that higher number of infections in males could be the result of differential 
occupational exposure of gender, but acknowledges the fact that differences in 
treatment seeking behavior might also be a contributing factor. Differential treatment 
behavior could be the result of intrahousehold resource allocation. 
There could be other reasons why malaria could infect males and females 
differently. This is because household members can take action to reduce the risk of 
infection such as using insecticide treated nets (ITNs). If there is only a single ITN in 
a household, then intrahousehold power dynamics could play a role in deciding who 
sleeps under the ITN. To study the cost-effectiveness of permethrin impregnated bed-
nets, Binka et al. (1997) provided ITNs in Kassena-Nankana district of Ghana to 
women of child bearing age and children under 10 years. Nets were available in 
different sizes and distribution of nets was based on the number of women of child-
bearing age and children under 10 years of age. Initially men were not allocated any 
nets. However, the researchers had to modify their research design and accommodate 
males to ensure that nets were not diverted for male use. This shows how 
intrahousehold power dynamics can affect the risk of infection to different household 
members.  
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Appendix V 
Survey instrument 
 
Malaria study 
 
Questionnaire Serial Number  
Enumerator Code  
Survey ID (efficacy-price) 95   -  0150 
Survey receipt Number  
 
Date: ________ 
 
============================================================ 
Name of respondent                         : _________________________________ 
 
Address: 
Line 1 :__________________________________ 
Line 2 :__________________________________ 
Sector  :__________________________________ 
City :__________________________________ 
Line 5 :__________________________________ 
 
 
 [Enumerator: Note that the name/ address or any other identifying information of the 
respondent, his/her family and home should not appear beyond this point]. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
For office use only: 
 
 
[Office manager: Detach the front page from the main survey. This data will be entered and stored 
separately. Maintaining privacy and confidentiality of this document is essential. It should never 
appear with the main survey again]. 
 Husband Wife 
Oral consent:   
Oral consent:   
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Section 1: Introduction and seeking appointment 
 
[Enumerator: This section has to be (partially) completed even if the respondent refuses to be 
interviewed. For correct answer, check the relevant option, do not circle or cross the option]. 
1.1 Date and time of interview 
Home interview details First Visit Second Visit Third Visit Fourth Visit 
1.1A Time home interview starts 
___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ 
1.1B Time home interview ends 
___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ 
1.1C Date of interview 
(dd/mm/yy)     
 
1.2 Questionnaire Serial Number  
1.3 Enumerator Code  
1.4 Survey ID (efficacy-price)   95  -  0150 
 
1  Head of  household couple- husband  
2  Head of  household couple- wife  
1.5 Are both the head of 
household or spouse of 
the head of household 
present? 
3  No couple in household (Terminate 
Interview, Go to 1.12-9) 
1.12 (9) 
 
  Yes No  
1.6 Do you have at least one child less than age of 
18 years? 
1 2 No (Terminate interview. Go to 
1.12 (11)). 
1.7 Are you and your partner fluent in Marathi or 
Hindi? 
1 2 No (Terminate interview. Go to 
1.12 (12)). 
 
1  Yes (Terminate interview), mark (10) on 
1.12. [Enumerator: say the following 
things. “Since this survey is on vaccines, 
we may not be able to interview a family 
with anyone who has Malaria. We are 
extremely sorry for this. We thank you for 
your support. We assure you that the 
information that you have provided us will 
be kept completely confidential.We hope 
that you get healthy soon. Thank you for 
your time”.] 
1.12 
(10) 
1.8 Are you or any of your 
family member currently 
infected with Malaria? Or do 
you think that any of you or 
your family members are 
infected with Malaria? 
2  No.  
Checked by:  __ __ on ________ 
Data entry 1: __ __ 
Data entry 2: __ __ 
Remarks
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[Now, give the information and consent  request to the respondent and allow him/her to read it. Make 
sure that he/she understands the information.] 
 
Consent Letter: 
 
Vimalanand S. Prabhu 
Graduate Student 
Department of Public Policy 
The University of NC at Chapel Hill 
CB#3435, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. 
E-mail: prabhu@unc.edu 
 
Date: October 26, 2005 
 
Subject: Information about Phase 1 of the Malaria Socio-Economic Study 
 
Introduction to the Study:  
• We are collecting data about people in the community to learn what they think and know about 
malaria, vaccines and health care. We are also interested in how much people would pay for a 
malaria vaccine.  
• We also want to learn how husbands and wives make decisions in the household. 
• We are collecting data on behalf of Mr. Vimalanand S. Prabhu, who is doing his Ph.D. in Public 
Policy from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
• Mr. Prabhu is doing this study in the city of New Mumbai. 
 
What Will Happen During the Study:  
We will ask you to answer some questions on malaria, health care, and vaccines. This study will be 
conducted in two phases. In the first phase we will interview you and your spouse separately. Phase 1 
will take about 20-30 minutes. Phase 2 will require 10 minutes. Details of phase two will be given after 
we finish phase 1.  
 
We will also take measurement of height and weight for each of you and your children and other 
family members. For some of the questions, we will give you a list of possible responses.  For some 
other questions, we will ask you to say what you think best answers the question.  Your name will not 
be recorded on the completed questionnaire form, and all of the questionnaires will be kept in a safe 
place with Mr. Prabhu until the information is entered in a computer. After that your questionnaires 
will be destroyed.  Only Mr. Prabhu will have access to your contact information, which will be stored 
in a secure place separate from where the data is stored.   
 
Your Privacy is Important:  
• We will make every effort to protect your privacy, even from your other family members, so 
we must interview you separately.  
• We will not use your name in any of the information we get from this study or in any of the 
research reports.  
• Any information we get in the study will be recorded with a code number that will let only 
Mr. Prabhu know who you are.  
• This study will not be used for any marketing purposes. 
 
Your Rights:  
• You decide on your own whether or not you want to be in this study.  
• You will not be treated any differently if you decide not to be in the study.  
• If you decide to be in the study, you will have the right to stop being in the study at any time, 
and to not answer specific questions.  
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You will receive the following: 
• Information about malaria. 
• Information about height and weight of your family members. 
• You will automatically be eligible to participate in a game that has real payoffs for you and 
your husband. You can get a minimum of Rs. 10 and a maximum of Rs. 100.  
 
Questions about this study? 
You have the right to ask, and have answered, any questions you may have about this research. If you 
have questions, or concerns, you should contact please contact Mr.Prabhu at prabhu@unc.edu, tel. 
+91-98676 00916 (India),+1-919-225-0991 (USA). 
 
Questions about your rights as a research participant? 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your rights and 
welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject you may contact, 
anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at 001-919-966-3113 or by email to 
IRB_subjects@unc.edu with Malaria study reference number PPA 05-007. 
 
  226
 
1  Yes   1.9 Respondent- wife has listened 
to the consent form and given 
oral consent 
2  No (Terminate interview) 1.12 
 
1  Yes   1.10 Respondent- wife has listened 
to the consent form and given 
oral consent 
2  No (Terminate interview.)  1.12 
 
(Enumerator: Please invite the couple to the field office) 
 
1.11 Appointment schedule First Visit Second 
Visit 
Third Visit Fourth 
Visit 
Fifth Visit 
1.11A Date of appointment 
(dd/mm/yy) 
___/___/__
_ 
___/___/__
_ 
___/___/__
_ 
___/___/__
_ 
___/___/__
_ 
1.11B Time of appointment ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ 
 
1  Respondent moved  
2  Respondent seriously ill, cannot reschedule  
3  Respondent deceased  
4  Respondent refused to be interviewed  
5  Respondent did not permit his wife to be interviewed  
6  Respondent refused to hear information and consent  
7  Respondent decided to stop before finishing interview 
(Complete Section 10) 
10 
8  Absent  
9  No couple in the household   
10  Respondent/ family member infected with Malaria  
11  No children between 1 and 18 years  
12  Not fluent in Marathi or Hindi  
1.12 If the survey 
is not 
completed, 
please 
indicate the 
reason why 
-95  ___________________ Others, Please Specify   
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(Part 2: Enumerator observations  
[Enumerator: In this section note what you observe. You need not have to ask the respondent questions 
for this section] 
 
1  Yes.  2.1 Is there a business on the 
premises? 2  No  
 
1  Mud     
2  Brick    
3  Stone    
4  Cement/ Coba    
5  Mosaic/ floor tiles, etc.    
6  Polished stones  
2.2 Please note the flooring 
material. 
-95  Others Please 
Specify____________________ 
 
 
1  Grass/  bamboos  
2  Plastic/ polythene   
3  Mud/ unburnt brick    
4  Wood    
5  GI/ Metal/ Asbestos    
6  Burnt Brick    
7  Stone    
8  Plaster  
9  Plaster and paint  
2.3 Please note the type of 
material used in the Wall 
-95  Others Please 
Specify____________________ 
 
 
1  Corrugated cement sheets  
2  Plastic/ polythene    
3  Manglore/ other Tiles   
4  GI/ Metal/ Asbestos   
5  Grass/ thatch/ bamboo/ wood/ mud, etc  
6  Concrete slab   
2.4 Please note the type of 
material used in the roof 
-95  Others Please 
Specify____________________ 
 
 
1  Yes.  2.5 Are there windows in the 
house? 2  No  
 
1  Slums    
2  Chawls   
3  government quarters  
4  Bungalow (single family home)  
6  Multi-storey building/ apartment complex  
2.6 What type of house does the 
respondent live in? 
-95  Others Please 
Specify____________________ 
 
 
1  Yes.    2.7 Is there an additional storey in 
the house 2  No  
 
1  Yes.  2.8 Is there an big-loft in the 
house? 2  No  
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Section 3: Some questions about the household 
 
1  Yes, Easily    
2  Yes, with difficulty    
3.1 Can wife in the household read a 
newspaper (in any language)?  (If no, 
record 3, if yes, probe to find out if they 
can read a newspaper easily, or with 
difficulty.) 
3  No, cannot read a  newspaper    
 
1  Yes, Easily    
2  Yes, with difficulty    
3.2 Can husband in the household read a newspaper 
(in any language)?  (If no, record 3, if yes, probe 
to find out if they can read a newspaper easily, 
or with difficulty.) 
3  No, cannot read a  
newspaper   
 
 
-85  _________________     
-98  Don’t know/ Not Sure  
3.3 How many rooms does your house 
have?   
-99  No response  
 
1  Gas (LPG)    
2  Firewood    
3  Kerosene    
4  Charcoal    
5  Electricity    
6  Cow dung    
-99  No response  
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure  
3.4 What is the main fuel used for cooking 
in the house? (Enumerator:  Read 
response, record only main fuel) 
-95  Others, please specify  
 
1  Husband    3.5 Respondent is 
 2  Wife    
 
Household Assets   
 
No.  (yes)   (no)  
3.6 1 2 Refrigerator    
3.7 1 2 Color TV   
3.8 1 2 Black and White TV   
3.9 1 2 Ceiling fan  
3.10 1 2 FM Radio/2 in one/ 3 in one (Tape/CD/ Radio)  
3.11 1 2 Portable fan  
3.12 1 2 Bicycle   
3.13 1 2 Motorbike  
3.14 1 2 Pressure Cooker  
3.15 1 2 Mixer/ Grinder  
3.16 1 2 Steel Cabinet (Cupboard)   
3.17 1 2 Cot  
3.18 1 2 Washing machine 
3.20 1 2 Plastic ghagar  
 
1  Yes  3.21 Does the household have 
electricity 2  (Go to 3.24 3.24 
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1  Paid entirely 
 
 
2  Shared  
3  Don’t have to pay/ included in rent 
(Go to 3.24) 
3.24 
3.22 Does your household pay the 
electricity bill entirely yourself 
or share it with someone else 
-99  No response (Go to 3.24) 3.24 
 
-85  _____________Rs. per month  
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure  
-99  No response  
3.23 How much was your 
electricity bill last month? Or, 
if you share the bill, how 
much was your share? -95  Others, Please Specify___________   
 
 
 
1  Private  tap  
2  Shared Public Tap/ standpost  
3  Own shallow well     
4  Own hand pump   
5  Water tanker  
3.24 
 
What is the primary source of 
drinking water in your 
household? 
-95  Others, Please Specify___________   
 
 
 
1    Paid entirely  
2   Shared  
3  Don’t have to pay/ included in rent 
(Go to 3.27) 
3.27 
3.25 Do you pay the bill entirely or 
share it with someone else  
 
 
-99  No response(Go to 3.27) 3.27 
 
1  Rs. per month  
-98   Don’t know/ Not sure  
-99   No response  
3.26  How much was your bill last 
month? Or, if you share the 
bill, how much was your 
share? -95  Others, Please Specify___________   
 
 
 
1  Yes  3.27 Is there a telephone in the 
household 2  No (Go to 3.30) 3.30 
 
1    Paid entirely  
2   Shared  
3  Don’t have to pay/ included in rent (Go 
to 3.30) 
3.30 
3.28 Do you pay the bill entirely or 
share it with someone else  
 
 
-99  No response(Go to 3.30) 3.30 
 
1  ________Rs. per month  
-98   Don’t know/ Not sure  
-99   No response  
3.29  How much was your bill last 
month? Or, if you share the 
bill, how much was your 
share? -95  Others, Please Specify_________     
 
1  Water closet used alone    
2  WC shared with 2 - 10 households  
3  Go into the bush, river, lake or canal?      
4  Public flush toilet/ public latrine  
3.30 
 
What type of toilet does the 
household use for defecation? 
[Enumerator: Spontaneous 
response; one response 
permitted] 
 
-95  Others, Please Specify_______     
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1  Private car   
2  Private auto rickshaw   
3  Company car    
4  Motorbike    
5  Bus   
6  Auto Rickshaw   
7  Train    
8  Taxi    
9  Bicycle    
10  Walk    
3.31 
 
What transportation means 
does wife mainly use?  
[Enumerator:  Spontaneous 
response; one response 
permitted]   
-95  Others, Please Specify___________   
 
 
 
 
1  Private car   
2  Private auto rickshaw   
3  Company car    
4  Motorbike    
5  Bus   
6  Auto Rickshaw   
7  Train    
8  Taxi    
9  Bicycle    
10  Walk    
3.32 
 
 What transportation means does 
husband mainly use?  [Enumerator:  
Spontaneous response; one response 
permitted]   
-95  Others, Please 
Specify___________    
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Section 4: Demographics  
 
 [This section should be started at home after at least one member has listened to the consent 
information and given oral consent]. 
 
4.1  [Enumerator: Please fill in the following table for all household members. To 
protect privacy and confidentiality, no name, address or any other indicator should 
appear on the final survey document. If some children are not present, you may 
need to come later for height/weight measurements]. 
 
1  Yes (Enter in table 4) 4 4.11 Does anyone within the household 
have a mobile phone? 2  No (Go to 4.13 ) 4.13 
 
4.12 4If yes, note the monthly expenses in Table 4.  
 
4.13  1.1 B Please enter time the home interview ends in 1.1B 
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Certificate of Height and Weight 
 
Household Member Height (cm) Weight (kg) 
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[Enumerator: Section 5 – 10 are to be completed for husband and wife. Of these, section 8 is to be 
completed for wife only] 
 
Section 5: Awareness of Malaria ( for Both husband and wife)  
 
 First Visit Second Visit Third Visit Fourth Visit 
5.3  Date  of field interview(dd/mm/yy) ___/___/___ ___/___/___ ___/___/___ ___/___/___ 
5.4 Time start ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ 
5.5  Time end ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ ___ : ___ 
 
1   Husband    5.6 Respondent is  
 2   Wife    
 
1   Yes.  5.7 Have you ever heard of Any illness 
called Malaria? 2  No (Go to 5.9) 5.9 
 
1    Tiredness    
2    Headache    
3    Fever     
4    Shivering     
5   Fever with Shivering   
6    Convulsions    
7   Backache    
8   Anemia    
9   Stomach ache    
10    Vomiting    
11  Diarrhea    
12   Joint pain    
13   Loss of appetite    
-95  Others, Please Specify__________ 
 
 
5.8 
 
What are the symptoms of Malaria 
[Spontaneous response, multiple 
responses permitted] 
 
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure  
 
5.9  [Enumerator: Read the following statement to ALL respondents] Malaria is a disease often 
characterized by fever, chills, sweating, headaches, muscle pains, nausea and vomiting. In severe 
malaria, the infected person may have confusion, coma, severe anemia and respiratory difficulties. 
 
 Is it possible for a person to become infected with Malaria 
by.: (read responses; allow respondent to answer 
yes/no/don't know/not sure) 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Don’t 
know/not 
sure 
5.10 Drinking unboiled water (1) (2) (-98) 
5.11 Mosquito bite   (1) (2) (-98) 
5.12 Using unhygienic latrines (1) (2) (-98) 
5.13 Flies touching food   (1) (2) (-98) 
5.14 Living in marshy land (1) (2) (-98) 
5.15 Living in dirty unhygienic environment (1) (2) (-98) 
 
1  Yes, treatment is 
necessary. 
 
2  No, treatment is 
necessary. (Go to 5.21) 
5.21 
5.16 Is it necessary to treat someone infected 
with Malaria 
-98  Don't know/Not sure (Go 
to 5.21) 
5.21 
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  If someone is sick with malaria, what are the best ways 
to cure this person? [Enumerator: read all options, select 
one only] 
Yes No Don’t 
know/not 
sure 
5.17 Injections       (1) (2) (-98) 
5.18 Cleaning house, environment, or body   (1) (2) (-98) 
5.19 Religious healing: Holy water (1) (2) (-98) 
5.20 Herbal (Ayurvedic) medicine (1) (2) (-98) 
 
1  Yes  
2   No (Go to 5.28 5.28 
5.21 Can we take any precautions to avoid 
getting malaria? 
 -98  Don't know/ not sure (Go 
to 5.28) 
5.28 
 
 What are the best ways to avoid getting Malaria? 
[Enumerator: read all options, one response permitted] 
Yes No Don’t know/ 
not sure 
5.22 Cleaning the house or environment, including draining 
wet areas  
(1) (2) (-98) 
5.23 Sleeping under a bednet (1) (2) (-98) 
5.24 Burning leaves, dung and other material (1) (2) (-98) 
5.25 Spraying insecticides inside house (1) (2) (-98) 
5.26 Using a mosquito repellent for body like odomos. (1) (2) (-98) 
5.27 Burning mosquito incense/ Good Knight (1) (2) (-98) 
 
1  Yes.  
2  No (Go to 5.30) 5.30 
5.28 Have you heard of chloroquine? 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure 
(Go to 5.30)  
5.30 
 
1  Yes  
2   No  
-95  Others, Please Specify 
___________   
 
5.29 What is chloroquine? [Enumerator: 
Spontaneous response] 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure  
 
5.30  Chloroquine is the medicine (tablets) generally used to cure Malaria. 
 
1  Yes.  
2  5.35No (Go to 5.35) 5.35 
5.31 Do you know of any person infected with 
Malaria? 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure  
5.35 
5.35 
 
1  Self    
2  Spouse   
3  Children  
4  None in the family    
5.32 Was anyone in your household ever 
infected with Malaria disease? 
-95  Others, Please 
Specify_________    
 
 
1  Yes.  
2  5.35No (Go to 5.35)  
5.33 Do you know of any person who has died 
because of Malaria? 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure 
5.35 
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2  Spouse   
3  Children  
4  None in the family    
5.34 Has anyone in your household ever died 
because of being infected with Malaria? 
 
-95  Others, Please 
Specify_________    
 
 
5.35 [Enumerator: Please provide and explain the following Malaria information to the 
respondent to make sure that he/she understands the situation. Show Chart ] 
 
Now I would like to talk with you about the ways that Malaria can be transmitted and how 
people can protect themselves. 
In India, Malaria affects about 1.75 million annually, of which about a 1000 die. Malaria is 
transmitted from person to person through the bite of a female Anopheles mosquito, which requires 
blood to nurture her eggs (Show Chart 1).  
The female Anopheles mosquito lays her eggs in clean standing water. In urban areas such 
opportunities are provided by standing water in open water tanks, open drums, in petri-dishes below 
plant vases, etc. (Show Chart 2 (to be compiled). Anopheles breeding ground is also found when rain 
water pools in small places such as tires and other materials on top of roofs.  
 We can avoid getting malaria if we can prevent ourselves from getting a mosquito bite. Thus, 
if we sleep inside an insecticide treated net at night (Show Chart 3), we can reduce the risk of malaria. 
Malaria can be controlled by public authorities by spraying insecticides at locations where mosquitoes 
breed or rest. Traditionally, people infected with Malaria were treated using chloroquine, which is 
available at a low cost. However, in recent years, there is an increases drug resistance to chloroquine, 
and more expensive treatments such as Artimisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) may be 
necessary. Similarly, the mosquitoes have also developed resistance to low cost insecticides. As a 
result, treatment and control of malaria has become difficult. (Charts on next page) 
 
-95  If Yes, record the 
respondent’s questions: 
 Do you have any questions or anything 
you are not clear about? 
2  No  
5.36 
 [Enumerator:  If you know the answer to the respondent’s questions, please answer 
them truthfully and briefly.  If you are not sure you know the answer, please tell the 
respondent politely that you are not sure.] 
 
 
1  Better, prevalence of malaria will 
reduce 
 
2  Same    
3  Worsen, prevalence of malaria will 
increase   
 
5.37 
 
How do you think the Malaria 
situation in your community will 
change in the future? [Read all 
responses, single response 
permitted] 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure  
 
1  No, impossible    
2  Some chance  
3  Large chance    
5.38 
 
 How much are you and your spouse 
likely to be infected with Malaria in the 
future. 
 -98  Don't Know/ Not Sure  
 
1  No, impossible    
2   Some chance  
3  Large chance    
5.39 
 
How much are your children likely to be 
infected with Malaria in the future. 
 
 -98  Don't Know/ Not Sure  
 
1  Marathi  5.40 Language of interview 
2  Hindi  
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Malaria is transmitted from person to person 
through the bite of a mosquito. (Chart 1) 
 
 
The female Anopheles mosquito lays her eggs in 
clean standing water (Chart 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A photograph of a mother sleeping inside a 
mosquito net with her children (Chart 3) 
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Section 6:  Perceptions and Attitudes Regarding Vaccination (Both husband and wife) 
 
I would like to ask you the following questions about vaccines 
 
 
 
1   Yes.  6.1  Have you ever heard about 
vaccines? 2  No (Go to 6.3)   6.3 
 
1  Prevent disease for children  
2  Prevent disease for pregnant 
women 
 
3  Prevent disease for all people  
4  Cure disease  
-95  Others, Please Specify    
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure  
6.2 
 
In your opinion, what is the 
purpose of a vaccine?  
(spontaneous response; multiple 
responses permitted) 
 
 
-99  No response  
 
6.3 [Enumerator: Read the following statement to ALL respondents] Vaccine is for “prevention”, 
not for treatment. You have to take a vaccine before you get sick. An example of the vaccine is 
the polio vaccine that we give to young children to protect them from the disease. 
 
1  Self    
2  Spouse   
3  Children  
4  None in the family    
6.4 Have you or any of your family 
members ever been vaccinated 
before [Enumerator: Record the 
persons who are vaccinated] 
 -95  Others, Please Specify ___________  
 
 
 
1  Yes  
2  No  
6.5 Have you purchased the Hepatitis A 
vaccine for any of your family members? 
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure  
 
6.6 If yes, for whom did you buy this vaccine and  at what price? (Fill table 5.) 
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Section 7: Assessment of willingness to pay for Malaria (CV scenario) 
 
Doctors and scientists have been working for several years to develop a vaccine that can prevent 
people from getting Malaria.  We’d like to know what you would do if the Malaria vaccine were 
available in the market.  This vaccine would be given to individuals who don’t currently have Malaria 
to prevent him/her having Malaria in the future.  It would not be effective in treating someone already 
infected with Malaria. This vaccine cannot be used for children under 1 year and pregnant women.   
 
Suppose that this vaccine has no side effects and is safe, that is, after you were vaccinated you would 
have no chance to get Malaria from the vaccine. Suppose that you could drink the vaccine (like the 
polio vaccine). Assume that a single dose of the vaccine would be required taken. Suppose that taking 
the dose of Malaria vaccine would be [50% effective for 10 years/ 95% effective for 10 years].   
 
7.1 Now I want to explain exactly what I mean when I say the vaccine would be [50%/ 95%] 
effective. Suppose that each of these little blue or red figures (Enumerator: show the picture) 
represents a person. (Enumerator: point out the circle).  The 100 figures inside this circle represent 100 
persons who have got the vaccine, while the figures outside the circle represent those who have not got 
the vaccine. The Malaria vaccine is not 100% effective; that is the vaccine is only (50% / 95%) 
effective. Therefore, of the 100 people getting the vaccine in the circle, there will be (50% /95%) of the 
people who get the vaccine that are protected (i.e., the vaccine works for them) for a period of 10 
years.  The blue figures inside this circle represent these people.  
 
 
 
The rest of the people (the red ones inside the circle) who have been vaccinated [50, 5] will not be 
protected against Malaria even though they have got the vaccine, because the vaccines did not work for 
them.   They will still be at risk of getting malaria just like they were before they got the vaccine --or 
just like the people outside the circle who haven’t received vaccines, although the symptoms may not 
be quite as severe.  The people who receive the Malaria vaccine will not be able to know if the vaccine 
works for them.  Of course, we don’t know who would actually get Malaria.  A red person outside the 
circle who does not get a vaccine still has relatively small risk of being infected. 
 
Chart showing 95% Vaccine Efficacy 
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Assess understanding about the vaccine effectiveness 
Now I am going to ask you some questions to make sure that the information we told you is clear. 
 
First round 
1  Respondent did give the 
correct answer  
 
2  Respondent didn't give 
the correct answer 
 
7.2 Please point to all the people who have 
received the vaccine [Enumerator: put a 
mark into a relevant place] 
-98  Respondent did not 
know/not sure 
 
 
1  Respondent did give the 
correct answer  
 
2  Respondent didn't give 
the correct answer 
 
7.3 Please point to all the people who have 
got the vaccine and it works for them. 
[Enumerator: put a mark into a relevant 
place] 
-98  Respondent did not 
know/not sure 
 
 
-85  _____ Years  7.4 How many years would the 
Malaria vaccine work for them? -98  Don't Know/ Not Sure  
[Enumerator: If the respondent gives wrong answer, please read the following statement] 
Malaria vaccine would work for them for a period of 10 years.  
 
1  Respondent did give the 
correct answer 
 
2  If respondent gives wrong 
answer, please correct it. 
 
7.5  How many people have already 
received the vaccines but can still get 
Malaria ? [Enumerator: put a mark into  
a relevant place] 
-98  Respondent did not 
know/not sure 
 
 
1  Respondent did give the correct 
answer 
 
2  If respondent gives wrong answer, 
please correct it. 
 
7.6 If an unvaccinated person gets 
infected by Malaria, can the 
vaccine be used to cure them? 
[Enumerator: put a mark into  a 
relevant place] 
 
-98  Respondent did not know/not sure  
  
1  Yes (Go to 7.12) 7.12 7.7 Did the respondent give the 
correct answer to effectiveness 
questions (7.2, 7.3, 7.5)? 
2  No   
  
7.7 [Enumerator: If the answer to question 7.7 is no, please go to 7.1 and ask questions 7.8-7.10. 
 
Second round  
1  Respondent did give the correct 
answer. 
 
2  Respondent did not give correct 
answer 
 
7.8 Please point to all the people 
who have received the vaccine 
[Enumerator: put a mark into a 
relevant place] 
-98  Respondent did not know/not sure  
 
1  Respondent did give the correct 
answer 
 
2  Respondent did not give correct 
answer 
 
7.9 Please point to all the people 
who have got the vaccine and it 
works for them. [Enumerator: 
put a mark into a relevant place] 
-98  Respondent did not know/not sure  
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1  Respondent did give the correct 
answer 
 
2  Respondent did not give correct 
answer 
 
7.10  How many people have already 
received the vaccines but can 
still get Malaria ? [Enumerator: 
put a mark into  a relevant 
place] -98  Respondent did not know/not sure  
 
7.11 Note: Whether respondent did give correct answers or not, please go to 7.12). 
 
(Willingness-to-pay scenario) 
 
7.12 Suppose that the vaccine was in limited supply and that those who wanted a vaccine would 
have to pay a fixed price for the vaccine.  Everyone would pay the same price.  Assume that you would 
have to pay for the vaccine from your own pocket. Assume that the government clinic will not be 
supplying this vaccine for free.  
 
Now I’d like to know whether you would buy the vaccine if it were available at a specified 
price. Some people say they cannot afford the price of the vaccine or that they are actually not at risk 
of getting this disease. Other people say that would buy the vaccine because the protection is really 
worth it to them.  In other studies about vaccines, we have found that people sometimes say they want 
to buy the vaccine. They think: “I would really like as much protection from this disease as possible.” 
However, they may forget about other things they need to spend their money on.  Please try to think 
carefully about what you would actually do if you had to spend your own money. There are no right 
or wrong answers. We really want to know what you would do. 
 
 When you give your answer about whether you would or would not buy the vaccine, please 
keep in mind the following: yours and your family’s income and economic status compared with the 
price of the vaccine, and your risk of getting Malaria. Apart from the vaccine, remember that Malaria 
can be cured but we still have other ways to reduce the risk of Malaria such as use of insecticide 
treated nets and indoor residual spraying. Applying mosquito repellents such as Odomos may also 
help. Also, remember that the benefit of the vaccine in preventing Malaria is [50% effective for 10 
years/ 95% effective for 10 years].  Again, children under 1 year and pregnant women cannot use 
the Malaria vaccine.   
 
[Enumerator: Please hand the laminated reminder card to the respondent, to remind the 
respondent of the important information for their decision.  Also show them the relevant effectiveness 
card.  If a respondent is illiterate, show them only the relevant effectiveness card.] 
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(Laminated Card) 
Please Keep In Mind 
 
z Yours and your family’s income and economic status 
compared with the price of the vaccine 
z Your risk of getting Malaria. 
z We still have other ways to reduce the risk of Malaria such as 
use of insecticide treated nets and indoor residual spraying. 
Applying mosquito repellents may also help.  
z Children under 1 year and pregnant women cannot use 
this vaccine 
 
 
-95  If Yes, record the 
respondent’s questions: 
 
 
 Do you have any questions or anything 
you are not clear about? 
2  No  
7.13 
 [Enumerator:  If you know the answer to the respondent’s questions, please answer 
them truthfully and briefly.  If you are not sure you know the answer, please tell the 
respondent politely that you are not sure.] 
 
 
(Questions on respondent’s willingness to pay) 
 
 As you may be aware, towards the end of this survey you will get an opportunity to play a 
game where you can win some money. Please remember that your responses to the following questions 
have no bearing on the amount of money that you can win. You can win the maximum amount 
irrespective of whether you are willing to pay or not pay for the vaccine. There is no right or wrong 
answer. We only want to see what you would do if had to spend your own money on this vaccine. 
Also, remember that the benefit of the vaccine in preventing Malaria is [50% effective for 10 years/ 
95% effective for 10 years].  Again, children under 1 year and pregnant women cannot use the 
Malaria vaccine.   
 
1  Yes   
2  No 7.17 
3  Yes, if I had the money   7.17 
4  Yes, but too expensive 7.17 
5  Yes, but I am too old   7.17 
6  Yes, but only for someone 
else  
7.17 
7  Yes, only if many people 
around me get Malaria 
and mark option (5)) 
7.17 
8  Yes, only if it is very 
convenient 
7.17 
7.14 
? 
Suppose that this Malaria vaccine costs 
(Rs. 10/25/50/150/500) for the single 
dose needed for one person.  Would 
you buy one or more of this vaccine for 
the members of your family? 
(Spontaneous response; one response 
permitted) 
-98  Don't know/Not sure 7.17 
 
7.15            Who would you buy this vaccine for? (Fill table 5.) 
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1  Vaccine is useful for me 
because it is good for 
prevention and safety 
7.23 
2  Price is reasonable, can 
afford easily 
7.23 
3  I think I have a chance of 
getting Malaria 
7.23 
4  Malaria is a dangerous 
disease 
7.23 
5  It is recommended by the 
commune health center 
staff and/or the 
government 
7.23 
-95  Others, Please Specify   7.23 
7.16 
? 
What is the main reason that you would 
buy the vaccine? [Enumerator: Do not 
read choices; record only the most 
important reason] 
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure 7.23 
 
1  No money    
2  Too expensive    
3  I would buy this vaccine 
only if many people 
around me get Malaria 
 
4  I would buy this vaccine 
only if it is very 
convenient 
 
5  Do not think that vaccine 
is useful for me 
 
6  Do not think that we’d 
have a chance to get 
Malaria 
 
7  Afraid that the vaccine 
might not be safe 
 
8  Afraid that the 
syringe/container might 
be dirty 
 
5  Do not think that the 
vaccine can prevent 
Malaria 
 
6  Concerned that the 
vaccine will cause the 
Malaria 
 
-95  Others, Please Specify  
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure  
7.17 
? 
What is the main reason that you will 
not pay / you are not sure that you will 
pay for the vaccine [Enumerator: Do 
not read choices, record only the most 
important reason]? 
 
-99  No response  
 
1  Yes (Go to 7.20) 7.20 
2  No  
7.18 Why would you not want anyone to 
receive a vaccine if you could get it for 
free? (Do not read choices, record only 
the most important reason) 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure  
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1  Vaccine has little use or 
not useful (Skip to 7.25)  
7.25 
2  I don’t think I have a 
chance to get Malaria 
(Skip to 7.25)  
7.25 
3  Afraid that the vaccine 
might not be safe(Skip to 
7.25) 
7.25 
4  Afraid that the 
syringe/container might 
be dirty(Skip to 7.25) 
7.25 
5  Do not think that vaccine 
can really prevent Malaria 
(Skip to 7.25) 
7.25 
6  Concerned that the 
vaccine will cause the 
disease. (Skip to 7.25) 
7.25 
7  Have previously had a 
Malaria  vaccine, and 
therefore do not need this 
vaccine.  (Skip to 7.25) 
7.25 
-95  ________Others, Please 
Specify___________   
 (Skip to 7.25) 
7.25 
7.19 
? 
Why would you not want anyone to 
receive a vaccine if you could get it for 
free? (Do not read choices, record only 
the most important reason) 
 
 
 
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure 
(Skip to 7.25) 
7.25 
 
1  Vaccine is useful because 
it is good for prevention 
and safety   
 
2  If it is free, I don’t have to 
worry about cost   
 
3  I think I have a chance of 
getting Malaria 
 
4  Malaria is a dangerous 
disease 
 
5  It is recommended by the 
commune health center 
staff and/or the 
government 
 
-95  ________Others, Please 
Specify___________   
. 
 
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure  
7.20 
 
What is the main reason that you would 
want someone to be vaccinated if the 
vaccine is free? [Enumerator: Do not 
read choices; record only the most 
important reason] 
 
 
-99  No response  
 
1  Yes  
2  No  
7.21 Would you get someone in the 
house vaccinated if the price is 
very low? -98  Don't Know/ Not Sure  
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1  Very certain of my 
answer (Skip to 7.24) 
7.24 
2  Somewhat certain (Skip 
to 7.24) 
7.24 
3  Not certain; unsure (Skip 
to 7.24) 
7.24 
-95  Others, Please Specify  
(Skip to 7.24) 
7.24 
-98  Don’t know/ Not sure 7.24 
7.22 
 
How certain are you of your answer? 
 
-99  No response 7.24 
 
# Vaccines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cost 150 300 450 600 750 900 1050 1200 1350 1500 
 
1  Very confident of 
my answer 
 
2  Somewhat 
Confident 
 
3  Not Confident; 
unsure 
 
7.23 
 
[Enumerator: multiply the number of household 
members respondent said they would purchase 
by the price of the vaccine to obtain the total 
amount].  You’ve said that you would buy 
vaccines for a total of ______ household 
members including yourself at this price.  This 
would amount to a total cost to you of 
__________. How confident are you that you 
would be able to afford this amount of money? 
-98  Don’t know/ Not 
sure 
 
 
 
7.24 [Enumerator: Check mark in table 5] For the same vaccine i.e., vaccine efficacy [50%/95%] 
and duration of 10 years, and a price of price [Rs. 10/25/50/150/500] which household 
members do you think your husband/ wife would buy the vaccines for? 
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7.25 Please give consent letter 2 to respondent 
  
[Enumerator: Now read the consent form for the respondent. Make sure that he understands what is in 
the consent letter]. 
 
---Consent Letter before Joint Interview--- 
 
Vimalanand S. Prabhu 
Graduate Student 
Department of Public Policy 
The University of NC at Chapel Hill 
CB#3435, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. 
E-mail: prabhu@unc.edu 
 
Date: October 26, 2005 
 
Consent form for Phase 2 of Malaria Socio-Economic Study 
 
We have just finished phase 1 of the interview. We thank you for answering our questions. 
We now plan to begin phase two of the interview. Phase 2 will take 15 more minutes. 
 
Discussion with your spouse: Just to remind you, we are not going to reveal what you told us 
before to your spouse or any other person, but we will ask you some of the same questions about your 
willingness to pay that we asked you before. You have to answer these questions jointly. Both of you 
will be interviewed together by another person. Sometimes people want to revise their answers after 
their initial response and sometimes they don’t. There is no right or wrong way to do this. We just 
want you to discuss with your spouse as if we had not asked this question to you before and if you 
were presented with a household demand question for malaria vaccines.  
 
Your Rights:  
z You decide on your own whether or not you want to be in this study.  
z You will not be treated any differently if you decide not to be in the study.  
z If you decide to be in this part of the study, you will have the right to stop being in the study at any 
time, and to not answer specific questions.  
 
Compensation 
z There is no extra compensation for this portion of the study.  
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1   Yes   7.26 Respondent- wife has 
listened to the consent 
form and given oral 
consent 
2  No (Terminate interview, Go to 1.12) 1.12 
 
1   Yes   7.27   Respondent- Husband 
has listened to the consent 
form and given oral 
consent 
2  No (Terminate interview, Go to 1.12) 1.12 
 
After getting consent, send respondent for joint interview. There another enumerator will 
conduct the joint interview (Section 11).  
 
Section 7 Continued 
 
[Enumerator: Make sure that joint interview is over] 
 
7.28 If there is only one vaccine available for free, whom would you vaccinate? (Mark preference 
order against selected member in table 5). If there are only two vaccines available for free, 
whom would you vaccinate? (Mark preference order against selected member in table 5) 
If there are only three vaccines available for free, whom would you vaccinate? (Mark 
preference order against selected member in table 5) If there are only four vaccines available 
for free, whom would you vaccinate? (Mark preference order against selected member in table 
5). 
 
1   Savings of self    
2  Household Member (go to table 5) 5 
7.29 Who in your opinion is most 
likely to take care of you in 
your old age? [Enumerator: 
record only the most 
important person] 
3  Others, Please Specify___________   
 
 
 
Gender Preference (Ask this section to wives only) 
 
1  No education  
2  Grade 1 to 5  
3  Grade 6 to 9  
4  Grade 10 to 12  
5  Graduate and above  
7.30 In your opinion, up to which 
grade should girls and boys be 
educated? 
6  Until the son wishes to study  
 
1  No education  
2  Grade 1 to 5  
3  Grade 6 to 9  
4  Grade 10 to 12  
5  Graduate and above  
7.31 In your opinion, up to which 
grade should girls and boys be 
educated? 
 
6  Until the son wishes to study  
 
1  Yes   
2   No   
7.32 Have you started saving for 
the education of your son (if 
couple has a son)? 3  Don’t know/Not sure    
 
1  Yes   
2   No   
7.33 Have you started saving for 
the education of your daughter 
(if couple has a daughter)? 3  Don’t know/Not sure    
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Section 8: Women’s autonomy/ preferred gender (To be asked to women only). 
 
Self 
 
Husban
d 
With 
husban
d 
In-
laws 
 
With 
In-
laws 
Others  Who makes the following 
decisions in your household for the 
following activities? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
8.1 What items to cook         
8.2 Obtaining health care for yourself       
8.3 Purchasing jewelry         
8.4 Purchasing major household item 
like fridge, TV   
      
8.5 Your going and staying with 
parents and siblings   
      
8.6 Vaccinating self         
8.7 Vaccinating children       
 
1  Yes    
2   No    
8.8 Is the practice of “Dowry” 
common in your caste?   
-98  Don’t know/Not sure    
 
1  Arranged by Parents  
2  Love Marriage  
3  Arranged & love marriage   
8.9 What was the type of your 
marriage? 
-95  Others, Please Specify___________   
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Section 9: Socio-economic information 
 
1  Job (Go to 9.3) 9.3 
2  Daily work (Go to 9.2) 9.2 
3  Business (Go to 9.15) 9.15 
-95  Other  (Go to 9.2) 9.2 
9.1 What is your primary 
occupation? 
 
4  No  occupation (Go to 9.21) 9.21 
 
-85  Rs. ___________ per day  
-98  Don’t know/Not sure    
9.2 If laborer, how much is your daily 
wage rate? 
-99   No response  
 
-85  ___________ hours  
-98  Don’t know/Not sure    
9.3 
 
 
How many hours a week did you 
work in your primary occupation? 
-99   No response  
 
-85  ___________ (Go to 9.9)  9.9 
-98  Don’t know/Not sure    
9.4 On the average, what was your 
monthly wage/ salary last year, 
excluding bonuses? 
 
-99   No response  
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.6) 9.6 
2   No  (Go to 9.8) 9.8 
-98   Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 9.8)  9.8 
9.5 
 
Would it amount to Rs. 3000 or 
more? 
 
-99   No response (Go to 9.8)  9.8 
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.9) 9.9 
2   No  (Go to 9.7) 9.7 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 9.7)  9.7 
9.6 Would it amount to Rs. 6000 or 
more? 
-99   No response (Go to 9.7)  9.7 
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.9)  9.9 
2   No  (Go to 9.9)  9.9 
-98   Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 9.9)  9.9 
9.7  
Would it amount to Rs. 4500 or 
more? 
-99   No response (Go to 9.9)  9.9 
 
1  Yes    
2   No    
-98  Don’t know/Not sure    
9.8  
Would it amount to Rs. 1500 or 
more? 
-99   No response  
 
1  Yes (Go to 9.10)  9.10 
2   No  (Go to 9.15)  9.15 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 
9.15)   
9.15 
9.9 Did you receive a bonus last year? 
-99  No response (Go to 9.15)  9.15 
 
  Rs. _________ (Go to 9.15)  9.15 
-98  Don’t know/Not sure    
9.10 What was the total value of 
bonuses for the entire year? 
-99   No response  
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1  Yes  (9.12)  9.12 
2   No  (9.14)  9.14 
-98   Don't Know/ Not Sure  (Go to 
9.14)  
9.14 
9.11 Would it amount to Rs. 3000 or 
more? 
 
-99   No response (Go to 9.14)  9.14 
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.15)  9.15 
2   No  (Go to 9.13)  9.13 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 
9.13)  
9.13 
9.12 Would it amount to Rs. 6000 or 
more? 
-99  No response (Go to 9.13)  9.13 
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.15)  9.15 
2   No  (Go to 9.15)  9.15 
-98   Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 
9.15)  
9.15 
9.13 Would it amount to Rs. 4500 or 
more? 
 
-99  No response (Go to 9.15)  9.15 
 
 
1  Yes    
2   No    
-98  Don’t know/Not sure    
9.14 Would it amount to Rs. 1500 or 
more? 
 
-99   No response  
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.16)  9.16 
2   No  (Go to 9.21)  9.21 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 
9.21)  
9.21 
9.15 Did you operate a small handicraft 
or small commercial business last 
year  
 
-99   No response (Go to 9.21)  9.21 
 
9.16-9.20 Small Business 
 
9.16 9.17 9.18 9.19 9.20 
Average 
monthly 
Revenue  Rs. 
Average monthly 
expenses Rs. 
Overall 
profit/loss  
-98 = don't 
know/ not 
sure 
Whose income 
1= husband's income 
2 = wife's income 
3 = shared 
# 
Business type 
Rs. -98 Rs. -98 Rs. -98 1= 2= 3= 
1   -98  -98  -98 1 2 3 
2   -98  -98  -98 1 2 3 
3   -98  -98  -98 1 2 3 
4   -98  -98  -98 1 2 3 
 
1  Job (Go to 9.23)  9.23 
2  Daily Work (Go to 9.22)  9.22 
-95  Other  (Go to 9.22)  9.22 
9.21  Do you work part-time in addition 
to the above mentioned work? 
4  No additional job (Go to 9.29)  9.29 
 
  Rs.___________ /day  
-98   Don't Know/ Not Sure  
9.22 If laborer, how much is your daily 
wage rate? 
-99     
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  ___________ hours  
-98   Don't Know/ Not Sure  
9.23 How many hours a week did you 
work in your primary occupation? 
-99     
 
  Rs. ___________( Go to 9.29)  9.29 
-98   Don't Know/ Not Sure  
9.24 On the average, what was your 
monthly wage/ salary last year, 
excluding bonuses? 
 
-99     
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.26)  9.26 
2   No  (Go to 9.28)  9.28 
-98   Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 
9.28)  
9.28 
9.25 Would it amount to Rs. 3000 or 
more? 
 
-99   No response (Go to 9.28)  9.28 
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.29)  9.29 
2   No  (Go to 9.27)  9.27 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 
9.27)  
9.27 
9.26 Would it amount to Rs. 6000 or 
more? 
 
-99   No response (Go to 9.27)  9.27 
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.29)  9.29 
2   No  (Go to 9.29)  9.29 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 
9.29)  
9.29 
9.27 Would it amount to Rs. 4500 or 
more? 
-99  No response (Go to 9.29)  9.29 
 
1  Yes    
2  No    
-98  Don’t know/Not sure    
9.28 Would it amount to Rs. 1500 or 
more? 
-99  No response  
Enumerator, ask about each income source and record the answers in the table below:       
 
9.29 9.30 9.31 
Did you receive 
income from this 
source during the 
past 12 months? 1 
= yes, 2 = no 
How much money 
did you receive? 
Who keeps the 
earned income 
1= husband's income 
2 = wife's income 
3 = shared  
Income source 
 
1=  2=. Rs.  DKNS 1= 2= 3= 
1) Rental of household assets 1 2  -98 1 2 3 
2) Rental of Auto rickshaw 
vehicles 
1 2  -98 1 2 3 
3) Retirement pensions 1 2  -98 1 2 3 
4) Money from children 1 2  -98 1 2 3 
5) Money from parents 1 2  -98 1 2 3 
6) Money from friends or relatives 1 2  -98 1 2 3 
7) Do you give money to your 
parents or friends? 
1 2  -98 1 2 3 
8) Interest income 1 2  -98 1 2 3 
9) LIC policy 1 2  -98 1 2 3 
10) Cash income from other 
sources 
1 2  -98 1 2 3 
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1  Yes  (Go to 9.33)  9.33 
2   No  (Go to 9.38)  9.38 
-98  Don't Know/ Not Sure (Go to 9. 38)  9.38 
9.32 Do your parents own any land/ 
property? 
-99   No response (Go to 9. 38 )  9.38 
 
9.33 9.34 9.35 9.36 9.37 
Type of land 
1 = Non 
Agricultural 
2 = 
agricultural 
Grow 
crops 
1= Yes 
2 = No 
Where is it 
located 
1 = Urban 
2 = Rural 
Area in acres 
 
Value of land (Rs.) 
 
 
1 =  2 =  1=   2 =  1 =  2 =  Acre Guntha 
(1/40 
acres) 
-98 Rs. -98 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2   -98  -98 
2 1 2 1 2 1 2   -98  -98 
3 1 2 1 2 1 2   -98  -98 
 
1   Mumbai/ Navi Mumbai/ Thane   
2  In other cities   
-98  In villages   
9.38 Where do your parents live? 
 
-99  Parents not alive   
 
1  Yes  (Go to 9.40)  9.40 
2   No  (Go to 9.45)  9.45 
-98   Don’t Know/ Not Sure (Go to 9.45)  9.45 
9.39 Do you own any land/ property? 
-99   No response (Go to 9.45)  9.45 
 
9.40 9.41 9.42 9.43 9.44 
Type of land 
1 = Non 
Agricultural 
2 = 
agricultural 
Grow crops 
1= Yes 
2 = No 
Where is it 
located 
1 = Urban 
2 = Rural 
Area in acres 
 
Value of land 
(Rs.) 
 
 
1 =  2 =  1=   2 =  1 =  2 =  Acre Guntha -98 Rs. -98 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2   -98  -98 
2 1 2 1 2 1 2   -98  -98 
3 1 2 1 2 1 2   -98  -98 
 
9.45 Please note the Monthly Income of other household members in table 5.  
 
1  I look after household money except my partner’s 
personal spending money. 
 
2  My partner looks after household money except 
my personal spending money. 
 
3  My partner is given a housekeeping allowance. I 
look after the rest of the money. 
 
4  I am given a housekeeping allowance. My partner 
looks after the rest of the money. 
 
5  We manage and share our finances jointly.  
6  We keep our finances completely separate.  
9.48 What is the most 
accurate description 
of financial 
arrangements in your 
household? 
[Enumerator: Read 
all the answers].   
 
-95  Other arrangement, Please specify.  
 
  254
1  No education  
2  Grade 1 to 5  
3  Grade 6 to 9  
4  Grade 10 to 12  
9.40 Mother's education 
 
 
5  Graduate and above  
 
1   No education  
2  Grade 1 to 5  
3  Grade 6 to 9  
4  Grade 10 to 12  
9.50 Father's education 
 
 
5  Graduate and above  
 
1   Hindu    
2   Muslim  
3   Sikh    
4   Christian    
5   Buddhist    
6   Jain    
7   No Religion    
-95   Other  specify  
9.51 What is your religion? 
 
 
-99   No Response  
 
Game with payoffs. 
 
In this section you will be shown choices involving a series of cards as shown below. Each 
card indicates a game with a payoff. [Enumerator: show the two choice cards below]. Each choice card 
will have a good luck payout and a bad luck payout. The good luck and bad luck payouts will be 
decided by the toss of a coin. If you have heads, you will receive good luck payout shown in green and 
if it is tails, you will be entitled to bad luck payout shown in red. Each payout has a payment for you 
and your husband. You will receive your prize corresponding to that card that you chose and the flip of 
the coin. Your partner will also receive the prize corresponding to the same number. You will be paid 
immediately, whereas your spouse will be paid after the end of the survey. Similarly, if you spouse 
wins some money for you, you will be paid at the end of the survey. 
 
As it is about all other questions, your choices are confidential - we will not reveal them anyone, 
including your partner. Even when receiving the payment, your partner will not know what choices the 
game contained. The options you will face will be similar to the one shown here (Enumerator show L1 
and L2).    
 
Please select one of the cards 
 
1  Respondent did give the correct 
answer 
 
2  Respondent didn't give the 
correct answer 
 
9.52 What would you receive if the coin 
flipped to “head”? 
-98  Respondent did not know/not 
sure 
 
Ö If respondent gave incorrect answer, please correct it. 
 
1  Respondent did give the correct 
answer 
 
2  Respondent didn't give the 
correct answer 
 
9.53 What would your spouse  receive if 
the coin flipped to “tails”? 
 
-98  Respondent did not know/not 
sure 
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Ö If respondent gave incorrect answer, please correct it. 
 
1  Respondent did give the correct 
answer 
 
2  Respondent didn't give the 
correct answer 
 
9.54 What would you receive if the coin 
flipped to “tails”? 
 
-98  Respondent did not know/not 
sure 
 
Ö If respondent gave incorrect answer, please correct it. 
 
9.55 Start of the game 
 
We have shown cards like these to various people. Some people said, I want to play the game that can 
give my household the maximum money. Others have said that I want to play the game that can give 
me the maximum money. Remember, in a bad-luck payout, i.e., if you don’t get a “Heads” on the coin 
flip, neither you nor your husband will get anything. Some people said that they will share their 
income, others said that they would use it for themselves. There is no right or wrong answer. Please 
select one card from the three cards shown below. Please carefully think about different options and 
then decide what you want to select. Remember that the choice will be played for real. Now choose 
one card from the following three options.  
 
(Trial one) 
 Good Luck Payout Bad Luck Payout 
 
Outcome Heads Tails 
You Win Rs. 8 Rs. 0 
Your Spouse Wins Rs. 2 Rs. 0 
 
 Good Luck Payout Bad Luck Payout 
 
Outcome Heads Tails 
You Win Rs. 6 Rs. 0 
Your Spouse Wins Rs. 5 Rs. 0 
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Enumerator: Please note the Reponses in table below 
  Heads  Tails 
X1 Card X1 (2.5 + 2.5 = 5.0) 1 2 
X2 Card X2 (3.0 + 1.5 = 4.5) 3 4 
9.56 Enumerator: Please note 
the selected card. 
X3 Card X3 (4.0 + 0.0 = 4.0) 5 6 
 
  Heads  Tails 
Y1 Card Y1 (10 + 10 = 20) 1 2 
Y2 Card Y2 (12 + 6 = 18) 3 4 
9.57 Enumerator: Please note 
the selected card. 
Y3 Card Y3 (16 + 00 = 16) 5 6 
 
  Heads  Tails 
Z1 Card Z1 (40 + 40 = 80) 1 2 
Z2 Card Z2 (50 + 25 = 75) 3 4 
9.58 Enumerator: Please note 
the selected card. 
Z3 Card Z3 (65 + 0.0 = 65) 5 6 
 
9.59 Total expenses for husband  -85       ______________ 
      ______________ 
      ______________ 
Rs. _________________ 
 
 
9.60 Total expenses for wife  -85       ______________ 
      ______________ 
      ______________ 
Rs. _________________ 
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10 Interviewer’s opinion   
 
10.1 Time Finish (record in 5.5)  __________________ 
 
1  Very reliable    
2  Reliable    
3    Fairly reliable    
4  Not reliable    
10.2 How reliable do you think 
is the information you got 
from the respondent? 
 
5   Very unreliable  
 
1  Did not understand    
2   Understood     
10.3  [Enumerator: This 
question is not to be asked, 
just record your 
comments]Do you think 
the respondent understood 
about the vaccine efficacy 
scenario? 
 
-98  Don’t know/not sure    
 
10.4  Other suggestions/ comments    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
12 End of Questionnaire   
 
This is the end of the interview.  Thank you very much for your participation. We’d like to stress that it is necessary for 
you to protect yourself from contracting Malaria.  The objective of this survey is to learn about your willingness to pay 
for Malaria vaccines either for yourself or your household members.  We need to ask different households their 
willingness to purchase at different prices.  Thus, don’t worry if you hear that other people in your community have 
been asked about purchasing the vaccines at different prices. However, until today, a commercially available vaccine 
does not exist for Malaria. It may take another 10-20 years to develop a good commercially available malaria vaccine. 
 
12.1  How long do you think it may take to develop a good commercially available malaria vaccine? 
 1 10-20 years [Enumerator read the following: “Thank you for your response. As you have noted, 
the Malaria vaccine does not exist]. 
 2 No [Enumerator: Until today, a commercially available reliable Malaria vaccine does not exist. 
This survey was conducted to estimate the WTP for a hypothetical Malaria vaccine. Since there 
is no such vaccine, we urge you to protect yourself from contracting Malaria. It may take 10-20 
years to develop a good Malaria vaccine 
 
Repeat 12.1 until the respondent replies “Yes”. 
 
[Enumerator: Return this filled form to the Manager. You will not be able to see this form again, except if 
you have made some errors, where the form may be used to explain to you the error. Do not copy or make 
any notes from this survey instrument]. 
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Section 11: Joint responses 
 
11.1 Questionnaire Serial Number  
11.2 Enumerator Code  
11.3 Survey ID    95-0150 
 
Table 11: Husband and Wife Joint Interview Table 
 
11.8 4.2 4.3 
Sex 
4.4 
1 2 
Age  
1=Male  
2=Fema
le 
Husband is 
Willing to Pay 
for 
1=yes  
2= no 
Wife is Willing 
to Pay for 
1= Yes 
2= No 
M 
E 
M 
B 
E 
R  
# 
Member 
Y M M F 
Relation 
to 
Respon
dent 
Y N Y N 
1    ? 2 1 1 2 1 2 
2    1 ? 7 1 2 1 2 
3    1 2  1 2 1 2 
4    1 2  1 2 1 2 
5    1 2  1 2 1 2 
6    1 2  1 2 1 2 
7    1 2  1 2 1 2 
8    1 2  1 2 1 2 
9    1 2  1 2 1 2 
10    1 2  1 2 1 2 
11    1 2  1 2 1 2 
12    1 2  1 2 1 2 
13    1 2  1 2 1 2 
14    1 2  1 2 1 2 
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11.4                I would like to remind you briefly about the Malaria vaccine. As you may remember, the 
Malaria vaccine was [50% effective /95% effective] and had a duration of 10 years. A single dose 
of this vaccine cost [Rs. 10/25/50/150/500]. 
 
 I will ask you some of the same questions that I asked before. In the previous section, 
you had to take the decision individually. But sometimes, people think differently when they are 
together? We asked this question to many couples. Some had agreed on the individual responses. 
Others had not.  
 
 They thought about the vaccine, the risk of the disease, and whether the protection is 
worth to them and their household members. Sometimes they thought, “I would like my family to 
have as much protection from this disease as possible”. However, they may forget about other 
things they need to spend their money on. Please try to think carefully about what you would 
actually do if you had to spend your own money. There are no right or wrong answers. We 
really want to know what you would do if you were to purchase this vaccine jointly in a real life 
situation. 
 
 When you give your answer about whether you would or would not buy the vaccine, 
please keep in mind the following: yours and your family’s income and economic status compared 
with the price of the vaccine, and your risk of getting Malaria. Apart from the vaccine, remember 
that Malaria can be cured but we still have other ways to reduce the risk of Malaria such using 
insecticide treated nets and indoor residual spraying.  
 
 As you may be aware, towards the end of this survey you will get an opportunity to play 
a game where you can win some money. Please remember that your responses to the following 
questions have no bearing on the amount of money that you can win. You can win the maximum 
amount irrespective of whether you are willing to pay or not pay for the vaccine. There are no 
right or wrong answers. We only want to see what you would do if had to spend your own money 
on this vaccine. Before answering the question, please discuss with your spouse. If you are 
changing your decision, please think and discuss why you are changing your decision. I will be 
back after 2 minutes to ask you about your joint decisions. 
 
Also, remember that the benefit of the vaccine in preventing Malaria is [50% effective for 10 
years / 95% effective for 10 years].  Again, children under 1 year and pregnant women cannot 
use the Malaria vaccine.  
 
11.5 Suppose that this Malaria vaccine costs [Rs. 10/25/50/150/500].for the single dose needed for one 
person.  Would you buy one or more of this vaccine for the members of your family? 
 (Spontaneous response; one response permitted 
 
1   Yes   11.6   Husband’s response 
2  No  
 
1   Yes   11.7  Wife’s response 
2  No   
 
11.8  For whom would you like to purchase the vaccine (Table 10) ?   
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1  Husband took the decision and 
wife agreed  
 
2  Wife took the decision and 
husband agreed 
 
11.9 How did the husband and wife take 
the decision? 
3  Husband and wife discussed 
among themselves and then 
took the decision 
 
 
House Characteristics 
 
1  11.13Own-husband (Go to 
11.13)   
11.13 
2  11.13Own-wife(Go to 11.13)   11.13 
3  11.13Own-joint(Go to 11.13)   11.13 
4  11.14 Rent  (Go to 11.14)   11.14 
5  11.15  11.15 
11.12 Who owns this house? 
-95  ______________11.15 11.15 
 
1  Rs. ___________ (Go to 
11.15)  
11.15 
-98  Don’t know/ not sure (Go to 
11.15) 
11.15 
11.13 What would someone expect to pay 
to purchase a house like yours? 
-99  No response (Go to 11.15) 11.15 
 
1  ___________   Rs/month    
-98  Don’t know/not sure    
11.14 What is your monthly rent?     
-99  No response    
 
1  ___________   Rs/month    
-98  Don’t know/not sure    
11.15 In the last month, what were you 
approximate household expenses. 
This includes food, health care, loan 
payments, etc.   
-99  No response    
 
1  Much better than most people    
2  Better than most people    
3  About average    
4  Below average    
5  Much worse than average    
11.16 How would you classify the 
economic status of your household 
relative to others in this 
neighborhood? (Enumerator:  read 
responses) 
 
 
 
-98  Don’t know/not sure   
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